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The California Supreme Court Survey
A Review of Decisions:
July-November 1980
The introduction of the California Supreme Court Survey in this issue of
the Pepperdine Law Review marks a new and continuing addition to the
review. It is hoped that each issue's discussion and analysis of preceden-
tial supreme court cases will provide a useful source of material for the le-
gal practioner. A survey of decisions will appear in issues one, two and
four of each volume.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
1. Voir Dire Examination: Hovey v. Superior Court of Ala-
meda County
The California Supreme Court in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda
County1 held that although a juror may be fair and impartial in determin-
ing the guilt of a defendant charged with a capital crime, that juror may
be removed for cause from serving at that phase if such juror is unequivo-
cally opposed to the death penalty at the separate trial on the penalty is-
sue.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Hovey, charged with murder and kidnap, brought a
pretrial motion to limit the exclusion for cause of jurors on the
ground that although they could impartially sit at the guilt phase
of a trial, they could not objectively sit at the penalty phase of a
bifurcated capital trial.2 The basis of the motion was that such
exclusionary practices denied him due process of law under the
state and federal constitutions, and also denied him the right to
an impartial jury,3 as it resulted in an unrepresentative jury on
1. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 130, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980) (opinion by Bird, C.J.,
Mosk, Newman, J.J. concurring; Richardson, Clark and Manuel, J.J. concurring and
dissenting). Justice Richardson concurred in the portion of the judgment denying
petitioner's motion to limit exclusion of jurors for cause but dissented in the por-
tion granting petitioner's request to provide individualized voir dire examinations.
Justices Clark and Manuel concurred in Justice Richardson's opinion.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1980):
A case in which the death penalty may be imposed pursuant to this
chapter shall be tried in separate phases as follows:
(a) The question of the defendant's guilt shall be first determined. If
the trial of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at
the same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged as
enumerated in Section 190.2 except for a special circumstance charged
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 where it is
alleged that the defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the
offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(b) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one of
the special circumstances is charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 190.2 which charges that the defendant had been con-
victed in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder in the first or second
degree, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the question of
the truth of such special circumstance.
(c) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one or
more special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 has been
charged and found to be true, his sanity on any plea of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity under Section 1026 shall be determined as provided in Sec-
tion 190.4. If he is found to be sane, there shall thereupon be further
proceedings on the question of the penalty to be imposed. Such proceed-
ings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 190.3
and 190.4.
3. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV and XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 7,15, and 16.
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the issue of guilt.4
The evidence in support of petitioner's contention was devel-
oped at a separate hearing which covered seventeen court days.
Over 1,000 pages of exhibits, consisting mostly of sociological
studies, were admitted into evidence.
While the trial court denied the request to limit juror exclusion
under section 1074 of the California Penal Code,5 the petitioner in-
voked the original jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court
filing for a writ of mandate because of the importance of the ques-
tions presented.
As with the other instances 6 in which such a proposition has
been asserted, the court ultimately found that the petitioner had
not met his burden of proof 7 of establishing that jurors qualified
to sit in capital cases in California were more likely to convict
than those qualified to sit in noncapital cases.8 The petitioner
presented numerous empirical studies supporting his contention
that a jury qualified to sit in a capital case under the controlling
standards announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois9 is less than neu-
4. This same contention was made in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
516-18 (1967), and in People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 433, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1980).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West 1970). This statute reads in relevant part:
A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following
causes, and for no other: . .. 8. If the offense charged be punishable by
death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude
his finding the defendant guilty: in which case he must neither be permit-
ted nor compelled to serve as a juror.
6. See note 4 supra.
7. 28 Cal. 3d at 17 n.37, 66 P.2d at 1308 n.37, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.37. Hovey
found that the court in Witherspoon placed the burden of proof on the defendant
as to the nonneutrality of a California jury in a capital case, and that burden is to
establish a "substantial doubt" that such jury is neutral in regard to determining
the issue of guilt or innocence. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1967).
The fact that the court found the studies presented by the petitioner in this case
insufficient to establish the proposition that jurors in favor of the death penalty
favor the prosecution indicates that the burden of proof is on the petitioner.
8. 28 Cal. 3d at 67, 66 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 172. The majority states
that even if the petitioner had proven that California juries in capital cases tend to
convict more than if such juries included persons unequivocally opposed to the
death penalty at the guilt phase, such evidence would not prove that capital juries
are more likely to convict than juries in noncapital cases. This, the court asserts,
is the crux of the matter. Juries in noncapital cases would include persons eligible
to serve in capital cases as well as those unequivocally opposed to the death pen-
alty and those who would vote for death in any capital case. Only a difference in
conviction proneness between these two juries would warrant a finding that capi-
tal juries were partial.
9. 391 U.S. 510 (1967). In Witherspoon, an accused had been convicted of
tral with respect to the determination of guilt. The studies, how-
ever, were not applicable to California juries who were qualified
regarding the death penalty issue, because the juries were com-
posed of different groups.10
The high court did find that petitioner's second major conten-
tion had merit and held that the portion of the voir dire examina-
tion of potential jurors dealing with death qualification should,
hereafter, be conducted individually and in sequestration.
II. HISTORICAL ANAiSIS
Although the literal wording of California Penal Code's section
1074, subdivision 8, authorizes removal of a juror for cause only
where his or her opposition to capital punishment would '"pre-
clude his finding the defendant guilty,"" it was judicially con-
strued in People v. Riser12 to allow the exclusion for cause of
jurors whose views on the death penalty would affect the penalty
determination.
While Riser was decided before the legislature provided for the
bifurcation of trials on the issues of guilt and penalty in capital
cases, 13 the Riser court's interpretation of the code section was af-
murder and given the death sentence. The statutes in effect at that time allowed
the prosecution to excuse for cause any prospective jurors who had "conscientious
scruples against capital punishment, or ... [was) opposed to the same." The
Supreme Court reversed Witherspoon's sentence but upheld the murder convic-
tion. The high court found that it was obvious that if a state excuses all persons
from a jury deciding one's penalty who have any doubts about the wisdom of the
death sentence, the jury is unnaturally willing to render a sentence of death.
10. 28 Cal. 3d at 63, 616 P.2d at 1343, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170. Of the spectrum of
beliefs in regard to the death penalty, there are five groups represented: those
that would automatically vote for the death penalty in any capital case, those that
favor the death penalty but would not vote to impose it in every capital case,
those that are indifferent to it, those that oppose it, but would not automatically
vote against it in every case, and those that are unequivocally opposed to it and
would never consider voting for its imposition under any circumstances. Id. at 20,
616 P.2d at 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
While a Witherspoon qualified capital jury theoretically consists of persons who
automatically approve of the death penalty, the group which favors the death pen-
alty, the group which is indifferent, and the group which opposes the death pen-
alty, California excludes from juries trying capital cases the group which
automatically supports the death penalty. This is the essential difference upon
which the case turns. Id. at 63-64, 616 P.2d at 1343-44, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
11. See note 5 infra and accompanying text.
12. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 575-76, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956). While a literal reading of section
1074, subdivision 8 of the California Penal Code does not compel the exclusion of
jurors incapable of exercising the discretion of whether to impose a death or life
imprisonment sentence, it would be doing violence to the purpose of section 190 of
the Penal Code to construe section 1074, subdivision 8 to allow those jurors to
serve. The result would be a de facto abolition of capital punishment, which is not
proper for the court to achieve through construction of an ambiguous statute.
13. See note 2 infra.
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firmed by subsequent decisions.14 These subsequent decisions in-
terpreting section 1074 of the Penal Code noted the legislature's
preference for one jury to determine both the issue of guilt and
penalty.'5 These decisions promoted judicial economy and effi-
ciency. Judicial economy was served by eliminating the need to
qualify a second jury. Efficiency was promoted by avoiding the
need to repeat the presentation of the evidence considered in the
guilt phase of the trial.16 Thus, it was common practice to exclude
prospective jurors from serving at either phase of a trial involving
a capital crime if their opposition to the death penalty was so
strong as to require their exclusion under the standards of Wither-
spoon.17 A literal reading of section 1074, subdivision 8, of the Pe-
nal Code, appears to grant the petitioner the relief requested.
This is due to the language which indicates that only those per-
sons whose beliefs regarding the death penalty would preclude
them from making an impartial decision, would be excluded from
the jury.
Prior to the Witherspoon decision, jurors were excluded for
cause under Penal Code section 1074 if they voiced any general
objections or conscientious scruples against capital punishment.18
14. People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966). As
the legislature, in providing for a separate penalty trial in murder cases, expressed
its preference for one jury to act throughout the entire case, it was not improper
for the court to excuse jurors for cause who stated that they would have been able
to fairly and objectively adjudicate the issue of guilt even though they were con-
scientiously opposed to capital punishment. There is no merit to the assertion
that such jurors should serve at the guilt phase of the trial and then the court
should impanel a new jury, if necessary, for the determination of the penalty.
Since the evidence introduced at the guilt trial is also relevant to the penalty de-
termination, having the same jury serve throughout both phases avoids repetition
of evidence and is not an arbitrary requirement. People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779,
409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966), found that the enactment of section 190.1 of
the California Penal Code was not to be construed as evidence of the legislative
intent to overrule Riser. Rather, a closer examination of that section of the code
discloses the legislative directive that whenever possible the same jury is to serve
at both phases of a capital trial. This serves the purposes of continuity and econ-
omy of effort. Such practice neither denies a defendant due process of law nor fa-
vors the prosecution over the defense.
15. See note 2 infra. The relevant sentence, as referred to in People v. Smith,
63 Cal. 2d 779, 789, 409 P.2d 222, 229, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (1966), is that "If the de-
fendant was convicted by a jury, the trier of fact shall be the jury unless, for good
cause shown, the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be
drawn to determine the issue of penalty."
16. See note 14 infra.
17. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
18. 28 Cal. 3d at 9, n.10 & 11, 616 P.2d at 1303, n.10 & 11, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 130, n.10
& 11. The court admits that it has not always been consistent as to what is suffi-
The standards were not clear. The United States Supreme Court
conclusively resolved the conflict in Witherspoon by holding that
the only jurors who could be constitutionally excused for cause
were:
[Tjhose who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or
(2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from
making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.19
Subsequent cases in California have followed the Supreme
Court's decision.20 These decisions have, emphasized that general
opposition to the death penalty is not sufficient. To properly ex-
clude a prospective juror for cause under Witherspoon standards,
there must be some clear indication that the juror would be un-
able to follow his oath and put his personal feelings aside.
Although the defendant in Witherspoon asserted that an unrep-
resentative jury on the issues of guilt and penalty would result
from excluding jurors for cause because of their unequivocal op-
position to the death penalty, the Supreme Court found the em-
pirical studies offered in support of this contention
unpersuasive. 2 1 However, the Court specifically left the issue
open and noted that an accused "in some future case might still
attempt to establish that [a] jury [which had been death-qualified
cient to exclude one because of his or her opposition to the death penalty before
Witherspoon. While "mere doubts with respect to the death penalty" were not
sufficient where a juror believed he or she could consider it in the proper case,
other standards enunciated indicated a more stringent test. Id.
19. 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
20. People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1980)
stated:
We are compelled by Witherspoon and its progeny to recognize certain
principles said to flow therefrom. Thus, expression of scruples against the
death penalty or abhorrence or distaste for sitting on a jury that is trying a
capital case is not sufficient; the juror must indicate that his beliefs or
feelings will automatically, whatever the circumstances, prevent him from
voting for the death penalty or will affect his determination of the defend-
ant's guilt.
Id. at 841-42, 608 P.2d at 703, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 615. People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480,
450 P.2d 533, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969). In applying the Witherspoon principle that a
death sentence can not be carried out if the jury was chosen by excluding venire-
men who voiced merely general objections to the idea of capital punishment, the
court must ascertain whether a prospective juror who has excused for cause made
it unmistakably clear that he would automatically vote against imposition of the
death penalty regardless of the evidence adduced at trial. The court must assess
the responses of the veniremen in the full context of that portion of the court and
counsel's voir dire examination of the entire panel conducted during the time the
veniremen were present in the court room. In In re Mathis, 70 Cal. 2d 467, 450 P.2d
290, 74 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969), the court held that where veniremen who voiced only
general objections to the death penalty were excused for cause without being
granted the opportunity to explain their individual attitudes, a sentence of death
must be reversed.
21. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 517-18.
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in compliance with the newly announced Witherspoon standards]
was less than neutral with respect to guilt."22
The California Supreme Court was confronted with the same
contention as that advanced in Hovey only a few months earlier.
In People v. Velasquez,23 decided in February, 1980,24 a defendait
sentenced to death asserted that the rule in Witherspoon resulted
in a jury which is unrepresentative at the guilt phase of the trial
and would thus be more likely to convict than the initial jury.25
The court, however, failed to reach the merits of that contention
because it found the defendant lacked standing. The court as-
serted that "[tihe important issue he raises concerning the fair-
ness of a death qualified jury can be properly reached on direct
appeal only in a case in which the Witherspoon test itself has ac-
tually excluded for cause a juror able to render a fair and impar-
tial verdict at the guilt phase. '26 Thus, when a proper defendant
presented the issue of the neutrality of a capital jury qualified un-
der Witherspoon standards, the time was ripe for an extended
consideration of the issue.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
Two major challenges to the system of jury selection and death
qualification were raised by the petitioner. The first challenge
suggests that the current class of jurors who would be excluded
under Witherspoon be limited to permit a certain subcategory to
serve during the guilt phase of a capital trial. These jurors would
be fair and impartial in determining the issue of guilt. However,
their opposition to capital punishment would make them unable
to serve at the penalty phase.27 This proposition is based on two
22. Id. at 520 n.18.
23. 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1980). The court did not
reach the merits of the issue because it found that none of the prospective jurors
fell within the class of persons who, although qualified to serve in a capital jury in
other respects, could properly be excused under Witherspoon. Id. at 433, 606 P.2d
at 345, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
24. Velasquez was decided in February of 1980 while Hovey came down in Au-
gust of that same year.
25. People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d at 433, 606 P.2d at 345, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
26. Id.
27. 28 Cal. 3d at 17 n.36, 616 P.2d at 1308 n.36, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.36. The
group that petitioner seeks to have included at the penalty phase are called the
"automatic life imprisonment" group whose members consist of those persons
who would never vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts of the
case were. The members are referred to in Hovey as "guilt phase includables."
constitutional theories. The first is based on the theory promoted
in Witherspoon, where the petitioner asserted that he could estab-
lish that such juries are less than neutral in respect to determina-
tion of the issue of guilt.28 The other theory is based on the
"purpose and functioning" analysis of Ballew v. Georgia,29 which
held that the function of a criminal jury was a safeguard for the
defendant against an abusive prosecutor.
The second major challenge to the system of jury selection in
capital cases is that the currently employed voir dire methods
tend to adversely affect jurors from the defendant's perspective.
The petitioner contends that the procedure used for qualification
on the death penalty issue works in such a fashion as to ulti-
mately bias the selected jurors in favor of the prosecution. Con-
sequently, whoever is selected to sit as a juror is likely to be less
than neutral in regard to determining the issues of guilt and the
penalty to be imposed.30
In consideration of the challenges presented, the court found
that the concept of a neutral jury was essential to the resolution
of the matter. In Witherspoon, the concern was with achieving
neutrality through diversity in the jury pool. "A neutral jury is
one drawn from a pool which reasonably mirrors the diversity of
experiences and relevant viewpoints of those persons in the com-
munity who can fairly and impartially try the case."31 This notion
of a neutral jury is a long standing constitutional doctrine.32 This
concept is relevant to the determination of guilt and penalty.
28. 28 Cal. 3d at 17 n.37, 616 P.2d at 1308 n.37, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.37.
"[Pletitioner's burden of proof in the present proceeding is to establish a 'sub-
stantial doubt' as to whether a 'California death-qualified' jury is neutral with re-
spect to guilt." Id.
29. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The court in Ballew held that a criminal conviction
rendered by a jury composed of only five persons violated the sixth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution. Under the "purpose and function-
ing" analysis used by the court, the court inquires of the purpose and functioning
of a jury in a criminal trial and determines whether the challenged procedure im-
paired it to any significant degree. Since the Supreme Court determined that the
purpose of a jury in criminal trials was to provide a safeguard between an over
enthusiastic or dishonest prosecutor and the accused, it found that the practice of
using only five people in a jury undermined that purpose. Relying on empirical
studies, the Court found a jury so composed was "less likely to foster effective
group deliberation," and was prone to "inaccurate factfinding and incorrect appli-
cation of the common sense of the community to the facts." Id. at 232.
30. 28 Cal. 3d at 18, 616 P.2d at 1308, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
31. Id. at 19-20, 616 P.2d at 1310, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (footnote omitted).
32. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (held as unconstitutional
a state's law excluding blacks from jury service where a black man was convicted
by such a jury); Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (held that the systematic
exclusion of women from the jury pool was a violation of the sixth and fourteenth
amendment requirement that a jury represent a fair cross section of the commu-
nity).
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While Witherspoon established that a jury comprised only of per-
sons who are either indifferent toward the death penalty, favored
it, or would automatically vote for it in any capital case, was less
than neutral in regard to setting a penalty, the instant petitioner
asserted the same with respect to the issue of guilt. However, in
petitioner's view, and as reflected in the numerous studies sub-
mitted in support of his contention,33 the jurors selected to serve
on capital cases consisted of persons in the pre-Witherspoon cate-
gories including those who are opposed to the death penalty but
who would not automatically vote against it in any situation. 34
California jurors who are qualified as to the death penalty issue,
however, differ from those in Witherspoon. "The pool of jurors el-
igible to serve in a capital trial in California consists of those per-
sons eligible to serve in a noncapital case whose attitudes toward
capital punishment would place them in either the 'favor death
penalty', 'indifferent', or 'oppose death penalty' group."35 The
problem with the petitioner's studies is that none focused on a
jury pool comprised of these groups but rather on the inadequacy
of a pool of Witherspoon qualified jurors. That group, however,
contains the automatic death penalty group and, thus, the peti-
tioner failed to demonstrate any deficiencies in the California ju-
ries used in cases involving capital crimes. 3 6
More fundamentally, however, is even if the studies indicated
capital juries in California tended to return more convictions than
they would if they included the subcategory which the petitioner
seeks to have represented at the guilt phase, "it does not neces-
sarily follow that the former would also tend to be more convic-
tion-prone than are jurors in noncapital case[s]. It is this latter
showing which is the crux of the Witherspoon issue."37
33. 28 Cal. 3d at 26-60, 616 P.2d at 1314-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 141-68.
Approximately twenty-four studies, surveys, and experiments were intro-
duced at the evidentiary hearing and were the subject of expert testimony
at trial. The California Supreme Court divided them into four categories
for analysis purposes: the studies relating to conviction proneness and ju-
ror voting tendency, studies on juror attitudes, studies on demographic
characteristics, and the research on juror evaluation of evidence.
34. See note 10 infra.
35. 28 Cal. 3d at 63, 616 P.2d at 1343, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
36. Id. at 63-64, 616 P.2d at 1343-44, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
37. Id. at 67 n.115, 616 P.2d at 1346 n.115, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173 n.115.
The essential showing is that a jury qualified to serve in a capital case is
more likely to convict than a noncapital jury, which includes persons hold-
ing the entire spectrum of beliefs as to the death penalty.
Petitioner Hovey sought to overcome the imperfections in the
studies by asserting that the group of persons automatically ap-
proving the death penalty is relatively minute as compared to per-
sons who would automatically vote against its imposition.38 The
petitioner, however, presented no evidence supporting this con-
tention. The court was not persuaded by a recent United States
Supreme Court decision that took note of the relatively small size
of the group of persons who "believe literally in the Biblical ad-
monition 'an eye for an eye.''39 In that case, the State of Texas
sought to defend a law that allowed the exclusion of prospective
jurors on broader grounds than permitted by Witherspoon. The
Supreme Court rejected its argument that the statute was neutral
because it allowed a challenge for cause to jurors whose views in
favor of the death penalty would affect their determination of
facts as well as those whose opposition would do the same. The
high court responded that "it is undeniable, and the State does
not seriously dispute, that such jurors will be few indeed as com-
pared with those excluded because of scruples against capital
punishment."40
The California Supreme Court indicated that more information
was required before findings in respect to the nonneutrality of a
Witherspoon qualified jury could be extrapolated to a California
one. The impact and unity of such a group is also relevant, but
there was no evidence offered on this point.4 1
There is one major problem with the majority's differentiation
of California juries which are qualified by the exclusion of those
persons who would automatically vote for the death penalty in
any capital case. The petitioner's motion was brought, and the
court's analysis was focused, on section 1074 of the Penal Code
which specifically provides for the exclusion of prospective jurors
unequivocally opposed to the death penalty. The few cases cited
by the court for the proposition that California also excludes per-
38. Id. at 64-67, 616 P.2d at 1344-46, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 171-73.
39. Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2528 (1980). In this case a defendant con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death appealed the sentence and the proce-
dures employed to set a penalty. The United States Supreme Court found that
Witherspoon was applicable to the state's bifurcated procedure whereby the jury
merely answers statutorily prescribed questions which determine the penalty pro-
nounced by the judge. However, the Court also found that Witherspoon and the
Texas statute could not co-exist where a juror is excused for cause unless he can
state, under oath, that a mandatory death sentence will not affect his determina-
tion of the factual issues. The Court found that the exclusion was not permissible
where the statutory test employed excluded jurors who would say that they would
be "affected" by the possibility of the death penalty when they actually meant that
they would undertake deliberations with greater caution and seriousness.
40. Id.
41. 28 Cal. 3d at 66, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
[Vol. 8: 501, 19801 California Law Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sons biased in favor of the death penalty fall under section 1073,
which deals with challenges for cause on the grounds of implied
and actual bias.42 The one case where the California Supreme
Court dealt with this issue found:
[t] he entertaining of an immutably established opinion in favor of invaria-
bly selecting the death penalty in any case where the offense charged is
punishable at the discretion of the jury either by death or imprisonment is
such a "state of mind" ... which will prevent [the juror] from acting with
entire impartiality and without prejudice.4 3
The reference is to section 1073 of the Penal Code, not section
1074.
Even if it was proven that the group automatically approving
the death penalty is minute in size as compared with those hold-
ing beliefs at the opposite end of the spectrum, the petitioner fell
short of establishing the essential theory: that juries excluding
those that the petitioner would have included" would be more
likely to convict than juries in noncapital cases. 45 The court con-
cludes this issue by stating:
However, the study's omission of the 'automatic death penalty' group-
which comprises an unknown proportion of the pool of jurors in noncapi-
tal cases-renders unsound petitioner's leap from the results of this study
(that 'California death-qualified' jurors are more conviction prone than
'guilt phase includable' jurors) to the conclusion that 'California death-
qualified' jurors are also more conviction-prone than a 'neutral' jury.4 6
42. 28 Cal. 3d at 66, 616 P.2d at 1345, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 172. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1073 (West 1970) provides in relevant part:
Particular causes of challenge are of two kinds:
Second-For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in
reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which will prevent him
from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substan-
tial rights of either party, which is known in this Code as actual bias.
43. People v. Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d 89, 95, 367 P.2d 33, 36, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620
(1967). The court stated that counsel for the defendant in a capital case had a
right to question prospective jurors for the purpose of ascertaining whether any
would vote to impose the death penalty in the event of a finding of guilt, without
regard to the evidence. A challenge for such bias is not specifically provided for
in section 1074 of the California Penal Code. Rather, section 1073 permits such a
challenge for actual bias. The entertaining of such an established opinion of se-
lecting the death penalty in any case where the offense charged is punishable at
the jury's discretion by either death or imprisonment is such a "state of mind ...
which will prevent [a juror] from acting with entire impartiality and without
prejudice" within the meaning of section 1073.
44. Those jurors who are sought to be included in the guilt phase as referred
to by the Hovey court are those who could be entirely fair and objective at the
guilt phase but not at the penalty phase. 28 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 616 P.2d at 1344, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 170-73.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 67, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173. The reference is to the Ells-
The court did conclude, however, that the presently employed
procedures for jurors to be qualified on the issue of the death
penalty tended to prejudice them from an accused's perspective.
Voir dire examinations occur in open court and in capital cases,
there is extensive emphasis on the jurors' opinions on the death
penalty. The court found that the focus on the penalty phase of
the trial, which is contingent upon a finding of guilt, tends to lead
jurors to infer that the second phase will be necessary. This is
particularly so when the judge and counsel repeatedly question
prospective jurors on their ability to hand down a death sentence
before the issue of guilt has even been heard. Such procedures, it
was found, could easily lead jurors to infer that those persons pre-
sumably familiar with the evidence in the case, that is, the judge
and counsel, actually believe the defendant is guilty as charged
and the penalty phase will surely ensue.
Further, constant focus on the hypothetical occurrence of the
penalty phase could tend to desensitize jurors about the impor-
tance and seriousness of that determination.47 Even those in
favor of the death penalty may dread the prospect of having to
make a personal decision as to whether another human being is
to live or die. By repeatedly asking prospective jurors to imagine
the penalty phase, and their ability or inability to render a death
sentence, what was initially an intimidating decision may become
easier to do because of constant exposure to the idea.
Thus, where jurors are predisposed to believe that the defend-
ant is guilty by the very procedures that qualify them to sit on a
capital jury, the court found that such members will tend to:
(1) selectively perceive the evidence-e.g., 'forgetting', distorting, or actu-
ally failing to perceive evidence which conflicts with his or her preconcep-
tions; (2) to draw only those inferences from the evidence which support
those preconceptions and perhaps to 'create' data to reinforce those be-
liefs; and (3) to evaluate the evidence perceived-e.g., assess credibility of
worth Conviction-Proneness Study. The study, conducted in 1979, provided strong
support for the proposition that jurors qualified to serve in capital cases are more
likely to convict than those excludable under Witherspoon standards. Id. at 39-40,
616 P.2d at 1324-25, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52. However, at the time it was conducted,
no questions were asked of the subjects that would identify them as being a mem-
ber of the group automatically approving the death penalty. When this problem
became apparent, Dr. Ellsworth recontacted those subjects that indicated they
strongly favored the death penalty by phone. Of the 23 persons who indicated this
preference, she reached 22, all of whom stated that they would consider voting for
life imprisonment, rather than death, if the evidence supported such a penalty. Id.
at 66-67, 616 P.2d at 1344-45, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73. The problem is with the relia-
bility of this delayed call back procedure. Dr. Ellsworth herself admitted that it
was possible that different answers to the call back questions might have been re-
ceived had the questions been asked at the time the experiment was conducted.
Id.
47. Id. at 75, 616 P.2d at 1350, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
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witnesses, weigh the inferences drawn-in a manner which tends to fulfill
his or her expectations. 4 8
To minimize the possible prejudicial effects of group voir dire
methods used in capital cases, the supreme court ordered, pursu-
ant to its supervisory authority over the state's criminal proce-
dure, that in the future, that portion of voir dire relating to jurors'
beliefs about the death penalty is to be conducted in sequestra-
tion.49 While the purpose of instituting this procedure is to mini-
mize prejudice to a defendant, the court admitted that it was
"unknown at this point whether such personal voir dire would en-
tail the same dangers of inducing bias as do the current proce-
dures for voir dire."5 0
IV. CASE IMPACT
The impact of the court's holding as to the first issue, the non-
neutrality of capital juries, appears to be limited in California ab-
sent further study into the matter. The case may, however, have
effects upon those jurisdictions that rigidly adhere to Wither-
spoon standards in selecting capital jurors. It is extremely likely
that surveys will be conducted to establish the size of the group
which automatically approves the death penalty. Since the court
seems to readily rely on such empirical research in its rulings, it
would consider such evidence to conclusively put the proposition
to rest, or point out the biased nature of capital juries in the state.
If future studies reveal that the death penalty group at issue is
of insignificant size and impact, then the results of the petitioner's
studies might be extrapolated to include California capital juries.
If proven, then controlled studies and actual records of case out-
comes might show that such juries are more conviction prone
than noncapital juries. It would then follow that defendants in
capital cases, under the right to a fair and impartial jury trial,
would have won the right to have persons adamantly opposed to
capital punishment sit at the guilt phase of the trial and be ex-
cused only for penalty determination. This is, of course, only if
such jurors could be objective at the guilt phase determination.
This process of qualifying separate juries, or jurors, in the pen-
alty phase could prove costly to the state's resources. Indeed, this
is one of the major arguments presented against the court's reso-
48. Id. at 72, 616 P.2d at 1349, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
49. Id. at 80, 616 P.2d at 1353, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
50. Id. at 81, 616 P.2d at 1354, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
lution of the second issue involving individualized voir dire.5 1
As for the majority's resolution of the voir dire procedural is-
sue, Justice Richardson, in his dissent, asserts that such a cum-
bersome procedure will add a significant burden to the
judiciary.52 He points out that group voir dire serves an educa-
tional function by demonstrating to the assembled panel the
causes for disqualification and by clarifying abstract legal princi-
ples through applicable hypotheticals. Justice Richardson found
that the new procedure will forego this benefit and each individ-
ual juror will have to be educated alone.
The minority further points out that any prejudicial effect suf-
fered by the group voir dire examinations could be lessened by
admonishing the jury.53 Further, as the majority acknowledges, 5 4
sequestered voir dire may produce the same results that group
voir dire produced. The emphasis and mystery surrounding death
penalty issues may equally emphasize the penalty phase, and ju-
rors could just as easily infer the same adverse facts to the de-
fendant by the requirement that such questioning occur in
private.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hovey, the California Supreme Court found that Penal Code
sections 1074 and 190.1, as judicially interpreted in capital cases,
did not deny an accused his sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights. The petitioner failed to establish that exclusion of jurors
unequivocally opposed to the death penalty from the guilt phase
of the bifurcated trials in capital cases rendered the jury more
likely to convict. The provision for bifurcated guilt and penalty
determinations, and the exclusion for cause of jurors at the guilt
phase, because of their inability to serve at the penalty phase,
was reasonable in terms of judicial efficiency and economy.
While the petitioner did establish that Witherspoon qualified
capital juries were more conviction prone than noncapital juries,
this conclusion was found inapplicable to California capital juries
because California requires that persons who would always vote
in favor of the death sentence in a capital trial be excluded. How-
ever, this exclusion is for bias, not specifically because of a juror's
opposition to electing life imprisonment as an alternative sen-
tence.
The court did find that the process of qualifying jurors to serve
51. Id. at 83, 616 P.2d at 1355, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 182. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 84, 616 P.2d at 1356, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
54. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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on capital juries tended to prejudice them in the prosecution's
favor. Individualized, sequestered voir dire examinations on
questions relating to a juror's views on capital punishment was
ordered to remedy the situation in spite of the acknowledgement
of the unknown effects of the new procedure and the burden it
would impose on the judicial system.
2. The Effect of Material Omissions Within Search Warrant
Affidavits Under California Penal Code Section 1538.5-40:
People v. Kurland1
Relying on decisions of the California Court of Appeal, the California
Supreme Court formulates a method in which to deal with innocent, negli-
gent, and intentional omissions present within a warrant affidavit. The
distinction in effect between misstatements and material omission and the
increased likelihood of deception in withholding material facts as a result
of the court's decision is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court ruled that a facially valid search
warrant affidavit may be challenged under California Penal Code
sections 1538.5-15402 on the ground that it omits certain material
facts that would have affected the finding of probable cause. This
decision was based on the idea that the determinations of a neu-
tral magistrate are as greatly tainted when an affidavit fails to in-
clude a material fact, as when it includes a misstatement.3 The
remedy imposed for failure to include a material fact will vary ac-
cording to the affiant's motive for committing the omission.
On April 6, 1976, Officers Bell and Matt of the Modesto Police
1. 28 Cal. 3d 376, 618 P.2d 213, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1980).
The majority opinion was written by Justice Newman with Justices Tobriner,
Mosk, Richardson, and Manuel concurring. Justice Clark wrote a separate concur-
ring opinion and Chief Justice Bird authored the sole dissent.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (2) (West Supp. 1980) provides in pertinent
part that a defendant may move to suppress evidence if the search and seizure
with a warrant was unreasonable because the warrant was insufficient on its face
or there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
3. The California Supreme Court has recently considered the problem of
warrant-affidavits containing misstatements in People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 383
P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978), and Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501
P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972). The court was faced with the problem of omis-
sions for the first time in Kurland. Although new to the supreme court, the issue
has been raised in many prior court of appeal decisions, see note 25 infra. For a
discussion of Cook and Theodor, see notes 20 and 23 infra and accompanying text.
Department obtained a warrant to search the defendant's store
for cocaine and related paraphernalia. The search yielded a
"coke" spoon, a vial of white powder, one and one-half pounds of
marijuana, and a .38 caliber pistol.
Probable cause for the issuance of the warrant was principally
supported by Officer Matt's affidavit which stated that a confiden-
tial informant, known as Z, had provided information that Z had
seen the defendant in his store in possession of cocaine and mari-
juana, and that Z had been an eye-witness to other suspicious
criminal behavior.4
The affidavit claimed Z to be a reliable informant who in the
past had never failed to give reliable information. The affidavit
further described Z as a former cocaine user and as one knowl-
edgeable about its packaging and use. In addition, the affidavit re-
cited Officer Matt's fear for Z's safety if his identity were
disclosed.5
At the hearing to suppress the seized evidence, the defense
counsel alleged that the affidavit was incomplete, 6 asserting that
the affidavit failed to disclose that Z had been convicted of a fel-
ony in 1974 after Officer Matt had filed a complaint against him,
and that Z had been placed on probation. Officer Matt testified
that at the time he signed the affidavit, he was not sure whether
Z's probation had been terminated or violated. Officer Matt then
denied that threats had been made against Z in order to insure
his assistance against the defendant.
Granting defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence
on the ground that it had been taken pursuant to a defective war-
rant, the trial court reasoned that since the supporting affidavit
failed to disclose "material information," the presiding magistrate
might have been led to conclude differently with respect to the
credibility of the informant Z. As a result, probable cause would
4. The defendant had confided in Z regarding his storage and sale of narcot-
ics. Z had also seen a .38 caliber pistol in the defendant's store and had been told
by the defendant that he intended to kill the next person with whom he found dis-
favor. The defendant had also asked informant Z to kill an unidentified individual
who had "ripped him off" in a recent drug deal. 28 Cal. 3d at 381-82, 618 P.2d at 216,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
5. Z's information about recent narcotic traffic through defendant Kurland's
water bed store was substantiated by an affidavit submitted by Officer Ladd which
was supported by information from informant X. X's information about the nar-
cotics was held too stale to support a warrant to search the store. 28 Cal. 3d at 382
n.1, 618 P.2d 216 n.1, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 670 n.1; cf. Alexander v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.
3d 387, 508 P.2d 1131, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1973) (information may be so stale that
magistrate may not be fully informed nor justified in concluding information is re-
liable).
6. The defense counsel wished to argue that the affidavit had not met either
prong of the test laid down in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); see note 13 in-
fra and accompanying text.
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then have been negated.7
The People of the State of California asserted that the affidavit
was not misleading and that any absent information was withheld
in good faith. The California Supreme Court considered the prob-
lem of proper application of suppression and exclusionary rules
when a warrant affidavit, although sufficient on its face, is chal-
lenged as incomplete. The court decided that a warrant would be
treated differently, depending on the motivation behind the mate-
rial omissions as shown in three situations: (1) the unintentional
and reasonable omission; (2) omissions that result from negli-
gence or an enforcement officer's careless over-zealousness; and
(3) those omissions that are a product of an enforcement officer's
intent to deceive or with reckless disregard of the omission's im-
portance. 8
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The court set out to examine the issue of information omitted
from a supporting affidavit in light of the fourth amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures 9 and the ex-
clusionary rule as set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Mapp v. Ohio.1O
The court's concern was based on the concept in Johnson v.
7. In essence the court of appeal believed that the warrant must be entirely
quashed since the magistrate may have decided the Aguilar test had not been met
if he had been presented with all information. The court of appeal refused to add
the excluded material and retest the affidavit's sufficiency in place of the original
magistrate.
8. 28 Cal. 3d at 385-90, 618 P.2d at 219-22, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 673-76.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (war-
rant is not invalid if warrant affidavit contains negligent misstatements); United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (informant statements against his penal inter-
ests enhances his credibility); Whiteley v. Worden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (defective
affidavit may not be later salvaged by police testimony that they actually had addi-
tional facts); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (explicit detail of infor-
mants tip may enhance his credibility); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
(informant's past experience may be considered to evaluate his credibility); Agui-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (established a two prong test for probable cause
based on informant's tip); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973)
(warrant is invalid where it contains immaterial but deliberately false state-
ments).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In order to deter unconstitutional behavior in the area
of fourth amendment search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court held
that any evidence seized pursuant to such an illegal search must be excluded at
trial.
State" that a neutral magistrate should act as an intermediary
between the public and the police officer engaged in the competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime. An affidavit which fails to
fully disclose all material information removes the valuable infer-
ence-drawing ability from the magistrate and essentially vests it
in the affiant. The court felt this failure to fully disclose greatly
increased the chance that the defendant's rights may be invaded
without sufficient probable cause.' 2
To insure that the magistrate's decision is based upon proper
considerations, Aguilar v. Texas 13 established a two-prong test to
be employed when informants are used to demonstrate probable
cause. First, the affidavit must establish the credibility of the in-
formant. Credibility is shown by alleging information that the in-
formant has been reliable in the past;14 the information given is
against the informant's penal interest and may expose the inform-
ant to criminal liability;15 or the informant is a citizen-informant. 16
Second, the affidavit must describe facts, not mere conclusion-
ary statements, showing that the informant has a foundation on
which to base his report. This requirement seeks to insure that
the informant is not mistaken about what he has seen nor that he
has drawn incorrrect conclusions from his observations. The re-
quired descriptive facts usually consist of those concerning where
and how the informant obtained his information.'7 Information
obtained by hearsay may present special problems and require a
further showing of authenticity. Highly detailed information,
rather than reliance on vague rumor, was accepted by the United
11. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
12. Johnson sought to insure that it was a neutral and fully informed magis-
trate that determined whether probable cause existed to justify a search. A police
officer caught up in the excitement of the enterprise would not be neutral. Omis-
sions that keep the magistrate from being fully informed circumvents his purpose
as much as if he were deceived by affirmative misstatements.
13. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
14. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973) (mag-
istrate could reasonably conclude informant was reliable due to past reliability).
15. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (informant's admission that he
had bought contraband from defendant carried extra indicia of reliability since he
had admitted he himself had broken the law); Ming v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App.
3d 206, 91 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1970) (declaration against informant's penal interest in-
creases likelihood of reliability).
16. An informant's testimony based solely on his desire to be a good citizen is
presumed reliable. See People v. Schulle, 51 Cal. App. 3d 809, 129 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1975) (testimony of 14 year old girl who told police she saw marijuana in stepfa-
ther's bedroom was sufficient to establish probable cause); People v. Scoma, 71
Cal. 2d 332, 455 P.2d 419, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1969) (informant may not be considered
citizen informant where his penal interests are at stake); see note 43 infra.
17. See People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176, 179-80, 454 P.2d 681, 683, 77 Cal. Rptr.
785, 787 (1969) (the California Supreme Court essentially reiterates the two prong
test of Aguilar).
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States Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States,18 as fulfilling
Aguilar's second prong. Based on the Aguilar test, the defendant
in Kurland challenged the warrant affidavit as being insufficient
to establish the credibility of the informant.19 Lacking such estab-
lishment, it was asserted that the warrant should be quashed.
California had previously addressed the problem of the effect of
a negligent misstatement within a supporting affidavit in Theodor
v. Superior Court of Orange County.20 The Theodor court be-
lieved that to allow the use of negligent misstatements would be
tantamount to removing the effectiveness of the neutral magis-
trate. Rejecting the approach that all erroneous information must
be excised from the affidavit whether reasonable or not,21 the
court held that only negligent or unreasonable misstatements
must be removed from the affidavit. The affidavit would then be
retested for evidence of probable cause. Since deterrence was be-
lieved to be the purpose behind the exclusionary rule, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court did not feel the excision of reasonable but
mistaken misstatements should be required since no deterrent
purpose would be served.22
In 1978, the California Supreme Court considered the problem
of a warrant affidavit containing intentional or reckless misstate-
18. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The decision allowed the use of additional corrobora-
tive evidence to support an informant's tip which by itself was insufficient. An ex-
ample of the use of this idea may be seen in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959), where a suspect, closely matching an informant's carefully detailed
description, arrived at the designated location closely within the time frame as-
serted by the informant.
19. 28 Cal. 3d at 382-83, 618 P.2d at 217, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
20. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972). In Theodor, the court
held that a negligent misstatement of informant's identity and his participation as
a drug customer of the defendant will require the affidavit to be retested for proba-
ble cause after the misstatement was excised.
21. See Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If
It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 96 (1971). The author asserts that whether material
omissions occur reasonably or negligently, they taint the magistrate's decision.
Therefore, omissions of either type should be removed and the remainder of the
affidavit retested. The Theodor court rejected this approach as being in violation
of the principle of reasonableness which controls the application of the fourth
amendment. Since probable cause, not certainty, is the test, reasonable material
misstatements are allowed without sanction and only unreasonable misstatements
are excised. 28 Cal. 3d at 385-88, 618 P.2d at 219-21, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 673-75.
22. The Theodor court rested its decision on both state and federal law. Sub-
sequent to the Theodor decision, the United States Supreme Court held in Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 159 (1978), that no sanctions would be imposed for negligent
misstatements contained in a warrant affidavit. The fourth amendment only com-
pels excision of those statements that are intentional or reckless.
ments in the case of People v. Cook.23 The court held that the affi-
davit could not be separated from an intentional falsehood and
then considered separately. Once the supporting affidavit has
been found to contain deliberate misstatements, the court cannot
excise the offending matter and presume the remaining state-
ments to be true; the whole document must be considered
tainted. As a result, the warrant must be automatically quashed
and the products of any ensuing search excluded,24 regardless of
the effects of the intentionally false statements on the existence
of probable cause. Only in this way may the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule be served.
Early California Supreme Court decisions were concerned with
the effect of misstatements actually contained within the support-
ing affidavit. The court in Theodor had recognized the corre-
sponding difficulties which might arise when an affidavit fails "to
include information which might otherwise negate a finding of
probable cause."25 The California Court of Appeal had addressed
the issue several times holding that an affidavit may be insuffi-
cient when it omits material facts adverse to the existence of
probable cause.26 The California Supreme Court, now directly
faced with the issue in People v. Kurland, endorsed the holding of
the lower courts.
23. 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978). In Cook, the defendant
was arrested for manufacturing dangerous drugs. The warrant affidavit contained
a number of intentional misstatements designed to elicit the magistrate's
favorable decision. At the suppression hearing, the prosecution contended that
the only remedy was to remove the misstatements and to retest the warrant.
Upon such removal, the trial court found probable cause remained and upheld the
warrant, disregarding the fact the misstatements had been included intentionally
rather than negligently as in Theodor.
The United States Supreme Court, in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),
held that intentional misstatements must only be excised from the warrant and
the remainder retested for probable cause. As a result of Cook, California law will
require the entire warrant to be automatically invalidated upon a showing of in-
tent. Due to the change in federal law, the Cook decision was based solely on Cal-
ifornia precedents. See 22 Cal. 3d at 88, 583 P.2d at 141-42, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
Similarly, the Kurland decision is based exclusively on California law.
24. This would merely be the application of the exclusionary rule found in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 343 (1961); see note 10 supra.
25. 8 Cal. 3d at 96 n.11, 501 P.2d at 247 n.11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.11.
26. See, e.g., People v. Neusom, 76 Cal. App. 3d 534, 143 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1977) (in-
formation intentionally omitted from the warrant affidavit will cause the whole
warrant to be quashed without regard to the omission's effect on probable cause);
Morris v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 521, 129 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1976) (omitted fact
is material if it could have negated the magistrate's finding of probable cause had
it been included); People v. Barger, 40 Cal. App. 3d 662, 115 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1974)
(where facts have been negligently omitted the warrant-affidavit must be
retested).
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III. CASE ANALYSIS
Just as the California Constitution27 and the California Penal
Code28 allow a facially valid search warrant affidavit to be at-
tacked on the ground that it contains misstatements, by judicial
determination an affidavit may now be attacked on the basis that
it fails to include material, adverse information pertinent to the
existence of probable cause. This is based on the belief that
"[t] he crucial inference-drawing powers of the magistrate may be
equally hindered in either case, with identical consequences for
innocent privacy." 29
A. The Material Omission
The court first considered what information must be disclosed
by the affiant in an affidavit supporting a warrant. An important
analytical distinction was noted between omissions and misstate-
ments. "Every falsehood makes an affidavit inaccurate, but not all
omissions do S0."30 Therefore, an affidavit need not include every
imaginable fact regardless of its relevancy. Only those material
facts which a reasonable magistrate would consider important in
establishing the existence of probable cause must be included in
an affidavit. Additionally, the materiality analysis should only be
extended to those omissions which substantially interfere with
the magistrate's ability to determine the existence of a need for
the desired search. 31 In defining materiality, the California
Supreme Court held that facts are material and must be included
if their omission would result in the affidavit being substantially
27. CAL. CONST. Art. 1, § 13. The court believed that the right to challenge a
warrant is a derivation of the constitution's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 28 Cal. 3d at 383, 618 P.2d at 217, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1538.5-1540 (West Supp. 1980). See note 2 supra.
29. 28 Cal. 3d at 384, 618 P.2d at 217-18, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72. See Moylan,
Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV.
741, 749 (1974). The author confronts the problem of the failure to find probable
cause if hearsay evidence is used. The author also discusses the justification and
abuses of hearsay evidence.
30. 28 Cal. 3d at 384, 618 P.2d at 218, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
31. The court relied on the discussion of materiality found in Morris v. Supe-
rior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 521, 129 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1976). Omitted facts may be
deemed material if "the magistrate's inference drawing ability is interfered with
substantially," or if they "could have had an adverse effect upon the normal infer-
ence drawing process of the magistrate," or could have negated the magistrate's
finding of probable cause, or might have caused the magistrate to find an inform-
ant "unreliable and his information untrustworthy." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 524-27, 129
Cal. Rptr. at 240-42.
misleading.32
Once it has been established that a material or relevant fact has
been omitted from the warrant affidavit, the effect upon the affida-
vit as a whole will depend on the affiant's motivation in withhold-
ing the pertinent information.
B. Remedies for Material Omission
Just as Theodor and Cook describe misstatements as reason-
able, negligent, and intentional, the California Supreme Court
wished to similarly classify omissions and apply the exclusionary
rule accordingly. The subtle differences between an affirmative
misstatement and a material omission necessitates some modifi-
cation of the remedies for misstatement as found in Theodor and
Cook .33
Although it is possible that a reasonable but wrongful material
omission would taint the affidavit thus requiring some adjust-
ment, the court did not agree; reasonable omissions were not held
fatal to the affidavit.3 4 The possibility of a wrongful invasion of
privacy was not considered; only the deterrence factor was con-
sidered to be important. 35 "A material omission is reasonable
32. Although a positive duty to disclose facts does exist, the duty only extends
to material or relevant adverse facts. People v. Barger, 40 Cal. App. 3d 662, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (1974), see generally People v. Neusom, 76 Cal. App. 3d 534, 143 Cal. Rptr.
27 (1977) (failure to skin-search an informant prior to a narcotics buy was insignifi-
cant where his reliability had been established by prior reliability and admissions
against his penal interests); Morris v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 521, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 238 (1976) (police efforts to create reliability of informant is material and
may not be omitted); People v. Barger, 40 Cal. App. 3d 662, 115 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1974)
(fact that informant had rescinded his statement in affidavit may be deemed mate-
rial); People v. Webb, 36 Cal. App. 3d 460, 111 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1973) (the magistrate
does not need to be presented with the precise nature of informant's criminal rec-
ord to be put on notice of his possible unreliability).
33. Of course, "misstatement" and "omission" are not equally opposite terms.
"Misstatement" is essentially conceived of as a wrongfully made affirmative state-
ment. "Omission" merely means not included and does not carry the same nega-
tive connotation as "misstatement." The court went out of its way to define
wrongful omission or misomission. Once defined and discovered, the remedy for
misstatement and misomission are essentially the same. See note 41 infra.
34. Comment, supra note 21, at 143-45. The author contends that when the affi-
ant errs and the probable cause ruling relies on the erroneous information within
the affidavit, the privacy guarding function of the magistrate is seriously dimin-
ished, even if the error is unintentional. Use of the exclusionary rule seems neces-
sary to deter such errors, even if innocent. The exclusionary rule's purpose was
also to uphold the integrity of the judicial system. Since efforts to determine an
affiant's prior state of mind are too imprecise and difficult, the Kurland holding
may serve to create a smokescreen that is difficult to penetrate.
35. 28 Cal. 3d at 386-87, 618 P.2d at 219, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The court relied
strongly on the Cook and Theodor decisions. It was noted that Cook had reaf-
firmed Theodor's "rule of reason" in holding that the exclusionary doctrine devel-
oped in Theodor was intended to minimize the risk that privacy may wrongfully be
invaded by means of deterring unlawful police conduct. It was believed that if the
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when despite the exercise of due care, [the] affiant was ignorant
of the omitted fact or forgot to include it, or his conclusion that it
was privileged or immaterial was reasonable even if incorrect."3 6
The court reasoned that since the affiant believes that he has
done all that is necessary to comply with the law, modifying the
affidavit to include the reasonable omission will have little deter-
rent effect.
An unreasonable or negligent omission arises "when the affiant
is unreasonably ignorant of facts, unreasonably forgets to include
them, or makes a good faith but unreasonable decision that they
need not or should not be included."37 To deal with this unrea-
sonable omission, the court adopted the "add and retest" formula.
The court would add the omitted material to the affidavit and then
test the affidavit again for probable cause.38 Recognizing the bal-
ance of the affidavit with the addition of the negligently omitted
material would serve to reward the affiant's good faith effort at ac-
curacy.39
However, the intentional omission received somewhat different
treatment than the case of a material misstatement.40 An omis-
sion did not damage the validity of a warrant affidavit merely be-
cause it was intentionally withheld. There must be demonstrated,
not merely an intent to withhold, but an intent to mislead by
withholding. An omission of this type was viewed by the court to
be no different than a reckless falsehood or deliberate lie and
should require harsh deterrence under the rationale of the People
affidavit reflects a reasonable attempt at truth, constitutional principles are satis-
fied and the deterrent purpose would not be served by quashing the warrant, "no
matter how crucial the inaccuracy."
36. 28 Cal. 3d at 388, 618 P.2d at 220, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
37. Id.
38. The "add and retest" formula was conceived in the cases of Barger, Morris,
and Neusom. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
39. The majority noted the thoughts of Chief Justice Bird in her dissent that,
as with intentional misstatements, deliberate omissions of material fact which
should have reasonably been included undermine the magistrate's finding that the
affant was credible and will serve to deprive any reviewing court of a "reliable fac-
tual basis" to redetermine probable cause. Since a reviewing court may not
merely assume the magistrate would still have found probable cause, had he
known of the negligent omission, an affidavit materially incomplete due to an affi-
ant's negligence should never support a decision to uphold the warrant. The ma-
jority regarded this viewpoint by noting that such considerations fail to consider
the precedents of Cook and Theodor. 28 Cal. 3d at 388, 618 P.2d at 220, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 674.
40. See note 33 supra.
v. Cook41 decision. Therefore, the California Supreme Court be-
lieved that the appropriate response was to quash the warrant
since it contained a deliberate misleading omission that was ulti-
mately deemed material. 42
Under the test established by Kurland it may appear that all
details of an anonymous informant's criminal history must be dis-
closed in order to avoid the creation of a misleading impression
regarding the informant's credibility and reliability. However, the
apparently strict test does not force such a conclusion. As long as
the magistrate is put on notice that the affiant does not wish to
claim that the informant enjoys the status of a citizen-informant 43
and is presented with other sufficient facts establishing general
credibility, a detailed criminal history need not be included. In
such a case, the omission of an informant's criminal record is sim-
ply not material.
IV. CASE IMPACT
Although People v. Kurland presented the California Supreme
Court with a matter of first impression, the concepts recognized
by the court's decision are not new to California. The Kurland
41. 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978). In applying Cook's ra-
tionale concerning intentional misstatements to situations where deliberate
wrongful omissions are present, the court noted the appropriate remedy is to viti-
ate the entire warrant since none of the remainder may be trusted. Any deliberate
attempt to mislead the magistrate was believed to undermine the judicial process
and render the entire affidavit suspect. The only possible remedy would be to
render the warrant a nullity.
The California Supreme Court wished to save this harsh remedy for use in situ-
ations of intentional wrongful omissions and not employ it where mere negligence
may be shown. The court believed that to apply the exclusionary doctrine so
harshly would tend to encourage intentional omissions, since an officer-affiant may
become frustrated and feel he has "nothing to lose" if his omissions were found
either negligent or intentional. 28 Cal. 3d at 390, 618 P.2d at 221-22, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
675-76.
42. It is important to note that under the intentional misstatement situation,
"materiality" is not given the importance it was given in Kurland. Although every
misstatement affects the accuracy of the warrant, not all omissions do. Therefore,
the court adopted a threshold test of materiality prior to employing any remedies
where omissions are shown. It was noted that although Theodor and Cook do not
apply any version of this two-step test, they also do not preclude its use. 28 Cal. 3d
at 389 n.7, 618 P.2d at 221 n.7, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 675 n.7.
43. The Aguilar rule does not apply to information from disinterested citizens
who report criminal activity responding to their civic duty. Such citizen-infor-
mants are presumed reliable. See People v. Smith, 17 Cal. 3d 845, 553 P.2d 557, 132
Cal. Rptr. 397 (1976) (affidavit must affirmatively establish citizen-informant sta-
tus); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) (citi-
zen-informant must still satisfy magistrate that he is correct in his beliefs). The
distinction between citizen informants and "criminal" informants is based on the
idea that criminal-informants "are generally motivated by something other than
good citizenship." People v. Schulle, 51 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815, 124 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588
(1975). See note 16 supra.
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decision recognizes the law regarding material omissions that has
been established by various decisions of the court of appeal."
The Kurland decision clarifies and solidifies previous decisions
providing clear-cut tests to be employed when a material omis-
sion is found.45 However, these tests may prove difficult to use
and the corresponding remedies may provide inadequate protec-
tion of privacy. 6
As noted by Chief Justice Bird in her dissent,47 the effect of the
Kurland decision will likely encourage the police to withhold ma-
terial facts adverse to the warrant application. A policy likely to
be adopted is "if in doubt, omit."4 8 Therefore, information reason-
ably omitted will not affect the warrants validity and will not be
subject to appellate review since the appellate court may not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the presiding magistrate.49
If the omitted material is subsequently found to be unreasona-
bly withheld, it is merely added and retested as if it had been
present from the outset. "Thus, the majority would allow a war-
rant to stand even though the affidavit on which it is based was
44. See note 26 supra.
45. The Kurland decision used the various tests established in Barger,
Neusom, and Morris (see note 26 supra) and the tests regarding misstatements in
Theodor and Cook thereby synthesizing the three situations of material omission
in one opinion. The Kurland decision serves as a "California handbook" on the
law regarding omissions from warrant affidavits. 28 Cal. 3d at 386-91, 618 P.2d at
219-22, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 673-77.
46. See note 34 supra. In addition to the fact that the motivation behind an
omission may be very difficult to discover, there remains the problem of remedies
to citizens whose privacy is wrongfully invaded. As Justice Douglas noted in his
concurrence in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 670, civil "trespass actions against police
officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are mainly illusory remedies,"
as are departmental sanctions. With the increased likelihood of warrants being
upheld despite omissions of a material fact, a private individual's privacy may be
further compromised.
47. 28 Cal. 3d at 396, 399-400, 618 P.2d at 226-28, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 680-82 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting).
48. An officer may believe that his chances of obtaining a search warrant are
-slim if he includes certain information, therefore, he omits the information. If
later his omission is found material and deliberate the warrant is quashed and any
evidence seized is suppressed, the very result the officer feared if he included the
information initially. If his omission is found to be a result of negligence, it is
merely added and retested; thus, the officer has lost nothing. If the omission is
found to be reasonable, the warrant stands. Therefore, where an officer is in doubt
about certain information, his inclinations may be to exclude the material. Deter-
rence does not seem to be effective here.
49. People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978) (citing
Skelton v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 144, 460 P.2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1969))
(credibility of witness must be judged by magistrate not by appellate court).
'substantially misleading' unless the 'unreasonably' withheld
facts would have necessarily precluded a finding of probable
cause."50 The dilemma within the "add and retest" concept is
that it is impossible for a reviewing court to know how the magis-
trate would have decided had he been aware of the material omis-
sion.5 1 When facts are unreasonably withheld, then later added
by the reviewing court which then retests the affidavit, the result
is that reviewing courts become the effective issuers of warrants.
Greater invasion of privacy is likely to result where affidavits
are not quashed despite negligent omissions. An affiant may un-
reasonably withhold material facts, a search warrant may be is-
sued, and a later retest may show that the affidavit was not
supported by probable cause. In spite of this situation, the uncon-
stitutional invasion has already occurred. The goal of deterring
unconstitutional invasions of privacy is not promoted, it is actu-
ally hindered.52
It may be argued that this sort of occurrence will be prevented
by the requirement of automatically quashing the warrant where
misleading intent can be shown. This remedy, however, appears
illusory since there is great difficulty in proving the requisite in-
tent to deceive. The court would be required to enter into the
nebulous endeavor of discovering the affiant's state of mind.53
Little or no concrete proof would be available, as opposed to the
case of the affirmative misstatement. The affirmative misstate-
ment exists on the face of the affidavit which itself serves as evi-
dence; therefore, its truth or falsity can be more readily
established, as can the affiant's intent. In contrast, the omission
may be more easily justified than the misstatement. If the omis-
sion is unreasonable, only inclusion and reevaluation will be re-
quired. Kurland may thereby encourage vague affidavits. It
appears the dishonest affiant has little to lose and much to gain,
especially if he is accomplished at feigning ignorance.
Tests that encourage inclusion of facts upon doubt rather than
their exclusion would be more in keeping with federal mandates.
The United States Constitution entrusts the citizen's right to pri-
50. 28 Cal. 3d at 400, 618 P.2d at 228, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 682. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
51. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
52. As shown in note 46 supra, civil remedies may be of little value to the of-
fended citizen. The likelihood of vexatious lawsuits being filed by bona fide of-
fenders to hinder police efforts and the inability of officers to adequately
compensate those truly wronged render this type of remedy of little use.
53. See Comment, supra note 21, at 145. The author notes the great difficulty
in attempting to determine the prior state of mind of the affiant. The Kurland ma-
jority also admits that showing purposeful deception may be a difficult burden, but
not one that cannot be accomplished.
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vacy to an independent and fully informed magistrate,5 4 not in a
later reviewing court that must adjust warrants with remedies
that stretch constitutional requirements. 55
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has utilized decisions from the
court of appeal in order to deal with the problem of a facially suf-
ficient warrant affidavit being challenged as incomplete due to
material omissions. The court has recognized that the omission
must first be examined for materiality, and if found material, then
the cause for its omission must be analyzed. If material facts
were omitted innocently and reasonably, no sanction is imposed
since no deterrent purpose would be served. If the omission was
a result of negligence or unreasonableness, the omitted material
will be added and the affidavit retested for probable cause. In this
manner deterrence is maintained while rewarding good faith. If
the material information is deliberately withheld with intent to
mislead, the warrant must automatically be quashed in order to
insure deterrence and to preserve the integrity of the criminal
justice system.
The Kurland holding points toward an increased likelihood of
deceptive omissions, since affiants may be more likely to withhold
information when in doubt of its requisite inclusion. The final re-
sult is that constitutional protections entrusted to a neutral mag-
istrate are severely curtailed. The risk of warrants being issued
by magistrates without first being fully informed has grown signif-
icantly with the decision of People v. Kurland.
54. Johnson v. State, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (designated neutral magistrate as the
proper guardian of a citizen's privacy).
55. Chief Justice Bird asserts that the test formulated by the majority which
Would allow negligently omitted information to be added and the affidavit retested,
even though the initial affidavit was substantially misleading to the magistrate, is
a "legal fiction ... too far removed from reality to be indulged in at the expense of
the Fourth Amendment. Under this scheme, there will never be any informed
weighing of all the relevant facts known to the police by a neutral and detached
magistrate" as required by both federal and state constitutions. 28 Cal. 3d at 400,
618 P.2d at 228, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. Speedy Trial Under California Penal Code Section 1382:
Owens v. Superior Court
The California Supreme Court in Owens v. Superior Court,' dis-
regarded precedent 2 by holding that the sixty day statutory pe-
riod mandated for initiating a speedy trial was not to be
decreased by the amount of time a criminal defendant receives in
continuances. 3 Previously, any delay caused by the defendant
would stay the running of the sixty day period.4 Under section
1382 of the California Penal Code,5 a criminal defendant may then
demand a trial after the sixty day period expires. A trial must
then be forthcoming within ten days or all charges against the de-
fendant are dismissed.6 Contrary to prior law,7 the Supreme
1. 28 Cal. 3d 238, 617 P.2d 1098, 168 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980). Defendant was
charged with two counts of robbery and pleaded not guilty at arraignment. At de-
fendant's request, the trial date was set beyond the 60 day period required by stat-
ute for a speedy trial. On the day set for trial, defense counsel was prepared but
the prosecution was not, claiming inability to locate the victims of the robbery.
Trial was ultimately set for January 22, the last day within the 10 day grace period,
but did not actually begin until January 23.
2. See People v. Conway, 271 Cal. App. 2d 15, 76 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1969); People
v. Flores, 262 Cal. App. 2d 313, 68 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1968); People v. Burch, 196 Cal.
App. 2d 754, 17 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1961); People v. Harrison, 182 Cal. App. 2d 758, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1960); People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal. App. 2d 94, 257 P.2d 37 (1953); People
v. Peter, 20 Cal. App. 151, 128 P. 415 (1912).
3. The Owens court interpreted the statute involved as requiring only a 60
day period within which a speedy trial could be brought. As soon thereafter, if de-
fendant had caused the delay, as defendant was prepared to go to trial, the prose-
cution would be required to commence such trial within the 10 day grace period
given them. After the expiration of the grace period, charges must be dismissed in
the absence of a showing of good cause for the delay. See Owens v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 248-49.
4. This was done on a purely mechanical basis. If, for example, the trial be-
gan 100 days after an information was filed and the court determined that the de-
fendant caused 60 days of such delay, the court would then deduct the 60 days
from the 100 days to end up with 40 days, thus within the 60 day statutory limit.
See, e.g., People v. Harrison, 182 Cal. App. 2d 278, 759, 6 Cal. Rptr. 345, 345 (1960).
5. The statute states, in pertinent part:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the ac-
tion to be dismissed in the following cases:
2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a Superior Court within 60
days after the finding of the indictment or filing of the information or, in
case the cause is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order granting a
new trial again from which an appeal is not taken, or an appeal from the
Superior Court, within 60 days after such mistrial has been declared, after
entry of the order granting the new trial, or after the filing of the remitti-
tur in the trial court . . . ; except that an action shall not be dismissed
under this subdivision if it is set for trial on a date beyond the 60 day pe-
riod at the request of the defendant or with his consent, express or im-
plied, or because of his neglect or failure to appear and if the defendant is
brought to trial on the date so set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.
Cal. Pen. Code § 1382.
6. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
7. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8: 501, 19801 California Law Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Court in Owens held that the sixty day period excluded the possi-
bility of considering defendant's continuances since state interest
was sufficiently protected by allowing the prosecution sixty days
in which to prepare its case. Legislative intent was proffered as a
major reason for this interpretation. 8
2. Prior Admissions: People v. Hall
In People v. Hall,' the Supreme Court impliedly overruled prior
inconsistent cases 2 by "disapproving" of the admission in evi-
dence of a prior conviction when an ex-felon is charged for a
crime of possession.3 The court concluded that a prior felony con-
viction could not be given to the jury if the accused stipulates to
the prior conviction unless the state can clearly demonstrate that
its exclusion will legitimately impair the prosecution's case or
preclude the presentation of alternative theories of guilt.4 How-
8. 28 Cal. 3d at 244-46, 617 P.2d at 1101-03, 168 Cal. Rptr. 66 at 469-71.
1. 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 166 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1980).
2. The court cites the following cases as being "disapproved" of to the extent
that they are inconsistent with Hall: People v. Jackson, 53 Cal. 2d 89, 346 P.2d 389
(1959); People v. Gross, 105 Cal. App. 3d 542, 166 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); People v.
Piper, 103 Cal. App. 3d 102, 162 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1980); People v. Black, 96 Cal. App.
3d 846, 158 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1979); People v. Morrison, 67 Cal. App. 3d 425, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 650 (1977); People v. Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384, 104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972);
People v. Gallinger, 212 Cal. App. 2d 851, 28 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1963); People v. Daven-
port, 210 Cal. App. 335, 26 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1962); People v. Garrow, 130 Cal. App. 2d
75, 278 P.2d 475 (1955); People v. Domenico, 121 Cal. App. 2d 124, 263 P.2d 122
(1953); People v. Israel, 91 Cal. App. 2d 773, 206 P.2d 62 (1949); People v. Hudging,
59 Cal. App. 2d 175, 138 P.2d 311 (1943); People v. Schunke, 47 Cal. App. 2d 542, 118
P.2d 314 (1941); People v. McFarlan, 126 Cal. App. 777, 14 P.2d 1066 (1932); People v.
Forrester, 116 Cal. App. 240, 2 P.2d 558 (1931). Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 156 n.8, 616 P.2d
826, 833, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 851 (1980).
3. The court felt compelled to rule that a prior felony conviction may not be
given to a jury if the accused stipulates to it in order to avoid any prejudice by the
jury which might result from this knowledge. See, e.g., People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d
441, 451-54, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 318-21, 492 P.2d 1, 6-9 (1972). The court also noted that
a stipulation to a prior conviction when admitted in evidence "relieves" the prose-
cution of the burden of proving the existence of a valid prior conviction beyond a
"reasonable doubt" and "involves the partial waiver of significant constitutional
rights." 28 Cal. 3d at 157 n.9, 616 P.2d at 834, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 852. The court
pointed to the similarity of the prejudice and constitutional characteristics of the
admission of the stipulation for this purpose and that of the admission for en-
hancement purposes, see e.g., In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 519 P.2d 516, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 513 (1974), and the submission of a case for decision on the basis of a prelim-
inary learning transcript, see, e.g., Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 592, 531
P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975).
4. Under this exemption, the evidence of the prior felony conviction will have
ever, admission of a prior conviction where the exception does
not apply will not be reversible error if there is sufficient in-
dependent evidence to prove that the defendant was guilty of a
possession crime.5
C. FIRST AMENDMENT
1. Ordinances Regulating Arcades: People v. Wheatly Glaze
The significance of People v. Wheatly Glaze,1 lies in its clarifica-
tion of how a municipality may regulate a business enterprise in
which first amendment activity is involved. 2 The operation of a
retained some probative value beyond proving the fact of felony status as an ele-
ment of the charge. An example of this would be where the evidence is relevant to
an issue not covered by the stipulation, see, e.g., People v. Maler, 23 Cal. App. 3d
973, 100 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972); Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal. App. 2d 133, 98 P.2d 816
(1940). See also, People v. McClellan, 71 Cal. 2d 793, 457 P.2d 871, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1969) (stipulation admissible where it forces prosecution to elect between theo-
ries of guilt or hampers the presentation of remaining issues); Fuentes v. Tucker,
31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947) (admissible where ambiguous in form, limited in
scope or used to deprive an opponent of the legitimate force and effect of material
evidence).
However, proof as to the nature of the felony is irrelevant to this charge since
any felony conviction establishes felony status. 28 Cal. 3d at 153, 616 P.2d at 831,
167 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
Also, where the stipulation to the possession charge is conditioned upon a jury
finding that the defendant "used" the firearm, the prior felony conviction is irrele-
vant since if the defendant used it, he must have also possessed it. 28 Cal. 3d at
155, 616 P.2d at 833, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
5. Where there is sufficient independent evidence to convict, the error could
not have been prejudicial because for the amount of evidence required under this
standard, there could be no reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different result if the prior conviction had not been admitted. 28 Cal. 3d
at 158, 160, 616 P.2d at 834, 836, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 852, 854. See, People v. Watson, 46
Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 255 (1956).
1. 27 Cal. 3d 841, 614 P.2d 291, 166 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1980). Appellant Glaze was
charged with a violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 103.101(g) which
provides that "[eIach picture arcade must remain closed between the hours of 2:00
a.m. and 9:00 a.m. and customers, patrons and visitors must be excluded from the
premises between these hours." The ordinance also provides that if there is only
one coin operated movieola and it is not the primary business, customers need not
be excluded during the otherwise imposed closing hours. The city contended that
the closing of picture arcades is a constitutional exercise of its police powers be-
cause the closing helps prevent masturbation during those hours when law en-
forcement problems are greatest.
2. A municipality has the general power to regulate commercial businesses
where the regulation is reasonable and non-discriminatory. See Burton v. Munici-
pal Court, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1968), in which it was held
that motion picture exhibitors are not immune from all restraint in pursuit of their
occupation, which, as an economic enterprise, is subject to reasonable municipal
regulation. See also, Antonello v. San Diego, 16 Cal. App. 3d 161, 93 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1971). So long as a relationship between the regulations of the public health,
safety, and welfare exists, the regulation wil be considered reasonable. A different
test is used if the ordinance is not uniformly applicable to all commercial enter-
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picture arcade has been held to be an activity which is protected
by the first amendment 3 and as such requires special considera-
tion when it is to be regulated. 61A3C provides a two step ap-
proach.
First, the ordinance must be directly aimed at the evil being at-
tacked 4 (in this case masturbation in public places). Secondly,
the ordinance must find the least restrictive means necessary to
regulate the activity.5 An approach which allows for no, distinc-
tion between picture arcades that show sexually explicit films and
those that show Mickey Mouse cartoons is overbroad. 6 The case
prises. For example, where the ordinance singles out for regulation a First
Amendment protected activity, the ordinance must be content neutral. Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
3. EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 3d 179, 158 Cal. Rptr. 579,
(1979). The court also stated that a city ordinance prohibiting concealed booths in
picture arcades was a reasonable exercise of the city's police power. The ordi-
nance requiring that the interior of the booths be visible did not restrict any rights
of freedom of expression; Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 488 P.2d 648, 97
Cal. Rptr. 320 (1971). Denial of a license which would prohibit an activity pro-
tected by the first amendment, even under a narrowly drawn ordinance, could
only be justified if granting the license constituted a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil.
4. In first amendment jurisprudence, "[pirecision of regulation must be the
touchstone .. " N.A.A.C.P. v. Button 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See also STONE, Re-
strictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 111-12.
5. People v. Wheatly Glaze, 27 Cal. 3d 841, 848, 614 P.2d 291, 296, 166 Cal. Rptr.
859, 864 (1980). See SAIA v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (A city ordinance
was found invalid as infringing the right of free speech in the absence of any stan-
dards prescribing the exercise of police powers by the chief of police); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (A limitation on the use of sound equipment emitting
loud and raucous noises upheld). See also, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal.3d 238,
599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979); Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d
276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
6. 27 Cal.3d at 849, 614 P.2d at -, 166 Cal. Rptr. at -.
"[tihe government assumes that because masturbation has occurred at
some picture arcades in the past, it is necessary to restrict the hours of all
such business in the future. The ordinance fails to regulate only those ar-
cades that have been or are likely to be havens for masturbation....
Such an undifferentiated approach is not sufficient to limit the right to
free expression."
People v. Wheatly Glaze 27 Cal. 3d 841, 849, 614 P.2d 291, 166 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1980).
See, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (the equal protec-
tion clause requires that statutes affecting first amendment interests be narrowly
tailored to their legitimate objectives; Cohen v. California 403 U.S 15, 23 (1971).
There may be some persons about which such lawless and violent proclivities, but
it is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional val-
ues, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident
more clearly specifies the necessity of dealing directly with objec-
tionable conduct.7
II. TORTS
A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Physical Injury Not Required Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospital
The recent case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital1 held that a
cause of action for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress need
not be accompanied by physical injury and that recovery for loss of con-
sortium may be predicated upon either debilitating physical or mental in-
jury.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court was called upon in Molien to de-
termine whether it should allow recovery of damages for the neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress absent accompanying
physical injury. The action was brought by a husband against a
doctor and a hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium arising out of an erroneous diagnosis of his
wife as having contracted syphilis.2 Subsequent testing revealed
that the plaintiff did not have venereal disease; however, hostility
arose between the spouses due to suspicion of extra marital af-
fairs which finally resulted in the initiation of divorce proceed-
ings. The couple also incurred large expenses for extensive
counseling in an attempt to save the marriage.
The court held that the unqualified requirement of physical in-
views into avoiding particular forms of expression; EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Ange-
les 97 Cal. App. 3d 179, 187, 158 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1979) (the city tried to rid itself of
undesirable establishments by creating a system of restraint based on past convic-
tions, rather than individual conduct, without showing such an individual with
such a record would present a clear and present danger of a serious and substan-
tive evil); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater 17 Cal. 3d 42, 59, 550
P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1976) (abatement must be directed to particular books
or films which have been adjudged obscene rather than against the premises in
which the material is sold).
7. People v. Wheatly Glaze 27 Cal. 3d 841, 849, 614 P.2d 291, 166 Cal. Rptr. 859
(1980). "Even if the First Amendment activity which the government seeks to reg-
ulate is of little value, the regulation must be necessary and it must focus nar-
rowly on the abuse sought to be remedied." Id.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
2. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. Plaintiffs wife was also re-
quired to undergo treatment for syphilis including the injection and administra-
tion of massive doses of penicillin. She alleged to have suffered "injury to her
body and injury to her nervous system" as a result. Id.
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jury, to which a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress
usually attaches, was no longer essential.3 Under the newly an-
nounced rule, the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to withstand
the defendant's general demurrer. Further, the court found that
the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable by the
defendant.4 A duty of care was, therefore, owed to the plaintiff to
accurately diagnose his wife.5 The negligent examination of
plaintiff's wife and the foreseeable consequences flowing there-
from, were external, objective, and verifiable events that served as
a measure of the validity of the claim. 6
The requisite standard of proof essential for the plaintiff to pre-
vail on his claim was found to be a sufficient safeguard against
false allegations of negligently inflicted emotional distress. 7 In re-
gard to the plaintiffs second cause of action for loss of consor-
tium, the court held that psychological injuries could be just as
disabling as physical injuries, resulting in nearly identical loss.
The issue involved was held to be one of proof rather than the
origin of the harm.8
Loss of consortium, only recently recognized in California, was
held not to be limited to those situations where the plaintiffs
spouse had suffered severe and permanent physical injury.9 In
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,1O the case that estab-
lished the viability of loss of consortium between spouses as a
separate cause of action, the injured spouse was rendered com-
pletely and permanently paralyzed below his chest. The court
held that it did not intend to restrict its ruling to those particu-
3. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
4. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. The court states that
In the case at bar the risk of harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable
to defendants. It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of
syphilis and its probable source would produce marital discord and resul-
tant emotional distress to a married patient's spouse; Dr. Kilbridge's ad-
vice to Mrs. Molien to have her husband examined for the disease
confirms that plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the negligent diagnosis.
Id.
5. Id. The court found that since the risk of harm was foreseeable, "that
under these circumstances defendants owed plaintiff a duty to exercise due care
in diagnosing the physical condition of his wife." Id.
6. Id. at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
7. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
8. Id. at 932-33, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
9. Id. at 931-32, 616 P.2d at 822, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
10. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
larly poignant facts." Rather, the court stated that the test of
whether or not the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff's
spouse is sufficient to warrant compensation for the tort is to be
determined by the adequacy of the evidence adduced in the par-
ticular case. The injury's classification as psychological or physio-
logical is not determinative.12 Given the nature of the loss, 13 the
court found it to be more consistent to recognize the fact that one
may become just as severely disabled mentally with the resulting
loss and suffering to the plaintiff just as serious as if the impair-
ment were of a purely physical nature.' 4
The court in Molien significantly extended liability for harm
manifested solely by mental distress absent some other tradition-
ally recognized guarantee of genuineness, such as accompanying
physical injury. The court held that it is now the jury's responsi-
bility to weed out the meritorious from the unmeritorious claims
according to the proof presented concerning the harm suffered.' 5
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. Emotional Distress
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to grant recovery for
emotional distress even when inflicted intentionally. They have
been even more hesitant when the claim has been for a distur-
11. Id. In Rodriquez, only 16 months after being married, the husband was
struck on the head while at work by a falling pipe that weighed over 600 pounds.
The blow severely damaged his spinal cord and left him completely paralyzed be-
low his chest and partially paralyzed in one arm. The accident changed the plain-
tiff's husband from an active participant in the marriage to a lifelong invalid. The
wife was forced to quit her job and devote 24 hours a day to her husband who re-
quired assistance in every activity of daily life. The wife had to awake at various
hours of the night to turn her husband to avoid bedsores. She had to help him
wash, dress, undress, and get in and out of his wheel chair every morning and eve-
ning. Additionally, as her husband had lost control over all bowel and bladder
functions, she was required to assist in the trying process of artificially inducing
these bodily functions.
12. 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
13. In Rodriquez, the court defined consortium as including factors such as
conjugal society, comfort, affection, and companionship. An additional component
recognized was the moral support that each spouse gives the other. 12 Cal. 3d at
405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
14. 27 Cal. 3d at 932-33, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
15. See Rodriquez v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The Supreme
Court of Hawaii addressed the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress as
an independent tort and in holding that there existed a duty to refrain from such
infliction stated that "[ciourts which have administered claims of mental distress
incident to an independent cause of action are just as competent to administer
such claims when they are raised as an independent ground for damages." Id. at
172, 472 P.2d at 519. In Molien, the court, in holding that negligent infliction of
emotional distress and loss of consortium do not require accompanying physical
injury, cited the Hawaii court's reasoning. 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 933, 616 P.2d at 821,
823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839, 841.
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bance negligently induced.16 Early reasons given for denial of
such recovery were that such intangible damages could not be
measured on a monetary basis,' 7 the consequences were too re-
mote and thus not proximately caused by the defendant's acts,'8
the fear of increased litigation,' 9 and the possibility of fraudulent
16. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896) (mental
suffering alone will not support a claim for damages; it does constitute aggravation
of physical harm if it naturally flows from the act complained of); Sprogis v. But-
ler, 40 Cal. App. 647, 181 P. 246 (1919) (plaintiff claimed injuries of a subjective na-
ture which depended entirely upon his own testimony; the court had a special
duty to thoroughly test the credibility and reliability of the plaintiff as a witness);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971). Dean
Prosser noted that the interest in freedom from mental distress has received rela-
tively little protection as compared to the protection afforded pecuniary and prop-
erty interests for various reasons. Courts had been reluctant to "recognize the
interest in peace of mind, even where the interference with it is intentional. This
reluctance has of course been more pronounced where the defendant's conduct is
merely negligent." Id.
17. See Ivnch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861) (mental suffering could not be
redressed because of the difficulty of measuring such harm and placing a mone-
tary value in it). See also Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Neg-
ligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG., N.S. 141, 143 (1902). The author attributed
the rule prohibiting recovery for emotional harm to the early rule holding that par-
ties to an action were incompetent as witnesses because of their inherent interest
in the action.
18. Victorian Rvs. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.S. 1888) (V.I.)
(emotional harm is not proximately caused by defendant's actions). See also 27
Cal. 3d at 933-37, 616 P.2d at 823-26, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841-44 (Clark, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Molien appears to assert that social policy mandates limiting liabil-
ity at a point short of that recognized by the majority. Since proximate cause is
basically a legal limit placed on factual causation, the dissent contends that the
limit should be placed where it was prior to Molien. Justice Clark warns against
imposing new burdens oh the court.
19. See 27 Cal. 3d at 937, 616 P.2d at 825, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 843. (Clark, J., dis-
senting) ("The author of today's majority opinion has properly cautioned against
the imposition of new burdens on the courts"); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In rejecting the rule denying recovery for emo-
tional distress based upon fear of peril to a third person, the court found that it
had previously rejected the argument that we must deny recovery upon a legiti-
mate claim because other fraudulent ones may be urged and went on to point out
that "courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, whether there
be few suits or many; the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows soci-
ety's pressing need for legal redress." Id. at 735 n.3, 441 P.2d at 917 n.3, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 77 n.3. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 327 (4th
ed. 1971). Prosser notes that:
[t Ihe same objections against allowing recovery have been advanced: it is
said that mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of money, and
so cannot serve in itself as a basis for the action; that its physical conse-
quences are too remote, and so not proximately caused, that there is a
lack of precedent, and that a vast increase in litigation would follow.
Id. See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921). "Most
valid objection to the protection of such interest lies in the 'wide door' which
claims.20 These reasons were advanced whether or not the plain-
tiff had additionally sustained physical harm.
Modernly, the issue is whether a claim for negligently inflicted
emotional distress can be maintained, absent physical impact,
like a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 21
The requirement that negligently inflicted emotional distress ei-
ther be accompanied by physical injury, result in physical harm,
or be intentionally inflicted, was to insure the genuineness of the
claim.22 The fear of false recovery for emotional distress has been
the most often cited reason for denying such claims.23
In California, damages for emotional distress were established
as parasitic to a recognized tort in the 1896 case of Sloane v.
Southern California Railroad Company.24 There it was held that
"mental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages when it
naturally ensues from the injury now complained of," but of itself,
would not sustain a right to relief.25 However, the same court in
Sloane ultimately found that a nervous disorder was a physiologi-
cal, and not a psychological injury. It noted that "the interdepen-
dence of mind and body is in many respects so close that it is
impossible to distinguish their respective influence upon each
might be opened, not only to fictitious claims but to litigation in the field of triviali-
ties and bad manners." Id. at 276.
20. See note 19 supra. The arguments against recognizing a right to recover
for emotional distress in the fear of feigned claims and the increase in litigation
generally, consisting both of fraudulent and perhaps valid claims, are often stated
together. But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12. (4th ed.
1971). Dean Prosser states:
Is]o far as distinguishing true claims from false ones is concerned, what is
required is rather, a careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting the claim
and the elimination of trivialities calls for nothing more than the same
common sense which has distinguished serious from trifling injuries in
other fields of the law.
Id. at 51.
21. See State Rubbish Collectors' Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952). Intentional infliction of severe emotional distress was recognized as an in-
dependent tort that would support a claim for damages. Extreme and outrageous
conduct associated with an intentional act was held to insure that a claim of emo-
tional harm would be genuine.
22. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967) (independent cause of action against an insurer for damages when it re-
fused to settle a claim against the insured within the limits of policy served as a
guarantee of genuineness sufficient to permit the plaintiff to recover for the emo-
tional disturbance as well as the excess judgment); Vanoni v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 46 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967) (allegations that plaintiffs suf-
fered severe shock to their nerves and nervous systems was sufficient to state a
physical injury to withstand a general demurrer). See note 21 supra.
23. See notes 19-20 supra; 27 Cal. 3d at 925-26, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
836.
24. 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 680, 44 P. at 322.
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other."26
Subsequent cases followed the rule laid down in Sloane and
held that actionable mental suffering results only when a person,
through negligence suffers "injury by physical impact or by shock,
through the senses, to the nervous system and damages for physi-
cal injuries may be supplemented with damages for mental suffer-
ing."27 The court in Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital,28 for example,
distinguished emotional distress resulting when plaintiffs were
given the wrong baby as being negligently inflicted and, thus, not
capable of being sustained as an independent tort. The court in
Espinosa clearly indicated that some physical manifestation was
required to maintain the action, whether it resulted from the emo-
tional injury or was incidental to it. However, the court did find
that "the human body can through negligence of others suffer in-
jury... by shock, through the senses, to the nervous system...
and a shock to the nervous system is an injury to the body rather
than to the mind."29
The case of Vanoni v. Western Airlines3O in 1967 relied on the
earlier decisions of Sloane and Espinosa in finding that the negli-
gent acts of the defendant airline and its agents in indicating that
the plane on which the plaintiffs were passengers was going to
crash could not sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress standing alone, unless accompanied by a physical
manifestation. The line of demarcation between physical and
mental injury seemed to be further eroded by the court's finding
that the plaintiffs' allegation that they had suffered "severe shock
to their nerves and nervous system" sufficiently stated a physi-
cal, rather than psychological, injury.3 1
26. Id.
27. Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952) (mental
suffering alone, when negligently inflicted, would not sustain a claim for relief).
28. 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952).
29. Id. at 234, 249 P.2d at 844. However, the ruling in Espinosa was that the
plaintiff's claim that their loss of sleep was a physical injury was a matter for the
jury to decide guided by the instruction that a physical injury must result from the
mental shock. See Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793 at 797, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 115 at 117 (1967), reiterating the rule laid down in Espinosa that a shock
through the senses to the nervous system constituted a physical injury. In Va-
noni, however, the allegations that the plaintiffs had suffered such shock to their
nervous system caused by the defendant's negligence in indicating to passengers
on a flight that the plane was going to crash was sufficient to sustain the claim of
physical injury. Both cases rested on Sloane.
30. 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
31. Id. at 797, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 117. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
Further problems arose when the alleged mental distress was
suffered by a third person. Even in jurisdictions which did not re-
quire a physical impact to sustain a mental distress action, such
as California, recovery was denied under the theory that the de-
fendant could not have anticipated any possible harm to the
plaintiff and thus owed the plaintiff no duty. The analysis re-
quired that one be in apprehension of his or her own safety to be
successful.
3 2
The California Supreme Court was first to recognize the viabil-
ity of claims for mental distress in the case of Dillon v. Legg.33
Dillon overruled the factually similar case of Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co. 34 decided only five years before. Both in-
volved a mother witnessing the negligent injury of her child.
However, Amaya and earlier decisions, held that "even where a
child, sister, or spouse is the object of the plaintiff's apprehension
no cause of action is stated unless the complaint alleges that the
plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright, or shock as a result of
fear for his own safety." 35 In retrospect, the Molien court as-
serted that the duty approach "begged the question whether
plaintiffs interests were entitled to legal protection: the finding of
a duty was simply a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather
32. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). Amaya required that a plaintiff be in the zone of danger to
recover for fear of peril to another. The court expressly rejected the idea that tort
liability could be predicated upon fright or nervous shock, even where bodily ill-
ness ensued where induced solely by one's fear of negligently caused injury to a
third person. Amaya denied recovery to a mother who witnessed her 17 month
old son struck by the defendant's delivery truck. See also Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939) (california rule was that recovery for negligence did
not require a physical impact, but physical injury resulting from or accompanying
the negligently induced harm was still necessary to a claim).
33. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Dillon expressly over-
ruled Amaya and the zone of danger concept referred to in note 31 supra. In this
regard, the court suggested that:
[r]ecovery for physical injury resulting from emotional trauma on wit-
nessing the tortious infliction of death or injury on a third party does not
require the claimant to have been in the zone of danger; such recovery
must be governed by the general rules of tort law, including the concepts
of negligence, proximate cause and foreseeability ....
68 Cal. 2d at 728, 441 P.2d at 913, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
34. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). The Dillon majority
sought to illustrate the fallacy of the Amaya rule that would deny recovery to the
mother who witnessed the death of her child but not to the child's sister simply
because she was a few feet closer to the accident and thus within the zone of dan-
ger. A further illustration of the inadequacy of the zone of danger rule pointed out
in Dillon was the incongruity of rejecting the impact requirement for recovery but
still requiring one be in the zone of danger by fearing impact of harm to oneself.
68 Cal. 2d at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
35. Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 45, 319 P.2d 80, 82 (1957); See Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)
(see note 32 supra). Dillon overruled these cases.
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than an aid to analysis in itself."36
In Dillon, the court listed three factors to balance in determin-
ing whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable by the defend-
ant: the plaintiff's proximity to the accident scene; whether the
shock resulted from direct observance of the accident as opposed
to learning of it second hand; and the closeness of the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the victim.3 7
The court in Molien, however, distinguishes Dillon in that
Molien inquired whether the plaintiff suffered direct emotional
distress, rather than by fear of peril to a third person as in Dil-
lon.38 This difference was based on the fact that in Molien the
plaintiff-husband was a direct victim of the negligent act.39 The
difference in the plaintiffs' positions in the two cases did not ap-
pear to be all that distinct.40
B. Loss of Consortium
Loss of consortium was an action defined at early common law
as any wrong resulting in physical incapacity to a wife which was
sufficient to deprive a husband of her "services." 41 The reciprocal
action was not recognized. The loss of services was the primary
loss at that time, but modernly, consortium has evolved to repre-
sent the noneconomic aspects of the marital relationship. These
have been held to include intangibles as society, comfort, com-
panionship, and sexual relationships.42
36. 27 Cal. 3d at 921-22, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The duty approach
was defined by whether or not one was within the zone of danger. If a person was
within the zone of danger, the defendant owed a duty to him. This was the reason-
ing of the Dillon court which the Molien majority preferred not to follow. Id.
37. Consideration of these factors would determine whether the harm to the
plaintiff was foreseeable and thus whether the defendant owed a duty of care that
was breached by the action.
38. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
39. Id.
40. Although the positions of the plaintiffs in Molien and the plaintiffs in Dil-
lon do not appear to be very significant, the court in Molien felt otherwise even
though both plaintiffs suffered emotional harm. In Molien, the court found that
the negligent conduct of the defendant was directed toward the plaintiff because
of the nature of the disease and the manner in which it is transmitted. The negli-
gent diagnosis of the doctor allegediy caused the plaintiff to be a direct victim.
However, in Dillon, the court found that it was foreseeable that a mother would be
in the vicinity of her child and, thus, when the child was in danger, the mother
would probably suffer serious shock. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 79.
41. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 889. (4th ed. 1971).
42. See note 13 supra.
The general rule in California was, until Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corporation,43 that neither spouse could recover for this
tort. However, the Rodriguez court revitalized the action under a
paticularly compelling factual situation." In Molien, however, the
court asserted that the extreme physical disablement of the hus-
band in the Rodriquez case was not crucial to the decision. The
critical factor was the debilitating injury to the spouse, from what
ever its origin.45
The California Supreme Court took note of a decision by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts which addressed the issue of
nonphysical injury to a plaintiff's spouse in the context of inten-
tionally inflicted emotional distress. 46 The Massachusetts court
found that "the underlying purpose of such an action is to com-
pensate for the loss of companionship, affection and sexual enjoy-
ment of one's spouse, and it is clear that there can be loss as a
result of psychological or emotional injury as well as from actual
physical harm."47 The California court found this reasoning to be
persuasive and equally applicable to situations where the psycho-
logical harm is negligently inflicted.48
III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. Emotional Distress
The California Supreme Court initially seized upon the distinc-
tion between the respective positions of the plaintiffs in Dillon
and Molien in declining to apply to the guidelines established in
Dillon to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff. The court held the general principle of foreseeability,
which was the controlling principle in Dillon, to be applicable to
the present case and that each case would turn on its own unique
factual setting.49 Finding at the outset that the risk of harm to the
plaintiff, as well as his wife, was foreseeable, the court found that
43. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
44. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
45. 27 Cal. 3d at 932-33, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
46. Agis v. Howard Johnson Company, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
47. Id. at 146, 355 N.E.2d at 320.
48. 27 Cal. 3d at 932, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
49. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. In this aspect, the court
stated that:
[T]he significance of Dillon for the present action lies not in its delinea-
tion of guidelines fashioned for resolution of the precise issue then before
us; rather, we apply its general principle of foreseeability to the facts at
hand, much as we have done in other cases presenting complex questions
of tort liability.
Id.
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a duty was owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. The Court pro-
ceeded to consider the issue of physical injury.
The court considered mental distress to be a specific tort and
found that the Sloane case laid the foundation for two often
stated principles. The first of these is that damages for emotional
distress are to be considered parasitic to an independently recog-
nized tort, and secondly, that mental harm can be classified as ei-
ther a physiological or psychological injury.50 The court noted
that the law of negligence still required either physical harm re-
sulting from emotional injury or physical injury incidentally pro-
ducing emotional disturbance.51 Additionally, the court found
that this rule has been blindly followed since its inception in
Sloane with little regard for the varied factual contexts in which
such claims arise.52
In the course of its opinion, the court ultimately recognized that
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was an in-
dependent tort, and searched for the historical justifications be-
hind the often stated rule requiring physical harm. It found that
the Sloane court, and subsequent courts applying Sloan, had not
examined the underlying reasons for the rule but had merely ap-
plied it mechanically.5 3 Through sources other than case deci-
sions, the court found that "[t]he primary justification for the
requirement of physical injury appears to be that it serves as a
screening device to minimize a presumed risk of feigned injuries
and false claims."5 4 Since physical harm was considered to be ca-
pable of objective proof, it served as a guarantee of the genuine-
ness of the accompanying claim of emotional distress.
California was also found to have generally provided an individ-
ual with compensation for emotional injury when some other cir-
50. Id. at 924-25, 616 P.2d at 817-18, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
51. Id. The court found the state of the law, to be as follows:
[t] here can be no recovery of damages for emotional distress unaccompa-
nied by physical injury where such emotional distress arises only from
negligent conduct. However, if a plaintiff has suffered a shock to the ner-
vous system or other physical harm which was proximately caused by
negligent conduct of a defendant, then such plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages from such a defendant for any resulting physical harm and emo-
tional distress.
Id. (citing BAI No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977)).
52. Id. at 924-25, 616 P.2d at 817-18, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
cumstance provided the desired guarantee of genuineness. 55
Physical injury occurring either simultaneously or as a conse-
quence of emotional harm was one means to assure a claim's va-
lidity. A second means was an independent claim asserted
separately from the personal injury cause of action. Finally, ex-
treme and outrageous conduct amounting to the intentional inflic-
tion of severe emotional distress served as another method for
assuring a claim for compensation for emotional injury was not
fraudulent.56
The court looked to various authorities in other jurisdictions to
sustain its proposition that the rule denying such recovery was
arbitrary, unfounded, and not the appropriate means to attain the
goal of warding off false claims. Certain scholars 57 had main-
tained that such artificial barriers were not essential to serve the
purported goal. "Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of
mental injury are marked by definite physical symptoms, which
are capable of clear medical proof."5 8 The problem, the court
found, was essentially one of proof, and that barring all claims
when some could be readily proven was an unnecessarily over-
broad means to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Sec-
ondly, the distinction between mental and physical injury had
proved to be a very vague distinction. Allowing recovery for emo-
tional distress when accompanied by physical manifestation, but
denying redress for emotional distress not so accompanied was
found to be an arbitrary denial.5 9
Also noted by the court was a decision by the Hawaii Supreme
Court on the identical issue. 60 In discarding the rule that there
could be no cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress standing alone, the Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that
"courts which have administered claims of mental distress inci-
dental to an independent cause of action are just as competent to
administer such claims when they are raised as an independent
ground for damages." 6 1 The Hawaii court found that by using se-
rious emotional disturbance according to a reasonable person
standard, defendants would not be held accountable for minor or
trivial actions.62 The California Supreme Court agreed that the
unqualified requirement of physical injury was no longer justi-
55. Id.
56. Id. at 926-27, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
57. The court primarily looked to the writings of Dean Prosser, Dooley, and
Roscoe Pound. Id. at 926, 930, 616 P.2d at 818, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836, 839.
58. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971).
59. 27 Cal. 3d at 928-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-40.
60. Id. at 927-28, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
61. See note 15 supra.
62. 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 519 (1970).
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fied.63
The court cited two major deficiencies in the reasoning that has
denied plaintiffs with claims for mental distress access to courts.
The first difficulty was that the scheme was overinclusive in al-
lowing any plaintiff access despite the triviality of his physical in-
jury and underinclusive in automatically denying the same access
to claims without physical injury that were meritorious and could
easily be proved. 64 The second major problem with the rule was
that it encouraged distorted pleadings in order for a plaintiff to be
able to get into court. Often a counselor could exaggerate a minor
injury so that a plaintiff could recover a large judgment on the el-
ement of emotional distress.65
The court found that the attempt to distinguish between a psy-
chological and physiological injury merely disguised the real is-
sue, which was one of proof. The standard of proof required to
support a claim of a compensable injury was found to be suffi-
cient to weed out fictitious from genuine claims. The court found
that screening claims at the pleading stage on the basis of an arbi-
trary classification of an injury as either mental or physical in-
vaded the province of the jury.66
In applying the foregoing reasoning to the facts presented, the
court held that the complaint stated a cause of action, being the
negligent diagnosis of the plaintiff's wife, and that the events re-
sulting proximately therefrom were objectively verifiable. The
emotional responses flowing from these actions were foreseeable
and, as such, served to insure the genuineness of the claim. Fi-
nally, the fact that a false charge of having syphilis can constitute
slander per se served to corroborate the claim of emotional dis-
tress. 6 7
B. Loss of consortium
The court found that the cause of action for loss of consortium
resulting from the same negligent diagnosis was valid despite the
63. 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
64. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. In light of the fear of liti-
gation, the court stated that "[iIf physical injury, however slight, provides the tick-
et for admission to the courthouse, it is difficult for advocates of the 'floodgates'
premonition to deny that the doors are already wide open . . . 'mental suffering
frequently constitutes the principal element of tort damages."' Id. at 928.
65. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
66. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
67. Id. at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
fact that the initial case giving viability to such claims in Califor-
nia involved serious physical as distinguished from emotional in-
jury.68 Since the distinction between physical and mental injury
is no longer justified in sustaining an action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court held that the same is true for
loss of consortium. In Rodriquez, several references were made
to the severe physical injury of the plaintiffs husband, but the
court did not restrict the holding to those particular facts.69 As
previously discussed, one may become severely disabled from
mental, as well as physical causes.70 The loss to the plaintiff
spouse is the same. 71
Rodriquez dealt with the issue of whether or not to recognize
loss of consortium as a tort at all. There was no attempt to limit
the origin of the injury which would support the claim. Serious
physical injuries were not critical to the decision. The court de-
fined consortium to include such abstract factors as conjugal soci-
ety, comfort, affection, and companionship, and stated that "an
important aspect of consortium is thus the moral support each
spouse gives the other."72 Thus damage to a spouse's mental or
emotional well being could deprive the other of those intangible
factors included in consortium as surely as a physical injury.
Other compelling reasons were found by the court for not limit-
ing the injury suffered by the plaintiffs spouse to physical injury.
"It is irrefutable that certain psychological injuries can be no less
severe and debilitating than physical injuries."73 The question, as
with negligent infliction of emotional distress, is one of proof, i.e.,
whether the injury that the plaintiffs spouse received is serious
enough to interfere with the marital relationship in more than a
temporary fashion. The degree of harm suffered is susceptible to
proof and although proof may be more difficult when the harm is
emotional than physical, and where induced negligently rather
than intentionally, these are questions for the jury to resolve.7 4
IV. CASE IMPACT
The major repercussions feared by the extension of liability in
Molien are the same as those which have precluded recognition
of any independent tort in emotional injury. The dissenters in
Molien and Dillon marshal essentially the same reasons as those
68. Id. at 931, 616 P.2d at 821-22, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
69. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 931-33, 616 P.2d at 821-23, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839-41.
72. 12 Cal. 3d at 405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
73. 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
74. Id.
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historically advanced against recognition of emotional distress.
Their concern included fears of increased litigation, infinite liabil-
ity, and false claims.75 The California Supreme Court previously
held in State Rubbish Collectors Association v. Siliznoff that "to
allow recovery in the absence of physical injury will open the
door to unfounded claims and a flood of litigation, and that the re-
quirement that there be physical injury is necessary to insure
that serious mental suffering actually occurred" 76 when it recog-
nized an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress.
However, the Dillon court dismissed the argument that such an
extension of liability would result in holding persons responsible
for every trivial act amounting to little more than rude manners
by analogizing to the ancient products liability case of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright.77 The court asserted that history showed that this
argument was a fallacy.
Denying recovery to all plaintiffs because some may have man-
ufactured their claims was examined and rejected by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Dillon .78 Administrative convenience does
not justify blanket denial of relief to those asserting worthy
claims. Such a rationale imputes the ability of the judiciary to
perform its assigned function of providing remedies for substan-
tial wrongs.79 It seems that confidence in the judicial system and
its ability to recognize false claims is an underlying supposition to
allowing recovery for emotional distress or loss of consortium ab-
sent physical injury.8 0
75. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 933-37, 616 P.2d at 823-26, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841-44
(Clark, J., dissenting); Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 748-52, 441 P.2d at 925-28, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
85-88 (Traynor, C.J., and Burke, J., dissenting).
76. State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
77. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 631 (Ex. 1842). In citing the ancient
Winterbottom case, which denied recovery to a consumer for want of privity of
contract, the Dillon majority sought to illustrate that extending the area of possi-
ble liability was sometimes necessary to keep abreast of the needs of society. The
fact that liability is extended, it was asserted, should not be a reason in itself to
defeat it. 68 Cal. 2d at 735-37, 743-44, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 922-23, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78,
82-83.
78. 68 Cal. 2d at 735-37, 441 P.2d at 922-23, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83.
79. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
80. This certainly seems to be the underlying optimism in Dillon and Molien
asserted by the majority. The former case dealt only with the tort of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress and asserted that it was extremely unlikely that "the
problem of the fraudulent claim is substantially more pronounced in the case of a
mother claiming physical injury resulting from seeing her child killed than in
other areas of tort law in which the right to recover damages is well established in
The dissenters in Dillon and Molien contend that extending lia-
bility beyond the bounds of proximately caused injury would re-
sult in irrational and inaccurate jury verdicts. 8' They questioned
a jury's ability to discern viable psychological injury. In Amaya,
the case overruled by Dillon, the majority relied upon a medical
study emphasizing the complexity of such issues and urging that
juries not be utilized to decide such cases. 82 Further findings re-
vealed by the study indicated that most persons claiming emo-
tional distress had less than normal resistance to psychic stimuli.
Out of the 301 cases studied, only 55 established causation by a
preponderance of the evidence. The dissenters in Molien specifi-
cally accused the court of advancing the law ahead of modern
psychology and medicine, alleging that empirical data still
showed that neither psychologists nor juries are better equipped
today to accurately adjudicate the authenticity of emotional dis-
turbance claims than centuries ago.83
The majority, however, determined that the law does not re-
quire mathematical exactitude in either determining issues of lia-
bility or equating physical injury with monetary awards.84 More
fundamentally, they asserted that allowing for emotional injury,
and recognizing it as an actual injury, will open the courtroom
doors to meritorious claims while denying automatic entrance to
those that exaggerate physical symptoms and harbor ulterior mo-
tives of collecting large judgments on the emotional distress com-
ponent of damages.85 The burden of proof necessary to prosecute
a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of con-
California." Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78. In Molien,
which dealt with both torts, the court expressly stated it had confidence that the
system would accurately separate sham from serious suits. "[Ojur faith in the
ability of the jury to exercise sound judgment in fixing compensation [for mental
suffering was acknowledged in Rodriquez and we] reaffirm that faith today."
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
81. See 27 Cal. 3d at 935-36, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The dissenting
opinion examined the court's findings in Amaya and rightfully determined that
adjudicating the effects of mental disturbance would be very difficult for jurors.
See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
82. The study relied on by the majority in the Amaya case was Smith, Rela-
tions of Emotions to Injury and Disease, Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30
VA. L. REV. 193 (1944).
83. 27 Cal. 3d at 935-36, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
84. 68 Cal. 2d at 738, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79. After examining the
history of the law on the tort of both negligently and intentionally inflicted emo-
tional distress, and the rationales that have supported a denial of recovery, the
court noted that "[i In terms of characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a
money award to the injury suffered as well as in fixing the extent of injury, the
process cannot be perfect." Id.
85. 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. This follows from one
of the major problems that the majority saw in the rule that it abolished; that is,
the encouragement of extravagant pleadings alleging physical injury such that the
plaintiff could get into court.
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sortium absent physical injury to a plaintiff's spouse will suffice
as a guarantee of genuineness. While opponents of the newly an-
nounced rule contend than Molien dispenses with any meaningful
standards to which the evidence in the case may be directed, the
court believes that establishing foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff will suffice as a meaningful standard.86
Some limitations on recovery may be advisable, even though
subsequent cases may prove them to be arbitrary. The circum-
stances of each case will have to be evaluated to ascertain
whether any facts corroborate the claim of emotional distress and
thus guarantee the genuineness of the injury. Molien, it must be
remembered, is directed only to the situation where the person
asserting emotional harm is a direct victim or directly affected by
the defendant's negligent act.87 The standard is not the particular
defendant's range of foreseeability nor the particular plaintiff's
threshold of emotional strain, but is, instead, that of an ordinary
person of reasonably sound mind. Such a standard is useful in
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial system from the histori-
cal fear of the feigned claim. 88
While the court has not addressed a right of independent recov-
ery where the emotional distress is caused by fear of harm to a
third person, the same reasoning appears to be equally applica-
ble. If the harm is sufficiently severe to induce serious emotional
86. Id. at 934-35, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The dissenting opinion
states that the safeguard of the old rule in requiring accompanying physical injury
in a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress is abandoned for a new stan-
dard of "some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case" and
where "proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature." The dissent
finds these newly enunciated standards to be "nonstandards, opening wide the
door to abuse." Id. at 935, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
87. Id. at 922-24, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. The emphasis of the
majority is on a case-by-case approach. The court stated that "under these cir-
cumstances" the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. Id. at 923, 616
P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
88. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In agreeing with the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, which held a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was an independent tort, the Molien majority found that the
"general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress in some
guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case." Id. The Hawaii court
further held that a reasonable person standard should be utilized. Id. at 928, 616
P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. The court in Molien seemed to be saying
that since juries have always operated under the "reasonably prudent person"
standard, they should have no problems in deciding these cases. Id. at 930, 616
P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
distress in a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, recovery
should be permitted. While Molien classified the plaintiff as a di-
rect victim of the negligent act because the defendant could fore-
see the harm that could be caused him, the husband's position
does not appear to be significantly different from that of the
mother in Dillon who witnessed the death of her child.89 The rec-
ognition of the mother's right to recovery in Dillon was based
upon the fact that she was directly affected by the defendant's
negligent act.
Another limitation that should be placed on recovery concerns
the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. Dillon
stated that this was to be one factor in considering whether the
plaintiffs emotional injury was foreseeable. 90 For example, the
California Supreme Court has, subsequent to the Rodriquez case,
placed a limit on recovery that excluded a cause of action by a
child for loss of parental consortium. In Borer v. American Air-
lines, Inc. ,91 the court held a child had no cause of action for loss
of parental consortium.
V. CONCLUSION
By recognizing the severity and credibility of psychological in-
jury on a similar level as physical harm, the California Supreme
Court in Molien allows one to seek compensation for negligent in-
flection of emotional distress without prior requirements of physi-
cal injury to act as guarantee of genuineness. In categorizing the
problem as one of proof to be resolved by a jury, the court seeks
to allow deserving claims to proceed to trial while still assuring
the validity of complaints by allowing corroborating evidence to
serve as a measure of validity. By identifying the reasons for the
previous ban, and the inadequacy of the prior rule to serve its
purported purpose, the court has simultaneously created the pos-
89. See note 40 supra.
90. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
91. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977). It is interesting to note
that the reasons given for not allowing a child to recover for loss of parental con-
sortium are the same reasons that have been historically advanced for not recog-
nizing any form of emotional distress. The court suggests that:
[pJolicy considerations militating against the creation of such a cause of
action, unsupported by statute or precedent, include the difficulty of as-
sessing and the basic inaptness of, monetary compensation for such an in-
tangible injury to the child: the increase, if such a cause of action were
created, in the number of claims asserted against, and in the ultimate lia-
bility of, defendants in ordinary accident cases; and the administrative
burden of settling or resolving such claims.
Id. at 442, 563 P.2d at 859, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
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sibility of ill effects in the form of increased litigation while re-
ducing the necessity of exaggerated pleadings to get into court.
As for loss of consortium, the court has taken a considerable
step in extending liability when one considers that the common
law tort was revitalized only a few years ago. However, the na-
ture of the loss inherent in the tort makes it consistent to recog-
nize a plaintiff's claim where his or her spouse has suffered
serious, permanent, and disabling injury, whatever its source.
Since the loss is basically an emotional one, recognition of loss in-
curred as a result of mental or physical harm, appears to be a log-
ical extension.
B. DEFENSES
1. Governmental Immunity And The Duty To Warn:
Thompson v. County of Alameda
The California Supreme Court extends government immunity by restrict-
ing the existence of a duty to warn of a probationer's violent tendencies to
exacting circumstances. The simplistic and inequitable nature of the deci-
sion, in addition to its departure from recent trends is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court, in Thompson v. County of Ala-
meda,1 held that the state has no affirmative duty to warn large
amorphous groups of people of a probationer's dangerous propen-
sities. A specific duty to warn does not arise until it is demon-
strated that the state had knowledge of the offender's malevolent
intentions toward a known identifiable victim.2 Only with this
knowledge will a special relationship 3 exist between the potential
victim and the state such that the state has an affirmative duty to
warn the victim of his imperiled situation. By requiring that a
special relationship be demonstrated, the Thompson decision has
effectively expanded governmental immunity in police and correc-
1. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
The majority opinion was written by Justice Richardson with Chief Justice Bird
and Justices Clark, Newman, and Caldecott concurring. Justice Tobriner wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Mosk concurred. Justice Caldecott was tempo-
rarily assigned by the chairperson of the judicial council.
2. Id. at 750-51, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
3. See notes 18, 20, and 22 infra and accompanying text.
tional activities. 4
Plaintiffs resided a few doors from James, a known 18 year old
juvenile offender. Prior to his release, James had been under the
control of the defendant County of Alameda. During his confine-
ment the County became aware that James had manifested "la-
tent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding
young children and that sexual assaults upon young children and
violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing
[him] into the community."5 In addition, the County had knowl-
edge that James "indicated that he would, if released, take the life
of a young child residing in the neighborhood."6 However, he
never indicated any specific child as his potential victim.
Despite these known tendencies, James was released on tempo-
rary probation into the custody of his mother. Prior to his release
the County did not warn James's mother, the local police, or
nearby neighbors of James's intentions or his known violent ten-
dencies. Soon after his release, James murdered the plaintiffs'
son in the garage of James's mother's home.
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming the wrongful death of their child
due to the County's "reckless, wanton and grossly negligent ac-
tions ' in releasing James without sufficient warning. The County
demurred contending that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause
of action, since their actions were shrouded with immunity under
the California Government Code.8 The defendant's demurrer was
sustained and the plaintiffs appealed to the California Supreme
Court which upheld the trial court's decision. 9
4. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976), and Johnson v. State of Cal., 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1968). See also notes 10, 18, and 21 infra and accompanying text.
5. 27 Cal. 3d at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
6. Id.
7. Plaintiffs alleged four separate causes of action. First, the county had ac-
ted negligently in deciding to release James into the community. Second, the
county was negligent in failing to warn James's mother, the local police, and par-
ents within the neighborhood of James's release. Third, the county was negligent
in failing to exercise due care and control over James's conduct through James's
mother as the county's agent. Fourth, the county failed to use due care in choos-
ing James's mother as their agent to maintain control and custody over James.
The court believed counts one, three, and four to be covered by government immu-
nity due to their discretionary nature. Count two most concerned the court and
was given the greatest attention in the decision. 27 Cal. 3d at 746-47, 614 P.2d at
730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 818.2, 820.2, 844.6(a)(1), 845, 845.8(a), and 846 (West
1980). Although the defendant based its demurrer on all cited code sections, the
court found only sections 820.2 and 845.8 to be applicable. See note 11 infra and
accompanying text.
9. The California Supreme Court opinion vacated a California Court of Ap-
peal decision which had overturned the trial court's decision.
552
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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Although the Thompson decision does not turn solely on the
nuances of government immunity, it is important to note impor-
tant distinctions. In Johnson v. State of California,0 the supreme
court determined that the decision to release a prisoner was dis-
cretionary and, therefore, cloaked with statutory immunity." The
court in Johnson explained "the decision to parole thus comprises
the resolution of policy considerations, entrusted by statute to a
coordinate branch of government, that compels immunity from ju-
dicial reexamination." 12 Although the choice of custodians and
the decision regarding the readiness of a prisoner for release are
discretionary decisions, the court in Johnson refused to mechani-
cally apply the term "discretionary."' 3 Rather, the court preferred
to evaluate the policy considerations behind grants of immunity
in order to determine which acts are protected.14 The court found
that the complexity of choosing a guardian, decisions relating to
well-being, and the balancing of public interests are delicate mat-
ters of discretion requiring immunity.' 5
10. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
11, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980) provides: "a public employer is not
liable for an injury resulting from the acts or omission where the act or omission
was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such
discretion be abused."
12. 69 Cal. 2d at 795, 447 P.2d at 361, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 (footnote omitted).
13. The court in Johnson considered the immunity associated with a discre-
tionary decision as distinguished from the liability connected to ministerial deci-
sions as explained in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). In Muskopf, plaintiff sued defendant hospital for their neg-
ligence in causing her to fall and further injure her hip for which she was being
treated. The defendant demurred on the ground it was a state agency performing
a governmental function and as such was immune from tort liability. Seeing no
reason to over-extend government immunity, the court drew a distinction indicat-
ing that government officials are liable for the negligent performance of their min-
isterial duties, but are not liable for their discretionary acts within the scope of
their authority. See Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665, 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1978)
(public official is immune from tort liability for discretionary acts as long as he is
acting within his capacity of a public official); McCarthy v. Frost, 33 Cal. App. 3d
872, 109 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973) (decision of peace officer whether to investigate acci-
dent involves the exercise of discretion and is therefore immune from liability).
14. The Thompson court likewise felt the judiciary should examine if liability
should attach by determining if the proper policies would be served by the exten-
sion of liability. 27 Cal. 3d at 749-50, 614 P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74. Cf. McCor-
kle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969)
(government immunity should not be extended to cover the negligent implemen-
tation of a discretionary decision since no causal relation exists).
15. See Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189
(1977) (rejected the special relationship giving rise to a duty of the government to
Johnson noted the demarcation between discretionary acts,
which are shielded with immunity, and ministerial acts which are
vulnerable to court review. "Once the proper authorities have
made the basic policy decision-to place a youth with foster par-
ents, for example-the role of . . . immunity ends; subsequent
negligent actions, such as the failure to give reasonable warnings
to foster parents actually selected, are subject to legal redress."16
If a duty and subsequent breach can be demonstrated, liability
can be established.17
Johnson demonstrated the presence of "a duty upon those who
create a foreseeable peril, not readily discoverable by endangered
persons, to warn them of such potential peril."8 In Johnson, the
state placed a minor with homicidal tendencies in Mrs. Johnson's
home. Mrs. Johnson sued the state following an attack on her by
the minor. The court held the state and the plaintiff were in a spe-
cial relationship such that the state by its conduct had placed the
plaintiff in clearly foreseeable danger. The court noted that the
state had clear knowledge of the specific identity of the endan-
gered persons such that the special relationship existed giving
rise to the duty to warn.19 As in Johnson, the authorities in
Thompson were well aware of James's threats. However, due to
the imprecise nature of his threats, no special relationship was
found to exist. 20
In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,21 the court
relied on an exception to the general rule that one owes no duty
to control the conduct of another. Under this exception, a duty to
warn arose only in exceptional circumstances. 22 The exception is
control the defendant, where a probationer injured the plaintiffs due to county's
alleged negligence); County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d
751, 93 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1971) (failure to warn the general public of an offender's vio-
lent tendencies is covered by the immunity associated with the discretionary de-
cision to release).
16. 69 Cal. 2d at 799, 447 P.2d at 364, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
17. Duty would attach to the ministerial enactment of the discretionary deci-
sion to release. See McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969) (negligence in implementing police officer's decisions to in-
vestigate is not cloaked with immunity).
18. 69 Cal. 2d at 786, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (footnote omitted).
19. Specific knowledge of the potential victim's identity is what creates the
"special relationship" that is necessary for a duty to exist. The Thompson court
asserts the specifically identifiable victim must be present before a duty to warn
will arise. The court based this decision on Johnson. Although the Johnson deci-
sion did not hold that the victim must be identified and present, the court as-
sumed such a requirement because the factual setting in Johnson had concerned
such a particularized situation. 27 Cal. 3d at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
81.
20. 27 Cal. 3d at 751, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
21. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1963-64). Section 315 provided
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manifested in the special relationship that exists when an of-
fender informs his custodians of his intention to do violence.
Tarasoff determined that attending therapists had an affirmative
duty to warn a known, foreseeable, and specifically identifiable
victim of a patient's proposed violence. Relating the decision to
the facts of Thompson, the court indicated a specific duty to warn
only clearly identifiable persons would be imposed upon the
state. 23 Also, the court restricted the Tarasoff decision to physi-
cians, 24 while the suit in Thompson is against the County of Ala-
meda.
Thompson allowed the court to examine the degree of specific-
ity required in a suspect's threat before a duty arises by means of
a special relationship. The court's decision would, in essence, ex-
pand or contract governmental immunity depending upon the
amount of specificity required as determined from each set of
facts. The majority preferred the more restrictive view and held
the only obligation owed is a highly specific one.25
that such a duty will exist in two situations: "(a) a special relation exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection."
Johnson embodied the second situation where the state had entered into a spe-
cial relationship with the plaintiff by knowingly endangering her with the proba-
tioner's presence. Tarasoff considered the first situation where psychotherapists
had entered into a special relationship with the actor by undertaking to treat him.
The Thompson court considers the second situation, but did not find sufficient
specificity in the potential victim's identity to give rise to a special relationship.
See notes 37, 39, and 41 infra. See also Buford v. State of California, 104 Cal. App.
3d 811, 819, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264, 269 (1980) (state may be in special relationship with
the probationer which will give rise to a duty to control his conduct); McDowell v.
County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979) (county hospital
has a duty to insure mental patient's safe arrival at private hospital in order to
protect the public in the event of his escape); Harland v. State of California, 75
Cal. App. 3d 475, 142 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977) (special relationship may exist in situa-
tions involving an individual's dependence on a governmental agency for rehabili-
tation); Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977)
(policy behind recognizing a duty to aid is based upon the existence of relation-
ships of dependence).
23. The Thompson court approved the duty to control the conduct of a mental
patient found in Tarasoff. 27 Cal. 3d at 752, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76. By
doing so, the court appeared to indicate a more stringent rule is placed on ther-
apists and doctors than on government agencies. This distinction is based on the
importance of continuing an unhindered probation system. See note 28 infra.
24. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 25.
25. 27 Cal. 3d at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
III. RATIONALE OF THE THOMPSON DECISION
The court asserted that the existence of a duty is not a fact dis-
coverable in nature.26 Instead the imposition of a legal duty is a
question of law and will be imposed only where a party should be
liable for harm proximately caused by their negligence. 27 There-
fore, the court based its decision on whether public policy would
be promoted by requiring the government to warn the citizenry of
an offender's dangerous nature.
In examining the purposes behind the probation system, the
court found that parole and probation release play an integral
part in the correctional system.28 Quoting a variety of statistics,29
it was implied that due to the vast number of individuals incarcer-
ated, any undue restriction on the probation scheme would over-
load the penal system and its rehabilitative efforts. The court
believed the imposition of a general duty, as requested by the
plaintiffs, would result in fewer offenders being released on pro-
bation due to the government's fear of liability. Since this was
statistically unacceptable, 30 and may also tend to thwart the
state's legitimate rehabilitative effort, the court felt it better that
the public bear the risk of harm.31 Relying on Johnson, the major-
ity noted that "each member of the general public who chances to
come into contact with a parolee bear[s] the risk that the rehabil-
itative effort will fail."3 2 The risk that repeat offenses may occur
was seen by the court as inherent in the parole system and one
not properly curbed by an extension of government liability.33
In spite of the ever present dangers of the present system, the
court chose to acquiesce to the legislature.34 As a matter of pol-
26. Id. at 750, 614 P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74. "[Legal duties are not dis-
coverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a
particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done." (emphasis added).
27. The court in Thompson spends some time in discussing the role of duty in
tort law. 27 Cal. 3d at 749-50, 614 P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
28. Id. at 753-55, 614 P.2d at 732-33, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
29. See CALIFORNIA PROBATION PAROLE AND CORRECTION ASSOCIATION, THE Fu-
TURE OF PROBATION (1979); Comment, Tarasoff and the Psychotherapist's Duty to
Warn, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 932, 942-43 (1975); Livermore, Malurquist and Meehl,
On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 174 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 84 (1968).
30. See note 29 supra.
31. 27 Cal. 3d at 755, 614 P.2d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
32. Id. at 753, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (citations omitted). The
court also noted the United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). In Martinez, the Court rejected a con-
tention that the California immunity statutes, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 800 et seq.
(West 1980), deprived plaintiff-decedent of her right to life without due process of
law because a parole decision had led indirectly to her death. 444 U.S. at 280-81.
The Supreme Court noted that the risk that repeated offenses may occur is pres-
ent in any parole system.
33. 27 Cal. 3d at 756, 614 P.2d at 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
34. Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The court appeared to be
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icy, the court believed the parole and probation system was of too
delicate a nature to restrict with the imposition of a duty to warn.
The court concluded that the discretionary decision to parole
would be hindered by the imposition of a duty to warn. The dis-
sent 35 claimed that the discretionary decision to parole would re-
main cloaked with immunity under section 820.2 of the California
Government Code. It is the negligent implementation of the dis-
cretionary decision that would subject the government body to li-
ability. Therefore, the reason the government officers should fear
liability for making such discretionary decisions was not clear to
the dissent.
The California Supreme Court is also concerned with balancing
the respective interests of the public with the purposes of the pro-
bation and parole system. To further examine if a duty should be
imposed, the court weighed the possible benefit it would have rel-
ative to any corresponding detriment.3 6
The court was concerned with the practical difficulties in meet-
ing such a demanding obligation. A warning to police would not
saying the legislature has established the policy of placing the risk on the public
and any change in the law should come from them. As noted by the dissent, the
legislature had impliedly approved the trend that extended liability by refusing to
enact new, more stringent, legislation as a response to Johnson and Tarasoff. 27
Cal. 3d at 762-63, 614 P.2d at 740-41, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83; (Tobriner, J., dissenting);
see note 67 infra. See generally Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal.
App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979) (immunity extended to private hospital to bar
plaintiff's suit for injury by escapee); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (doctrine of governmental immunity may
be modified by California Supreme Court as modification is not within exclusive
province of the legislature).
35. Justice Tobriner notes the confusion between the discretionary decision
and the subsequent implementation. 27 Cal. 3d at 764, 614 P.2d at 741, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 83 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 755, 614 P.2d at 735-36, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The court believed an
increase in liability by an imposition of a more general duty could not be justified
as a good policy unless it could be shown as actual increase in protection would be
provided. In assessing any benefit, the Thompson court considered many factors
that must be balanced including:
[Tihe foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral balance attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968).
only create an even greater sea of paperwork 37 and increased
workload, but also would likely be ineffective unless a corre-
sponding duty was placed upon the police to act upon such warn-
ings. As noted in the Tarasoff decision, no such duty to act
exists.38
A mandatory duty to warn parents of neighborhood children
was thought to have similar prohibitive consequences. In addi-
tion to the vast and complicated effort required,3 9 a policy favor-
ing release programs 40 may be thwarted. Rehabilitative efforts
would likely be jeopardized by stigmatizing the released of-
fender 4 ' and possibly encourage the commission of an unlawful
act out as a result of his own frustrations.
Most notably, the court felt any duty to warn James's mother
would also be ineffective. It was believed such a duty would not
achieve the desired effect of warning potential victims. 42 Any
warning by the mother to other potential victims may also stigma-
tize the juvenile offender negating the rehabilitative effort.43
The issue here is what the court calls the "desired effect." Ar-
guably, the desired effect is not primarily to warn others of an of-
fenders dangerous propensities, but it is to prevent foreseeable
37. The majority believed that to increase protection in this manner would ne-
cessitate an inordinate and unrealistic expenditure of time and manpower such
that the other areas of police duty would be comprised. 27 Cal. 3d at 756, 614 P.2d
at 743, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 85. Also, if the legislature desired such a scheme, it would
have imposed mandatory registration as it has done with certain sex offenders.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1980).
38. 17 Cal. 3d at 444, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
39. The number of government employees engaged in probation is limited. In
1978, California probation departments employed 18,331 persons in order to super-
vise 315,000 parolees. Any increase in a duty to warn would misuse these re-
sources. See Keldgor and Norris, New Directions for Correction, 36 FED.
PROBATON 3 (1972).
40. See, e.g., Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979) (immunity extended to private organization to encourage re-
habilitative effort); Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 141 Cal. Rptr.
189 (1977) (special relationship doctrine infringes too greatly upon prisoner re-
lease and rehabilitation programs).
41. 27 Cal. 3d at 757, 614 P.2d at 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79. The majority also
feared probation administration would be less likely to release offenders fearing
potential liability and the substantial drain on their resources that warning poten-
tial victims would require. Id.
42. Id. The court surmises that the warning is the desired result. Arguably,
the desired result would seem to be protecting injured victims without jeopardiz-
ing the probation program. The court must agree that at least the desired result
would be to achieve the greatest utility. This is what it implies when it speaks of
balancing the benefits against the difficulties of application. See note 36 supra.
The contrary view would point out that to consider only the likelihood of a warn-
ing reaching endangered neighbors without considering the overall benefits a
warning to James's mother may have, fails to examine the scenario with sufficient
scope.
43. 27 Cal. 3d at 757, 614 P.2d at 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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victims from being harmed at the hands of the paroled offender. 4
A probationer's custodian may take other measures to ensure the
safety of others besides an express warning.45 The majority be-
lieved that to expect such controlling measures from James's
mother was unrealistic and could not support the imposition of
civil liability.4 6 To release a known dangerous offender to an un-
suspecting custodian seems equally unrealistic.
The court's analysis is basically twofold. First, it would be un-
wise to impose a general duty upon the state since it would
thwart important policy goals favoring probationary release. Sec-
ond, it is simply impractical and ineffectual to create a mandatory
duty to warn where the specific identity of the potential victim is
not known.4 7 The court felt little benefit would flow from genera-
lized warnings such that their mandate would justify their bur-
den.48 The Thompson decision will only impose a duty where a
"special relationship" can be demonstrated between the state and
the endangered individual.4 9 This special relationship will only
exist where an offender is released with the state's knowledge
that he intends harm to a certain individual, since the specific in-
dividual would be placed in danger by the offender's release.50 No
such duty will be imposed when the offender is released harbor-
44. See note 42 supra.
45. As Justice Tobriner notes in his dissent, the majority fails to realize that
James's mother, when properly apprised of his dangerous propensities, may take
special care to watch him, to know his whereabouts, insure he is not alone with
young children, or otherwise control his activities. 27 Cal. 3d at 764, 614 P.2d at 741,
167 Cal. Rptr. at 83. (Tobriner, J., dissenting). In fact if James's mother had been
aware of his intentions, she may not have agreed to assume custody at all, fearing
for the neighborhood's, her own, or even James's well-being.
46. Id. at 757-58, 614 P.2d at 737-38, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
47. The court believed such a duty to warn would stretch the concept of fore-
seeability to create a duty owed to a "member of a large amorphous public group
of potential targets." Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Of course, this
view begs the question of how a '"young child in the neighborhood" is a member of
such an amorphous group.
48. Id. at 755, 614 P.2d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
49. By approving the Tarasoff decision the court appeared to limit any special
relationship between the state and the offender to apply only to physicians. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1963-69). The state must bear a special
relationship to the victim before a duty will arise; thus, the victim's identity must
be readily identifiable. See note 62 infra.
50. Since the state would know the offender's intentions and the identity of
the potential victim, a duty to warn the victim would arise since he specifically has
been placed in peril by the offender's release. See Johnson v. State of Cal., 69 Cal.
2d at 785-86, 447 P.2d at 355,73 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (a duty to warn is placed upon those
who create a foreseeable peril).
ing a known general desire to commit an offense against no par-
ticular individual.5 1 No liability will arise for any subsequent
harm the offender inflicts, although the victim may be a member
of a foreseeable but ill-defined group.5 2
Since James failed to designate precisely which young child he
intended to murder, no duty was placed upon the County to warn
the police, potential victims, or James's mother of his release.
IV. CASE IMPACT
The Thompson decision narrows the holdings of Johnson and
Tarasoff. The majority presumes that since both Tarasoff and
Johnson concerned a failure to warn identifiable victims, the rea-
soning of those decisions is limited to only that situation despite
the indications, especially in Tarasoff, that there should be wider
application.53 For example, where the Thompson court desired
hard lines between the existence or non-existence of a duty,
Tarasoff sought to impose an obligation that would vary as the
situation demanded. For example, where the victim is specifically
identifiable, a warning directly to him will discharge the state's
obligation. If the potential victim is not specifically identifiable,
but is a member of an identifiable class, the state's obligation
should require some warning to the class. If the probationer is re-
leased with known hostile tendencies, but without an intended
victim, his guardian should be warned to be watchful for malevo-
lent actions. Under Tarasoff, the nature of the case would dictate
the nature of the duty to be imposed.54
51. 27 Cal. 3d at 750-51, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
52. Id.
53. The decision in Tarasoff indicates that the nature of the state's obligation
should vary with the surrounding circumstances. Even the existence of an identi-
fiable victim was not essential to the cause of action. What Taro.soff indicated was
a duty of care owed to all persons foreseeably endangered by the offenders re-
lease. Depending on how foreseeable a victim may be will vary the duty owed ac-
cordingly. Therefore, the degree of care owed depends on the circumstances.
"Thus, [the duty imposed] may call for [the doctor] to warn the intended victim
or another likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances." 17 Cal.
3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (emphasis added).
54. See Comment, supra note 29, at 937-38. The author notes that "[rather
than attempt to set up a rule with universal application, courts have focused on
special relationships between people as a basis for changing the traditional duties
owed between individuals. A moral dilemma is noted in Tarasoff, similar to the
law concerning the duty to rescue." See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 340-41
(4th ed. 1971). Examples of decisions which have attempted to turn moral duties
into legal ones are: Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947) (duty to res-
cue imposed upon social hosts); Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Mo. 1942)
(duty to rescue imposed upon innkeepers); Yee v. New York, New Haven, and
Hartford R.R. Co., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958) (duty to rescue imposed upon
carriers); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942) (duty to rescue
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Rather than allow the obligation placed upon the state to vary
with the specificity of an offender's threat or the foreseeability of
potential harm,55 the Thompson decision enacts a rigid test that
demands essential certainty as to the victim's identity. The court
implied any duty would require a maximum effort;56 therefore, a
duty would be imposed only in the most dangerous and demand-
ing circumstances. 57 Apparently overly concerned with the prac-
ticalities of an adequate warning,5 8 the court opted for the clear
but easy line of demarcation between the existence or non-exist-
ence of a duty to warn.5 9
Although admitting that a potential victim need not be precisely
identifiable, it still remains unclear how readily identifiable a vic-
tim must be before a duty will arise.60 This concern can be seen
in the nature of the facts in Thompson. James had identified his
imposed upon shopkeepers); and Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955)
(duty to rescue imposed upon jailers).
55. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
56. This can be inferred by the court's discussion of how difficult and time
consuming it would be to insure potential victims are warned. 27 Cal. 3d at 750-58,
614 P.2d at 732-38, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-80.
57. The duty to warn will arise only where a specific or readily identifiable vic-
tim is concerned. Id. at 753, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
58. The court asserts that the difficulties in application will override any bene-
fits that may result from warnings in other circumstances. This fails to consider
the real effect some method of warning might have had. See note 45 supra.
59. The majority preferred rigidity and ease of application to the flexibility
proposed by Tarasoff. See note 53 supra. It can only be surmised that the court
chose their avenue, not only to limit the liability of the state, but also to allow a
high degree of predictability to attach when the state releases an offender. Al-
though simplifying the issue, the Thompson holding does not create a duty corre-
sponding to the amount of peril created by the offender's release as Tarasoff
would have indicated. See Buford v. State, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1980) (a duty to warn will arise where a special relationship exists, with such re-
lationship being a function of foreseeability); Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977) (duty is a matter of relationship founded on
foreseeability).
60. Tarasoff had indicated a victim need only be readily identifiable for a duty
to attach. The Tarasoff court explained "readily identifiable" to mean that al-
though it may not be completely clear whom the offender intends as his victim, a
"moments reflection" will [generally] reveal the victim's identity. 17 Cal. 3d at 439
& n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 & n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 & n.11. If only a "moments reflec-
tion" will be necessary in order to determine the identity of the undisclosed vic-
tim, the potential assailant's description must be highly particular. This would
seem to indicate that if James had named twenty neighborhood children by name,
claiming he would kill one of them, the threat would still be too general and no
duty would arise. See Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600-01, 162
Cal. Rptr. 724, 729-30 (1980), which urged the holding in Tarasoff be construed nar-
rowly, lest liability come between the psychotherapist and his proper function.
victim as a "young child residing in the neighborhood."61 In this
manner James had identified both his victim's physical character-
istics and location. A "moments reflection" clearly reveals a spe-
cific group endangered by the state's conduct. Although the state
may have been unwise to warn every young child in the neighbor-
hood, some obligation to control James's behavior should have
been imposed. If the facts in Thompson will not give rise to such
an obligation, the court's holding likely requires certain identifica-
tion of a particular individual.62
The Thompson decision expands government immunity in con-
tradiction of the clear trend of California decisons. 63 By imposing
such a highly specific duty, it is the rare case in which the duty
will be imposed. It is likely the government will only infrequently
be found to have breached their obligation.64 The majority claims
such a specific duty is required by the legislative intent in pro-
tecting the important function of the probation program by cloak-
ing its administration with immunity.65
The court could have considered section 820.2 of the California
Government Code as sufficiently protecting the important parole
decisions and their discretionary nature. With this in mind, it
would be unnecessary to further shield the government from lia-
bility when it engages in the negligent implementation of those
decisions.
As noted by Justice Tobriner,66 twelve years have passed since
61. 27 Cal. 3d at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
62. The Thompson decision indicates that a particularized signification of an
identifiable group may not even be enough to invoke a duty to warn; a specific in-
dividual is necessary before an obligation will arise. Although a designated group
may be insufficiently particular to give rise to a duty to warn each member of the
group, knowledge of an offender's violent intentions arguably should create some
duty owed toward them to insure their safety. A discharge of this duty would at
least require a warning to an offender's custodian. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 315(a) (1963-64); Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967) (Veterans Administration failed to meet
their duty of care by releasing a patient to work on a local farm without warning
farmer of patient's intentions to kill patient's wife resulting in the wife's murder);
McDowell v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979)
(county hospital owed a duty to insure patient's safe arrival at treating private
hospital in order to protect the public in the event of his escape).
63. See Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 699, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1972); Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 692, 484 P.2d 93, 98, 94 Cal. Rptr.
421, 426 (1971); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 462,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961).
64. It is possible that the probation department will not release an offender
when he has manifested his violent intention so specifically or it may be difficult
to prove the state had particular knowledge of the offender's intended victim.
65. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
66. 27 Cal. 3d at 762, 614 P.2d at 740, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (Tobriner, J., dissent-
ing).
562
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the Johnson decision. In that period the legislature has not
amended the Government Code to increase government immu-
nity beyond that described in Johnson,67 nor has any exclamation
been heard to the effect that Johnson or Tarasoff endanger the
state's parole or probation programs. It is odd that the court feels
that it is necessary to defer to the legislature when the legislature
has implicitly consented to the trend in Tarasoff.
The court also believes that the duty created by a special rela-
tionship may only exist when the special relationship exists di-
rectly between the state and the potential victim.68 In contrast,
by implication, the majority did not agree that a special relation-
ship may exist between the state and the offender such that the
state would have a duty to control his conduct. Had this been the
holding, a warning to at least James's mother would have been
appropriate. It is likely the court found it inconsistent to find a
duty to control the offender's conduct existed and then hold the
duty to be discharged by nothing more than a mere warning to
the offender's custodian. Not wishing to impose a great burden of
absolute control upon the state, it was simpler to recognize a duty
that would extend only to a readily identifiable victim and then
require an express warning to that victim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Thompson decision reflects the California Supreme Court's
desire to clearly delineate the line between the imposition of a
duty and governmental immunity. Rejecting the flexibilities
found in Tarasoff,69 the court held only when an offender be-
comes sufficiently specific in his threats will a specific duty to
warn arise.7 0 Only then will a special relationship be created be-
tween the foreseeable potential victim and the state such that lia-
bility may be imposed. By this holding, an obligation will exist
only when the degree of risk is at its maximum; therefore, the de-
cision results in an extension of governmental immunity.
67. Justice Tobriner believed that the legislature has evidenced its intent by
refraining from enacting any further legislation in response to Johnson and
Tarasoff. The implication is that the legislature approves of the trend to find spe-
cial relationships giving rise to duties to warn, rescue, or otherwise control the
conduct of another. Id.
68. 27 Cal. 3d at 752-54, 614 P.2d at 734-35, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
69. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
70. 27 Cal. 3d at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
Although the court insisted its decision must be based on a bal-
ancing between the competing interests of an effective rehabilita-
tive and probationary system, and the safety of the general
public,7 1 the Thompson decision tends to balance in favor of the
state.
III. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A. DETERMINATION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY INTEREST
1. Community Installment Payments Made on Separate
Property After Marriage: Moore v. Moore
The California Supreme Court enunciates a formula by which the Com-
munity essentially "buys in" to separate property purchased by one spouse
before marriage by making community installment payments. The flex-
ibility of the formula and a detailed exposition of its operation is ex-
amined.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court ruled' that where community
funds are used to make installment payments on property
purchased by one spouse prior to marriage, the community has a
pro tanto interest in such property. That interest is equal to the
ratio between the amount paid with separate funds and the
amount paid with community funds. The significance of the
court's decision is that the community is deemed to have no re-
coverable interest in community funds paid for interest, taxes,
and insurance. 2 More importantly, the court delineates a precise
formula to be used in determining the proper amounts to be des-
ignated as community property and separate property.3 The na-
ture of this formula and its underlying rationale will be examined.
In 1966, approximately eight months prior to her marriage, Ly-
die Moore purchased a house, taking title in her name alone. A
down payment of $16,640.57 was made and a loan was secured for
the remaining $40,000.00. Prior to her marriage, Lydie made seven
payments which reduced the principal amount due on the loan by
$245.18.
Subsequent to their marriage, Lydie and David Moore lived in
the house until their separation in 1977. Throughout this period
71. Id. at 750-51, 614 P.2d at 732-33, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
1. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662
(1980). The opinion was written by Justice Manuel with Justices Tobriner, Mosk,
Clark, Richardson, Newman, and Chief Justice Bird all concurring.
2. See notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text.
3. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
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(1966-1977) all payments were made with community property
funds which further reduced the principal amount due on the
loan by $5,986.20. After the 1977 separation, Lydie continued to
live in the house while making payments with her separate prop-
erty totalling $581.07.
At the dissolution hearing, the trial court determined the resi-
dence to be Lydie's separate property; however, the community
was deemed to have developed an interest in it to the extent that
payments were made with community funds during marriage. 4
The ownership interest was to be determined according to the fol-
lowing ratio:
the reduction of principal resulting from the payment of community property funds 5
the reduction of principal resulting from the payment of separate property funds
The trial court allowed no credit for payments made toward inter-
est on the loan, taxes, or insurance.
On appeal, the parties agreed that the community had acquired
an interest in the house, however, they disagreed on how that in-
terest was to be determined. Appellant David Moore contended
that the determination of the community property interest should
be based upon the full amount of payments made, including inter-
est on the loan, taxes, and insurance, rather than by the amount
of payments which merely reduced the principal. Respondent Ly-
die Moore did not appeal. 6
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
5. At the time of trial the total principal paid was $23,453.02 with a balance
owed of $33,187.55. The market value of the home was $160,000.00 with an equity
therein of $126,812.45. The trial court determined the community interest by divid-
ing the community contribution by the total principal paid, or $5,986.20 + $23,453.02
= 25.5242%. Multiplying the equity in the house by the percentage resulted in the
share attributable to the community or 25.5242% X $126,812.45 = $32,367.86.
Lydie's separate property interest was similarly calculated by dividing her sepa-
rate contribution by the total principal paid, or $17,466.82 + $23,453.02 = 74.4758%.
When multiplied by the equity, Lydie's separate property share was determined to
be 74.4758% X $126,812.45 = $94,444.59. See 27 Cal. 3d at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 663.
6. The formula the court proposed would reduce the community property in-
terest from 25.5242% to 10.57% resulting in a detriment to David. Had Lydie ap-
pealed, the court would have ordered an adjustment of the division in her favor.
Since the trial court had calculated in the appellants favor, the award was not
modified.
Either Lydie's counsel was not aware of the Lucas and Aufmuth decisions, see
notes 16 and 21 infra, or they did not feel they were controlling. There is no indi-
cation that the Lucas and Aufmuth formulas were argued to the court. Appar-
ently the court chose to employ them upon their own motion. 28 Cal. 3d at 374, 618
P.2d at 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
The court was asked to decide if all such payments made, in-
cluding those made toward interest, taxes, and insurance, should
be considered in determining the community and separate prop-
erty interests. Additionally the court was asked to devise a
formula which would permit a precise division of the community
interest.
II. HISTORIAL ANALYSIS
The leading case dealing with apportionment of interests be-
tween separate and community property is Vieux v. Vieux. 7 In
Vieux the husband contracted before marriage to buy a piece of
property and made a down payment on the purchase price. After
marriage, community funds were utilized for payment of the prin-
cipal due, plus interest and taxes. The court of appeal held the
community owned a share of the property equal to the ratio of the
amount paid with community funds divided by the total purchase
price. The Vieux holding included interest and taxes in its calcu-
lation, but the issue had not been expressly considered by the
court.8
In 1953, the court of appeal decided Forbes v. Forbes.9 The
Forbes court rejected the idea that the community was only enti-
tled to reimbursement' 0 of installment payments made with com-
munity funds on property originally purchased prior to marriage.
Relying on Vieux, the court held the community had a "pro tanto
7. 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (1926). The Vieux case considered an install-
ment purchase situation, where title did not vest until all payments were com-
pleted. Moore considered a purchase money mortgage situation with title vesting
in Lydie at the time of purchase. The Moore court did not note this distinction. It
is likely the court did not address the installment purchase situation because no
loan was present that had to be characterized in order to determine the status of
the property. The loan and, therefore, the property was clearly separate since it
was purchased prior to marriage. The community would simply have an interest
in ratio that community payments bore to payments made with separate funds. In
re Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
8. The Moore court would later reject the Vieux case as a controlling prece-
dent on this basis. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
9. 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953).
10. If the community payments were considered loans to repay the purchase
price of the separate property of one spouse or improvements on the separate
property of one spouse, then the community traditionally would be able to seek
reimbursement and not otherwise share in the investment. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125
(West Supp. 1980); In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr.
483 (1972) (improvement on one spouse's separate property with community funds
will not change the character of the property; the community may only seek reim-
bursement); Wheeland v. Rodgers, 20 Cal. 2d 218, 124 P.2d 816 (1942) (community
is entitled to reimbursement for improvements on one spouse's separate prop-
erty). See also In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860
(1972) (where one spouse uses community property to improve the other's sepa-
rate property, reimbursement may occur only by agreement).
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community property interest in such property in the ratio that the
payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to
the payments made with separate funds.""
The rule in Vieux and Forbes has been construed to exclude
any payments for interest and taxes. In Bare v. Bare12 the court
of appeal held "the community is entitled to a minimum interest
in the property represented by the ratio of the community invest-
ment to the total separate and community investment in the prop-
erty."13
The Court in Bare also noted that in the event the fair market
value of the property appreciated, the community would be enti-
tled to participate proportionately in the increased value. This
demonstrated that the use of community funds was, in fact, an in-
vestment 14 in the asset as community property and not merely a
loan made for the purchase of separate property. Therefore, the
community was entitled to share in the appreciation.15
Recently, the court of appeal, in In re Marriage of Aufmuth 16
decided that the character of a loan must be considered in deter-
mining the respective interests of community and separate prop-
erty. In Auf/muth the parties purchased a house during their
marriage. The wife made the initial down payment using her sep-
arate property funds only. The balance was paid with a loan se-
cured by the purchased property. Title was taken in the names of
both spouses as community property.17 The wife contended that
11. Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 257 P.2d at 722. See also In re Es-
tate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 795, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
12. 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 64 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967).
13. Id. at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (emphasis added); accord In re Marriage of
Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972).
The Moore court did not expressly say so, but appeared to place great emphasis
on the Bare decision's words "minimum" and "investment" to require dividing the
least amount possible directly relating to the equity of the property. 28 Cal. 3d at
372, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664. Only that amount that contributed to the
property as an asset would be divided. Maintenance payments were held to be
non-divisible.
14. The Bare decision showed the community was essentially buying in to the
property and not merely improving it. Thus, mere reimbursement for expendi-
tures under Jafeman and Wheeland v. Rodgers was not proper, but an actual shar-
ing of profits and ownership privileges was appropriate.
15. The community, as a co-tenant of the property after the buy-in,' should be
able to share in the appreciation. Accord In re Marriage of Jafeman, 22 Cal. App.
3d at 256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
16. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
17. The dispute centered on the character of the property. Although a pre-
sumption may be raised, the form of the instrument under which the parties hold
the house should be entirely her separate property subject to the
community's right to reimbursement.18 She argued that where
the down payment was made entirely with separate property
funds and the balance paid with a loan secured by the purchased
property, the purchased property should be classified as separate
property. The court held this rationale failed to truly consider the
character of the loan.' 9 Relying on the intent-of-the-creditor test,
the court held that the loan was community property and, there-
fore, the community had an interest in the purchased property. 20
The California Supreme Court considered the division of prop-
erty in another mixed consideration case, In re Marriage of Lu-
cas.21 In Lucas, the court approved of the scheme developed by
title is not conclusive of the status of the property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West
Supp. 1980); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668
(1979) (form of title is not conclusive where property is purchased with mixed con-
sideration after marriage); Robertson v. Willis, 77 Cal. App. 3d 358, 143 Cal. Rptr.
523 (1978) (presumption that property acquired by wife in writing before 1975 is re-
buttable and may be overcome by circumstantial evidence).
18. Mrs. Aufmuth contended the community payments were loans or improve-
ments to her separate property and should only be compensated by repayment
rather than awarding a pro tanto interest in the appreciated property value. See
notes 10 and 14 supra.
19. In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
20. Mrs. Aufmuth asserted that the loan encumbered the house and the house
was separate property. Therefore, the loan was separate property. This argument
presumes the house to be separate property based solely on the separate charac-
ter of the down payment. Under Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656
(1953), and Ford v. Ford, 276 Cal. App. 2d 9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1969), the intent of
the creditor, or on what he relied in extending credit, will color the proceeds of the
loan with the same character. In the absence of a showing of clear reliance on
separate property, loan proceeds are presumed to be community property. In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 455-56, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
In Aufmuth, the loan was found to be based upon the credit of the community.
Although no direct evidence was submitted to support this finding, the court in-
ferred this from surrounding facts. The wife had no separate property except her
down payment. She was unemployed and the husband was a practicing attorney
with his income the sole source of familial support. The loan proceeds were,
therefore, deemed a community contribution to the purchase of the house. This
resulted in Mrs. Aufmuth owning a separate share equal to the ratio that her sepa-
rate down payment bore to the total purchase price. Therefore, the property divi-
sion substantially depended on the characterization of the loan. Id. at 456-57, 152
Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
21. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 283, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). Mrs. Lucas was held
to be vested with a separate property interest for her separate contribution to the
purchase of a house. The fact that no agreement had been reached between the
parties on this point was unimportant since the funds were clearly traceable to the
wife's separate holdings. See In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1975) (separate interest in property may be established by tracing
contributing funds to their source).
Lucas resolved a dispute between In re Marriage of Bjornstead, 38 Cal. App. 3d
801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974), which allowed only reimbursement for separate prop-
erty contributions to community purchaser and Aufmuth, which awarded a pro
tanto interest. The court felt Aufmuth was more persuasive. 77 Cal. 3d at 812-13,
614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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the court of appeal in Aufmuth, whereby the interest in the ap-
preciation of equity was apportioned pro rata between separate
and community property. 22 Lucas dealt with a purchase after
marriage, while Moore concerns subsequent community pay-
ments made on property purchased by one spouse before mar-
riage. Whereas Lucas turned on the issue of a possible
transmutation 23 of property by the parties, Moore is primarily
concerned with the proper characterization of the premarital loan
obtained to purchase the property. The Lucas - Aufmuth formula
is still applicable to the situation found in Moore .24
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MOORE DECISION
Appellant David Moore asserted that the interest on the
purchase loan, taxes, and insurance should be taken into account
when computing the community interest of the community in
mixed consideration cases. He relied on Vieux 25 because it had
included interest and taxes in its calculation. The California
Supreme Court noted that although the Vieux decision had made
this inclusion, it had not actually considered the propriety of in-
cluding interest and taxes. For this reason, the court did not con-
sider Vieux to be controlling on this issue.26 After examining
cases decided after Vieux, such as Bare and In re Marriage of
Jafeman,27 the court decided to continue to apply the rule that
excluded interest and taxes when determining the character of
property.
Appellant argued that interest and taxes should be included in
22. For a detailed explanation of the Lucas-Aufmuth formula, see note 33 infra
and accompanying text.
23. See In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1975) (no formalities are required between spouses to change status of property).
See also Wikes v. Smith, 465 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1972) (husband and wife may
agree to change status of property without formalities).
24. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. Although the trend had been to exclude taxes and interest from the disso-
lution computation, as demonstrated by Bare and Jafeman, see note 12 supra and
accompanying text, the Moore decision would expressly hold interest and taxes
are not to be included in any formula to divide property. Therefore, the Vieux de-
cision no longer has any precedential value in this area. As the court noted, the
issue in Vieux was whether or not the community should be given any interest at
all for contributions toward a spouse's separate property, not the suitability of in-
cluding taxes and interest in the computation. 28 Cal. 3d at 371, 618 P.2d at 210, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 664.
27. 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972).
the computation since they represent a substantial portion of the
purchase price. The court disagreed since interest and taxes
neither increase the equity value of the property28 nor contribute
to the capital investment in the property, and are not recovered
when the property is sold. Interest and taxes were merely one
type of a variety of expenses one must expend to maintain prop-
erty. "Upon dissolution it is the court's duty to account for and
divide the assets and the debts of the community. Payments
made for interest, taxes, and insurance are neither."29 The court
felt Lucas would require the community to be charged for its use
of the property if such items were considered in assessing its in-
terest. For these reasons the California Supreme Court did not
feel it was appropriate to depart from the present rule which ex-
cludes interest and taxes when determining the character of prop-
erty.30
IV. THE LUCAS-AUFMUTH FORMULA
The trial court used a formula that was based upon a statement
in In re Marriage of Jafeman3l that was interpreted to mean that
property interests are to be determined by considering the alloca-
ble equity contributions only, without considering the loan contri-
bution.32 Although the Moore court noted the possible suitability
of this formula when the obligation on the property has been fully
28. Payment of taxes can actually remove an encumberance on property, re-
sulting in an increase in equity. The community should at least be entitled to re-
imbursement for such expenditures under the improvement doctrine. In re
Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972). The court did
not expressly discuss reimbursement, but may have indicated it is allowable, al-
though the community in Moore had been sufficiently reimbursed by its use of the
property. 28 Cal. 3d at 372-73, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665. The court noted
if taxes and interest "were considered to be part of the community interest, fair-
ness would require that the community be charged for its use of the property." Id.
29. 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
30. The court may have held in this manner because it felt the community had
been sufficiently reimbursed. It is not clear what should occur when the commu-
nity has made interest, tax, and insurance payments upon property of which it has
had no use or benefit. The court held the Moore community to be reimbursed by
use. See note 48 infra.
31. 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972). In Jafeman, the parties made
community payments on a house originally owned by Mr. Jafeman before mar-
riage. Upon dissolution, the court awarded interests to the community and sepa-
rate property in the ratio that payments made with separate property bore to
payments made with community property. Id. at 256, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 491. This
appears to be the formula relied upon by the trial court in Moore. In contrast, the
supreme court compares respective payments made to the total purchase price.
32. The misconstrued section of Jafeman reads as follows: "The community
interest is determined by comparing the ratio of the community investment to the
total separate and community investment in the property." Id. at 256, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 491. The trial court apparently did not see any requirement of viewing the
loan as a separate contribution.
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repaid, it noted the inconsistency of applying such a formula
under the Lucas and Aufmuth standards when portions of the
loan remain unpaid.33
In Moore the loan and the down payment were based on sepa-
rate property assets and were, therefore, separate property contri-
butions. In such a situation, the Lucas-Aufmuth formula34 would
be applied as follows:
1. The separate property percentage interest equals the down
payment plus the full amount of the loan minus the amount
by which the community contribution reduced the loan princi-
pal. The total is then divided by the purchase price in order to
reach the separate property percentage share;35
2. The separate property interest would be the amount of capital
appreciation attributable to the separate funds plus the
amount of equity paid by separate funds;
36
33. The court believed that the proceeds from a loan based on separate prop-
erty are separate. The property purchased with such proceeds also remains sepa-
rate property. To fail to consider the loan as a separate contribution denies its
role in the purchase of the property. The formula used by the trial court penalizes
the separate estate for obtaining a loan to purchase property. The greater the loan
and the lesser the down payment, the greater the penalty becomes. Lucas and
Aufmuth have clearly shown the loan contribution must be considered. 29 Cal. 3d
at 816-17, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58.
34. The following symbols will be used to demonstrate the court's formula
along with the corresponding amounts related to the Moore cases where appropri-
ate:
P(s) = separate property percentage interest;
P(c) = community property percentage interest;
D(s) = down payment = $16,640.57;
L(s) = loan amount = $40,000.00;
C(s) = total separate cash contribution to purchase without loan amount =
$17,466.82 (This is the total of down payment, pre-marriage installment
payments, and post separation installment payments, or $16,640.57 +
$295.18 + $581.07 = $17,466.82);
C(c) = total cash contribution by the community = $5,986.20;
A = net appreciation = $103,359.43;
FMV = fair market value = $160,000.00;
AB = purchase price of the property = $56,640.57;
CP = community property share;
SP = separate property share.
28 Cal. 3d at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (the answers to the mathe-
matical computations are derived from the cited authority; but the computations
are the author's own work showing how the answers were derived).
35. Demonstration of the court's formula will be shown both symbolically and
using dollar amounts from the Moore case.
[(D(s) + L(s)) - C(c)] + AB = P(s)
[(16,640.57 + 40,000) - 5,986.201 + 56,640.57 = 89.43%. Id.
36. FMV - AB = A
3. The community property percentage interest is equal to the
amount by which the community contribution reduced the
principal divided by the purchase price; 37 and
4. The community property interest would be the amount of cap-
ital contribution attributable to community property funds
plus the amount of the equity paid by the community. 38
Since the formula considers the loan as a separate contribution
prior to marriage and community contribution subsequent to mar-
riage, the formula is sufficiently broad to include the situations
presented by both Lucas and Moore.39
V. CASE IMPACT
The court's formula places an emphasis on the separate or com-
munity contribution in relation to the total purchase price and not
the relation the separate and community contributions bear to-
ward each other.40 The property itself is deemed to be separate
or community based upon the character of the loan. Essentially,
all other subsequent contributions of a different character will be
"buying in" to the property.41 The extent of this buy-in will be
equal to the percentage paid toward the total purchase price up to
the time of dissolution. Thus, the party buying in to the property
will be able to take advantage of any appreciation that results.
This method is preferrable to a reimbursement for money ex-
pended as a mere loan to the other party.
The effect of the Moore decision will be that spouses will have
to remain married longer before the community develops a sub-
stantial interest in previously purchased separate property. This
will likely lead to more just results, particularly in market condi-
tions where property appreciates at a meteoric rate in a fairly
(P(s) x A) + C(s) = CP
160,000 - 56,640.57 = 103,359.43
(89.43% x 103,359.43) + 17,466.82 = 109,901.16. Id.
37. C(c) + AB = P(c)
5,986.20 + 56,640.57 = 10.57%. Id.
38. (P(c) x A) + C(c) = SP
(10.57% x 103,359.43) + 5,986.20 = 16,911.29. Id.
39. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
40. Id. The community is buying an interest in property already owned as
separate property, not contributing to a purchase in which title will pass upon
completion of the payments. See note 7 supra. At dissolution, the community will
own a percentage equal to the amount it has "purchased" from the whole. Sepa-
rate contributions after purchase are essentially irrelevant since the property is
separate in the beginning.
41. The community has purchased an increasing interest with each payment
and is entitled to much more than mere reimbursement for improvements. See
generally In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
See notes 15-16 supra.
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short period of time.42
In opposition to the trial court's decision, the California
Supreme Court placed greater emphasis on the initial loan and its
character. The character of the initial loan, in conjunction with
the character of the down payment, will determine the character
of the purchased property. Characterization of the property in
this manner is important in that it will determine if the commu-
nity is making payments toward property which already consti-
tutes a community asset, or is "buying in" to property which
constitutes one spouse's separate property.43
This will require the parties to establish more clearly the na-
ture of the loan under the intent-of-the-creditor test established
in Ford v. Ford." The extent of ownership of property may turn
on not what portion was paid with separate as opposed to commu-
nity funds, but upon whose credit the lender relied in making the
loan. Difficult situations may arise when loans are not clearly
based on one type of property or another, or are based upon a
mixture of community and separate assets not clearly allocated at
the time of the loan.45 Although some difficulty may be encoun-
tered in ascertaining the nature of the loan, a more equitable divi-
42. A spouse married only a short time may acquire a substantial interest by
her interest in the community if the old formula is followed. Suppose H before
marriage purchases a house with separate property under a 40 year mortgage in
year 1. H marries W in year 20 but separates in year 22. Payments made during
marriage are made with community property. Under the old formula the commu-
nity owns 2/22 or 1/11 when only payments to date of dissolution are considered.
Under the Lucas-Aufinuth formulation the community owns 2/40 or 1/20 when
payments are considered against the total purchase price. This may be more fair,
especially if the property has appreciated greatly in later years. It also better ac-
counts for inflation when the early payments made by H were of greater value.
43. As shown in the Aufmuth case, the characterization of the loan as an ini-
tial contribution will greatly vary the interest in the property upon dissolution. If
Mrs. Aufmuth had succeeded convincing the court that the loan proceeds were
separate property, Mr. Aufmuth's interest would have been vastly diminished.
See notes 18 and 20 supra.
44. 276 Cal. App. 2d 9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1969) (property purchased by husband
with loan was separate property where loan was secured by hypothecation of hus-
band's separate real estate). This holding was later approved in Jafeman where it
was determined the assets upon which a creditor relies in extending credit will de-
termine the character of the loan. See note 20 supra.
45. In the Aufmuth case it was not clear upon what security the loan was is-
sued. The court was required to surmise the lendor's intent from the surrounding
facts. See note 20 supra. In light of Moore's emphasis on the initial character of
the loan, if a party seeks a separate loan during marriage it would seem appropri-
ate to include language to that effect in the loan instrument in order to insure the
purchased property as being classified as separate.
sion should result from its consideration.46
The Moore decision is significant in that it settles any dispute
based upon the Vieux decision that interest and taxes should be
included in the determination of dissolution property settle-
ments.47 This may reach an odd result in the case of taxes rising
with the appreciated assessed value of the property and the new
"floating" interest loans. 48 Tax payments essentially remove an
encumberance from property increasing its equity. This may be
considered an improvement for which the community should be
compensated. It may be argued that the result is still equitable
since the community will share in the appreciation upon which
the increased taxes are based.49
The exclusion of interest payments may not enjoy the same ra-
tionale. This may especially be the case when "creative financ-
ing" is employed and a floating interest rateO is utilized. Due to
the nature of the floating rate, the interest paid on the portion
purchased with community funds may be much greater than the
interest paid with separate funds. Since the floating interest rate
is not tied to appreciation, but to such things as the prime interest
rate, no similar compensation may be realized for interest ex-
penses. Under the doctrine of improvements, it would seem reim-
46. See notes 32, 41, and 42 supra and accompanying text.
47. 28 Cal. 3d at 371, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664. Vieux included taxes
and interest in the computation without considering the suitability of doing so.
See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
48. A "floating" interest loan would be one in which the interest would vary at
a corresponding level to some market factor such as the prime interest rate. See
Note, McConnel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.: New Tests/or Vari-
able-Interest Loans, 30 HASTINGs L. J. 1843 (1979). Responding to inflation and the
demand for housing in California, the legislature has already provided statutory
standards and requirements for variable interest rate loans in real estate mort-
gages. See CAL. CIrV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1980). For an exposition of the
uses and advantages of creative financing, see Comment, The Variable Interest
Rate Clause and Its Use in California Real Estate Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 468 (1972).
49. The Court did not address the problem of reimbursement for taxes and in-
terest paid by the community on a spouse's separate property. It may have re-
frained from doing so in Moore due to community's use of the property. It is not
entirely clear what would happen to the same interest and tax payments made on
separate property of which the community did not have the benefit of using. Such
a situation may arise concerning investment property held out of state. It seems
possible the improvement doctrine under In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App.
3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972), and Wheeland v. Rodgers, 20 Cal. 2d 218, 124 P.2d
816 (1942), would require reimbursement. If tax and interest payments are made
along with payments on the principal such that the community is buying in to the
property, the interest and tax payments may be considered as 'applying to that in-
terest the community has purchased. In such cases an apportioned reimburse-
ment would seem proper. The reimbursement should be determined according to
the share purchased by the community and that amount retained in separate own-
ership.
50. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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bursement should be possible.5'
VI. CONCLUSION
In the Lucas, Aufmuth, and Moore decisions the California
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have adopted a new, more
complex formula which should provide more equitable property
division. The formula is designed to be employed in mixed con-
sideration cases, especially those involving purchase loans which
have not yet been fully repaid upon dissolution.
These decisions give special weight to the character and role of
the initial loan in purchasing property. Subsequent payments
from community funds on property classified as separate due to
the separate character of initial loan proceeds, will essentially
"buy in" to the property in proportion to the ratio that the total
payments bear to the initial purchase price. Only funds paid to
reduce the principal will be considered; there will be no consider-
ation of any payment of interest, insurance, or taxes. The formula
will turn on the relation between payments of principal and the
total principal purchase price, not on the relation between the re-
spective sums paid and the current reduction of principal as the
trial court had held.
Although left with a somewhat more complicated formula, it is
one that is not beyond the practitioner's, or more importantly, the
layman's comprehension. 52
IV. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
A. ARTICLE VI, § 16(c)
1. Judicial Vacanies: Stanton v. Panish; Chatterton v. Eu
51. This area may also lend itself to an apportioned reimbursement type the-
ory since the community may have paid more interest in ratio to the portion it re-
ceives for payment on the principal than that attributable to the separate
property.
52. It is also important that the layperson involved in the dissolution proceed-
ing understand the rationale behind the new formula. Often the recently divorced
individual expresses that he was treated unfairly in a divorce proceeding. Since
the court's formula accounts for the full separate or community property invest-
ment by including the original loan as a contribution, the overall division of prop-
erty should be more equitable. Therefore, if the layperson can understand the
Lucas-Aufmuth formula in its component parts, confidence in the community
property system should be insured.
In Stanton v. Panish,1 and Chatterton v. Eu,2 the Supreme
Court of California interpreted California Constitution Art. VI § 16
Subd. (c). The language in question states that, "a vacancy shall
be filled by election to a full term at the next general election af-
ter the January 1 following the vacancy, but the Governor shall
appoint a person to ifil the vacancy temporarily until the elected
judge's term begins." Despite what the dissent pointed out as the
clear language of the provision,3 the court interpreted it by mak-
ing a distinction between vacancies which occur before the electo-
ral process has begun and those which occur after it has begun.
The court believed that the provision was only intended to relieve
an appointee from the burden of standing for election immedi-
ately. When a vacancy arose early in the last year of an incum-
bent's term and if the appointee assumed office before one or
more potential candidates qualified 4 then no election is required.
In these two cases candidates had already qualified for a runoff
election in the November election when the vacancies occurred.5
1. 28 Cal. 3d 107, 615 P.2d 1372, 167 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1980). A superior court
judge, whose tenure terminated at the end of 1980, announced in January, 1980
that he would not run for reelection. The petitioner, a candidate in the June pri-
mary, qualified along with one other candidate for the November runoff election.
In June, after the primary, the incumbent judge retired. Pursuant to Cal. Const.
Art. VI, § 16(c), the petitioner was informed that the office would not appear on
the'November ballot. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to compel the registrar
to proceed with the election and to compel the Secretary of State to certify the
candidates for the election.
2. 28 Cal. 3d 123, 615 P.2d 1381, 167 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1980). A superior court
judge, whose term expired at the end of 1980, announced in November, 1979 that
he would not be seeking reelection. The petitioners and three others subse-
quently qualified as candidates for the June, 1980 primary election. There was no
absolute majority, therefore, the petitioner qualified for the runoff election in No-
vember. The incumbent judge retired in June, after the primary election. Peti-
tioner was informed that Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 16(c) precluded certification of the
office or candidate, for the November election. The petitioner sought a writ of
mandate compelling the registrar to proceed with the election and the Secreatary
of State to certify the office and candidates for the November election.
3. Despite what the dissent pointed out as the clear language of the provi-
sion, "[i]n the present case, the incumbent judge retired in June of 1980. Under
the clear language of the constitution, that vacancy must be filled by the exercise
of the Governor's appointment power. The appointee must then stand for election
June of 1982." Stanton v. Panish, 28 Cal. 3d 107, 116-17 (1980).
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 113, 615 P.2d at 1375, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 587. See Pollack v.
Hamm, 3 Cal. 3d 264, 425 P.2d 213, 90 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1970). The court held that only
if the vacancy arose in the year of expiration of an elected incumbent's term, or if
an elected incumbent should die in an election year at a time when it is no longer
possible to carry out the election process, can more than six years elapse between
election or opportunity of election for the office. See also Barber v. Blue, 65 Cal. 2d
185, 417 P.2d 401, 52 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1966) (established the general rule that an ap-
pointee need not stand for election in the year of the accrual of the vacancy).
5. In these two cases, candidates had already qualified for a runoff election in
the November election when the vacancies occurred. In Stanton, the incumbent
superior court judge announced his retirement on January 30, 1980, to become ef-
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Therefore, it was ruled that this provision did not operate to
cause cancellation of the upcoming election. This seems to be in
direct contradiction to the language in the provision.6 However,
the court found that the provision should be read in conjunction
with Art. VI section 16(b) of the California Constitution, which
commands that all judges (other than those of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeal) be elected in general elections, and Art. VI
section 16(c), which sets the terms for judges of the superior
court at six years.7 Read in conjunction with these two sections,
the court held the provision in question was an exception to the
general rules enumerated and would only apply when the elective
process had not already begun. 8
V. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. STANDING To SUE
1. Board Members: Carsten v. Psychological Examining
Committee
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Carsten v. Psychological
fective after June 21, 1980. In Chatterton, the incumbent superior court judge an-
nounced his noncandidacy on November 5, 1979 and retired June 30, 1980.
6. This seems to be in direct contradiction to the language in the provision.
See Fields v. Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 322, 326, 556 P.2d 729, 731-32, 134 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369-70,
(1976) (if a vacancy occurs at anytime in an election year, the office will not be
placed on the ballot until the next election year, i.e. two years later); Anderson v.
Phillips, 13 Cal. 3d 733, 739, 532 P.2d 1247, 1251, 119 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (1975) (pur-
pose was to eliminate the requirement that an election be held if the vacancy oc-
curs during the last year of the incumbent judge's term).
7. 28 Cal. 3d at 115, 615 P.2d at 1376-77, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89. The court indi-
cated that if respondent's argument was to prevail, incumbent judges would resign
or retire if they were unsatisfied with the candidates or election results. Further-
more, it would be unfair to other candidates who had expended time and re-
sources on the election.
8. The court felt the provision in question was an exception to the general
rules enumerated and would only apply when the elective process had not already
begun. See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal; 3d 247, 259, 502
P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972) (the literal language of a statute may
be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of the
framers); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
609, (1971) (constitutional provisions should be reasonably construed and if possi-
ble, harmonized to avoid conflict); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978)
(constitutional provisions should be construed reasonably if possible to avoid ab-
surd and unfair results).
Examining Committee, 1 held that a member of an administrative board
was not a citizen-taxpayer for purposes of establishing standing to sue the
very board on which she sat, because the roles of citizen-taxpayer and the
board member were deemed incompatible.
I. INTRODUCTION
A member of the Psychology Examining Committee of the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance 2 (hereinafter PEC) peti-
tioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the committee to comply
with the California Business and Professions Code section 2942.3
The committee under section 2942, has an obligation to assure
that only qualified persons are licensed to practice psychology in
the State of California. This statutory obligation is accomplished
by PEC's administration of examinations to persons seeking psy-
chology licenses.
The code states that only applicants receiving a score of at least
seventy-five percent on both the written and oral portions of the
examination may obtain a license. However in 1977, PEC began
utilizing the national average as the passing score rather than the
statutorily prescribed average of seventy-five percent. PEC also
substituted an objective test for the written examination. As a re-
sult of employing the national average for determining a passing
grade, applicants that were statutorily disqualified to receive
licenses to practice psychology nevertheless received licenses. 4
The overall effect was to lower the requirements for the acquisi-
tion of a psychology license by reducing the passing grade for the
examination.
The trial court sustained the committee's demurrer without
leave to amend. Carsten then asked the court of appeal for ex-
traordinary relief to compel the lower court to accept jurisdiction
of the matter.5 The court of appeal found that the petitioner was
1. 27 Cal. 3d 793, 614 P.2d 276, 166 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980). Justice Mosk wrote for
the majority with Justices Newman, Clark, and Manuel concurring. Justice Rich-
ardson wrote the dissent with Chief Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner concurring
in the dissent.
2. Petitioner, Arlene Carsten, was appointed by the Governor to serve a four-
year term on the committee. Id. at 805, 614 P.2d at 277, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2942 (West 1974): "The committee may examine
by written or oral examination or both. The examination shall be given at least
twice a year at the time and place and under such supervision as the committee
may determine. A grade of 75 percent shall be a passing grade." The 1980 supple-
ment adds to the above quoted section that "Examinations for a psychologist's li-
cense may be conducted by the committee under a uniform examination system,
and for that purpose the committee may make such arrangement with organiza-
tions furnishing examination material as may in its discretion be desirable."
4. Under the national means measure of passage, applicants scoring as low as
67.5% were licensed. 27 Cal. 3d at 796, 614 P.2d at 278, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
5. It is within the discretion of the court whether to accept jurisdiction of the
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only incidentally a board member, and was able to sue in her ca-
pacity as a citizen-taxpayer. The court ruled that under the cir-
cumstances, the petitioner had standing to sue and was a
"beneficially interested" party within the meaning of the Califor-
nia Civil Procedure Code sections 1085 and 1086.6 The court of ap-
peal also held that the matter was not a political issue, thus it was
justiciable.7 Despite the fact that Carsten was given standing to
sue, the appellate court denied the application for the writ of
mandamus. 8
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that Carsten did
not have standing to sue, as she was not a "beneficially inter-
ested" party within the meaning of the California Civil Procedure
Code requirements. The high court affirmed the portion of the
judgement denying the writ of mandamus.9
matter about which the writ of mandamus is sought. Carsten v. Psychology Exam-
ining Comm., 97 Cal. App. 3d 110, 158 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1979) (the responsibility of
issuing a writ of mandamus rests in the wise discretion of the court); McDonald v.
Stockton Metropolitan Transit Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1974)
(exercise of jurisdiction in mandamus proceeding rests to a considerable extent
with the discretion of the court, weighing the applicant's need for relief and his
beneficial interest, against the public need for enforcement of the official duty);
American Friends Service Dist. v. Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22
(1973) (whether a writ of mandamus is to issue depends on the wise discretion of
the court).
6. See CAI. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 1085, 1086 (West 1980). Section 1085 reads in
reference to writs, that:
It may be issued by any court, except a municipal or justice court, to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or persons, to compel the perform-
ance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from which
he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person.
Section 1086 states that "The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be is-
sued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested."; Carsten v.
Psychology Examining Comm., 97 Cal. App. 3d 110, 158 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1979). Under
sections 1085 and 1086 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only a beneficially interested
person has standing to bring a petition for writ of mandamus, and ordinarily, this
means one must have a private right to be protected or an interest other than that
held by the public in general. Taschner v. City Council of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973), held that one who has some special interest to
be served or a particular right to be protected has sufficient beneficial interest to
seek a writ of mandamus and an elector, taxpayer, and property owner has suffi-
cient personal interest to challenge the validity of a building height limitation ordi-
nance.
7. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
8. Id.
9. 27 Cal. 3d at 795, 802, 614 P.2d at 277, 281, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 845, 849. The Cali-
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A writ of mandamus may be issued by:
any court.... to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to
compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or to compel the admission
of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is enti-
tled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded. 1 0
While issuance of the writ of mandamus rests within the discre-
tion of the court," "the writ must be issued in all cases where
there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary
course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the
party beneficially interested",12-considering the applicants need
for relief and his beneficial interest as against the public need for
enforcement of the official duty.
Generally, a beneficially interested person who has standing to
petition for the writ is one that has "some private right to be pro-
tected or preserved or an interest which is other than that which
he holds with the public at large.'1 3 The courts, however, have
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's denial of petitioner's applica-
tion for a writ of mandate. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 557. The
appellate court had reversed the trial court's dismissal of Carsten's complaint af-
ter sustaining the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend. 27 Cal. 3d at 795,
614 P.2d at 277, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
10. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980); accord McDonald v. Stockton
Metropolitan Transit Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1973).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 1980); Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344,
254 P.2d 6 (1953) (a writ of mandate will not be issued except upon the affidavit on
application of the party beneficially interested); accord Ellis v. Workman, 144 Cal.
113, 77 P. 822 (1904).
13. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 556; see Board of Social Welfare v.
Los Angeles County, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 162 P.2d 627 (1945). The California State Board
of Social Welfare is a beneficially interested party within § 1086 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and thus could maintain mandamus seeking to compel county of-
ficials to issue duplicate welfare checks for needy persons whose checks had been
cancelled. Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 3d 344, 254 P.2d 6 (1953), held that a writ of
mandamus will only be issued where it is shown that it is necessary to protect a
substantial right and where shown that substantial damage will be suffered by pe-
titioners if denied. As such, neither an individual who served as secretary-treas-
urer of a voluntary incorporated association on behalf of members of
unincorporated labor organizations nor a labor council and its affiliated unions had
sufficient interest to have standing for mandate proceedings seeking to compel
city officials to fix wages at a price comparable to those in similar employment in
the private sphere. Fritts v. Charles, 145 Cal. 512, 78 P. 1057 (1904), found that the
applicant for a writ of mandamus to compel the arrest of one accused by peti-
tioner's complaint of misdemeanor violation involving use of slot machine unlaw-
fully was not a party beneficially interested within the meaning of the statutory
requirement as he was not different in any manner from the general applicant in
any prosecution of complaint. Ellis v. Workman, 144 Cal. 113, 77 P. 822 (1904). A
writ of mandamus was denied because the party was not sufficiently interested.
In this case, the party's land was sold by a city treasurer for failure to pay street
improvement installments under a bond which constituted a lien for the amount
of the bond on petitioner's property. Since the party did not claim that the bond
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considerably expanded the concept of beneficial interest to in-
clude property owners, taxpayers, and voters.14
While the general rule on the issuance of a writ of mandamus
requires that one have some special interest above and beyond
that of the public at large, an exception has developed if the issue
is one of public right or duty. In this context, the requirements of
a clear and beneficial right of the petitioner and the correspond-
ing duties of the respondent have been relaxed. Under this ex-
ception it is sufficient that the individual seeking the writ is
interested as an ordinary citizen in having the laws enforced and
executed.' 5 The Supreme Court of California noted this excep-
was illegal, the bond does not affect the petitioner's right to redeem; thus, he can-
not be interested or have a substantial right protected unless the city refuses to
redeem. Potter v. City Council of Port Hueneme, 102 Cal. App. 2d 141, 227 P.2d 25
(1951), held that generally, a private person may apply for a writ of mandamus
only where he has some private or particular interest that will be served or pro-
tected, separate and distinct from that held with the public at large, and unless
such special interest appears, the application should be denied.
14. 27 Cal. 3d at 796, 614 P.2d at 278, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 845. As a general proposi-
tion, state taxpayers have standing to challenge the validity of public fund expend-
itures by any governmental agency and even to challenge the legality of non-fiscal
issues. Taschner v. City Council of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr.
214 (1973), found that the fact that the petitioner was a voter, taxpayer, and owner
of real property was sufficient to render him a beneficially interested party for pur-
poses of standing to obtain writ of mandamus to challenge building height limita-
tions enacted as ordinance by initiative. Knoff v. City and County of San
Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969), held that the petitioners' sta-
tus as taxpayers made them beneficially interested parties who could maintain
mandamus proceeding in a class action suit against the Board of Supervisors of
San Francisco and the Assessor, where petitioners sought to compel performance
of public duties which the law specifically required.
15. Board of Social Welfare v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 100-01, 162
P.2d 627 (1945):
[W[here the question is one of public right and the object of the manda-
mus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is suffi-
cient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the
duty in question enforced.
Holman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948), found that under certain cir-
cumstances, it is sufficient that the person seeking a writ of mandate is interested
in his capacity as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty at issue en-
forced. Carsten v. Psychology Examining Comm., 97 Cal. App. 3d 110, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 554 (1979), held that under the relevant statutes, only one who is beneficially
interested has standing to prosecute an action for a writ of mandamus. While or-
dinarily this means one must have some private right to be preserved, an excep-
tion to such rule is recognized where the issue is one of public right and the
objective of the writ is to procure performance of a public duty. Fuller v. San Fer-
nando Valley Mun. Water Dist., 242 Cal. App. 2d 52, 56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 120, 124 (1966),
found that while generally a writ of mandamus is only granted where necessary to
protect a substantial right and protect against substantial damage, this rule does
tion for standing if one is a citizen, taxpayer, property owner, and
the like. The court, however, was silent as to the general excep-
tion allowing standing for mandate where citizens seek to have
the laws enforced. The appellate court, on the other hand, also
took note of the general exception, but found that the citizen had
standing, and where "the question is one of both public interest
and duty and requirements relating to the petitioner's rights and
respondent's duties are 'relaxed.'"16
Several cases in which a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus
has been found to be beneficially interested, under the public
right and duty exception to this general rule, bear mentioning. In
Board of Social Welfare v. Los Angeles County,17 it was stated
that "generally, when a power or duty is imposed by law upon a
public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or per-
form such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of manda-
mus, it or he may apply for the same."' 8 This case arose when the
Board of Social Welfare applied for a writ of mandamus to compel
the county to issue duplicate checks on behalf of three needy wel-
fare recipients. Similarly, in American Friends Service Committee
v. Procunier,19 several nonprofit organizations interested in
prison reform were given standing to petition for mandamus
where the petitioner was one "alleging that a government depart-
ment is not complying with the law and seeking a court order
compelling such compliance." 20 American Friends Service Com-
mittee was decided in reliance upon the rule stated in Fuller v.
San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District,21 that there was
an exception to the general rule, requiring a petitioner for stand-
ing to have a substantial right at stake. This exception was recog-
not apply where the issue is one of public right and the writ's objective is to pro-
cure the performance of a public duty. American Friends Service Comm. v.
Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252 at 256, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 at 24 (1973), stated: "Where,
however, the question is one of public, as opposed to private, interest, and peti-
tioner seeks performance of a public duty, it is said the foregoing requirements of
petitioner's rights and respondent's duty have been 'relaxed.'" McDonald v.
Stockton Metropolitan Transit Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1973),
held that where the public need is great, the court will grant mandamus to a peti-
tioner without a showing of personal interest where he seeks to enforce an official
duty that is clear and certain. Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr.
358 (1969), stated that where the question is one of public right, such as entitle-
ment to welfare benefits, and the mandamus is sought to enforce a public duty,
such as information regarding those rights, the relator does not have to show any
special interest in the result because it is sufficient that he is interested as a citi-
zen in having laws executed.
16. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 556; See note 15 supra.
17. 27 Cal. 2d 96, 162 P.2d 627 (1945).
18. Id. at 100-01, 162 P.2d at 628-29.
19. 33 Cal App. 3d 252, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1973).
20. Id. at 256, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
21. 242 Cal. App. 2d 52, 51 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1966).
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nized where "the question is one of public right and the object of
the writ is to procure performance of a public duty."22
While American Friends Service Committee and Fuller were ap-
pellate court decisions, the Board of Social Welfare case was de-
cided by the California Supreme Court. A subsequent supreme
court case noted the same exception where an applicant for a writ
of mandamus sought to compel the Governor to appoint notary
publics for the San Francisco region. In Hollman v. Warren,23 the
petitioner was an applicant for a notary commission, and the
court stated that "aside from her character as an applicant for ap-
pointment as a notary it is alleged that she is a resident and tax-
payer of the City and County of San Francisco. As such she is
interested in having a sufficient number of notories commissioned
to act therein."24
Similarly, in the case of McDonald v. Stockton Metropolitan
Transit District,25 where two bus riders sought a writ of manda-
mus to compel the defendant to install twenty bus stop shelters,
it was noted that "when public duty is sharp and public need
weighty, [a] court will grant a mandamus at behest of an appli-
cant who shows no greater personal interest than that of a citizen
who wants the law enforced."2 6 However, that court also noted
that where the public need is not so compelling, the applicant for
mandamus must show a more personal interest in the matter. It
would seem then, that the categorization of a duty as a public in-
terest would grant a citizen standing to obtain a writ of manda-
mus. Such mandamus would compel the performance of the
22. Id. at 57, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
23. 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948).
24. Id. at 356-57, 196 P.2d at 566.
25. 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1973). In McDonald, two bus pa-
trons sought mandamus to compel the defendant to install 20 bus stop shelters.
However, the court found that mandamus was not the proper remedy to enforce
contractual obligations of a public body. Here, the Federal Department of Trans-
portation was the primary obligor, and it had never charged the Metropolitan
Transit District with breach of contract which would require it to complete a pro-
ject involving the building of bus stop shelters in exchange for a grant of federal
funds. The federal agency had a choice of remedies on the contract which it could
exercise against the defendant district. The presence of a third party, the federal
government, who could exercise discretion in choosing a remedy against the de-
fendants named in the suit, might have had an adverse effect on the petitioner's
standing to enforce that same contract by mandate. There was an element of dis-
cretion involved in the case which might have rendered the mandate inappropri-
ate because mandamus is usually issued if the magistrate has a clear ministerial
function.
26. Id. at 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
duty.27
Also, where the duty or performance of a duty is clearly minis-
terial, the court will find that the exception mentioned above is
applicable. For instance in Diaz v. Quitoriano,28 the court found
that the county welfare department had a ministerial duty to ad-
vise every person requesting any type of public aid of their rights
to apply for such benefits. Furthermore, if such persons were dis-
satisfied with the county's determination of their need, they were
to be advised of their right to request an administrative hearing
before the Department of Social Welfare.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court found that the petitioner did not
have standing to sue the board on which she sat, because she was
not a "beneficially interested" party. This was based on the fact
that she was neither seeking a psychology license, nor in danger
of losing one.29 The court defined a beneficially interested party,
as one with a special interest,30 and the court distinguished this
from those cases which recognized a citizen's standing in the en-
forcement of a public duty.31 The court further found that the pe-
titioner acquired her knowledge about the committee's deviation
from Business and Professions Code section 2942 by virtue of her
membership on the board. It was in that capacity, not that of a
citizen-taxpayer, that she brought the suit. Since the majority
found the two roles incompatible, it held that she could not "exer-
cise her citizen's right to sue an administrative board and . . si-
multaneously serve on the same board. The two functions are
manifestly incompatible; one or the other must yield."32
While the court agreed with the petitioners argument that suits
by citizen-taxpayers have been recognized where they are
brought to compel a governmental entity to comply with its statu-
tory or constitutional duty, it found that the petitioner was not en-
27. Also relevant to the determination of the McDonald case was the issue of
discretion in the duty to be compelled. See note 24 infra.
28. 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969). The proceeding for the writ
was brought by welfare applicants seeking to compel the county welfare depart-
ment and its director to perform their ministerial duties.
29. 27 Cal. 3d at 797, 614 P.2d at 278, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The typical case for
mandamus is where a ministerial duty exists and one seeks to obtain a writ to re-
view actions taken by a board. For instance, in Cooper v. Board of Medical Exam-
iners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 123 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1975), a psychologist sought review by
a writ of administrative mandamus of the revocation of his license by the board
after he was accused of administering dangerous drugs and engaging in sexual re-
lations with three female patients.
30. 27 Cal. 3d at 797, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
31. Id. at 797-98, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
32. Id. at 800, 614 P.2d at 280, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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titled to such an exemption because of the requirements of the
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1086.33
The majority distinguished Board of Social Welfare v. County of
Los Angeles 34 where the board's role as parens patriae of the
needy welfare recipients gave it standing on their behalf.35 The
Carsten court found that the statement in Board of Social Wel-
fare that citizens had an interest in enforcing a public duty was
dicta and found that the board was "unquestionably... benefi-
cially interested in the result within the meaning of section
1086."36 While the majority in Carsten found that the petitioner
had no analogous interest, the court never clearly indicated why
this was so and how the case differed.
The court quickly distinguished Holiman v. Warren37 on the
ground that the person seeking the writ of mandamus was, her-
self, an applicant for a notary's commission. This brought her
within the meaning of "beneficially interested," despite the
court's note about her interest as a citizen and resident of San
Francisco.38 The majority stated that since Carsten was not seek-
ing a psychology license, she had no comparable interest.
The majority also found that Fuller v. San Bernardino Munici-
pal Water District39 was irrelevant because the court in that case
ultimately ruled that the petitioner for the mandate had a special
interest under the general rule.40 Finally, the court distinguished
American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier4l in a brief sen-
tence stating the case "involved groups active in prison reform
seeking invalidation of certain rules enacted under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act; the court merely held the rules are not ap-
plicable." 42
Justice Richardson, in his dissenting opinion, cited each of the
foregoing cases in support of the proposition urged by the peti-
tioner; that is, where the issue is one of public interest and the
33. Id. at 797, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 846; see notes 13-15 supra and
accompanying text.
34. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
35. 27 Cal. 3d at 797, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
36. Id.
37. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
38. 27 Cal. 3d at 797-98, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
39. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
40. 27 Cal. 3d at 798, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
41. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
42. 27 Cal. 3d at 798, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
petitioner seeks to compel the performance of the public duty, the
traditional mandate requirements of plaintiff's rights and the de-
fendant's corresponding duty have been relaxed.43 Justice Rich-
ardson cited Board of Social Welfare as standing for the
proposition that "when a power or duty is imposed by law upon a
public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or per-
form such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of manda-
mus, it or he may apply for the same."4 For the minority, the
significance of Hollman was in that court's characterization of the
petitioner as a resident and taxpayer and her interest in that ca-
pacity was held sufficient to warrant standing.45 Similarly, the
majority in Fuller "acknowledged that an exception to the general
rule requiring the existence of a substantial right" was recognized
in the context of a public duty.46 Finally, referring to American
Friends Service Committee, Justice Richardson noted that the ap-
pellate court had specifically addressed the issue of standing and
concluded that it was conferred where the mandate is one seek-
ing to compel a governmental entity to comply with the law. 47
The Carsten majority cited two premises for denying petitioner
standing before examining the policy reasons militating against
finding her beneficially interested. The first reason cited for its
conclusion was that the petitioner had no personal stake in the
outcome of the suit because she was not seeking a license nor
was she in danger of losing one. The court felt that any opinion
rendered would be merely advisory. 48 While the majority alleged
that a decision would have no effect on the petitioner, but would
only serve to offer advice on future examinations, it denied that
Carsten was seeking "an affirmative mandate . . .directing PEC
to comply with its statutory obligations." 49
The second reason given for denying the petitioner standing
was that she was suing herself. The majority contended that
since she was the moving party and a duly appointed member of
PEC, she was both plaintiff and defendant. Thus, she was said to
be indulging in "narcissistic litigation" in which she could not
lose.50 However, the dissent pointed out the petitioner was suing
the agency as a legal entity, not the members individually. Fur-
ther, the committee is a mere creature of statute and the peti-
43. Id. at 802-05, 614 P.2d at 281-83, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
44. Id. at 803, 614 P.2d at 282, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 803-04, 614 P.2d at 282, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 798, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
49. Id. at 805, 614 P.2d at 283, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
50. Id. at 798, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
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tioner is but a "constituent element of the Board of Medical
Examiners of the Department of Consumer Affairs."51 Finally,
the petitioner was only appointed to serve a four-year term.
The court's primary reason for denying petitioner standing to
sue rested on policy considerations. The court found that the pe-
titioner had to forfeit either her status as a member of the com-
mittee or her citizen's right to sue that same committee. As
justification for this proposition in the context of an admittedly
novel situation,5 2 the majority stated that "[T]he law is replete
with examples of forfeiture of some rights available to others by
virtue of acceptance of public service."5 3
Certain language in the Carsten opinion indicates that what the
majority feared was the creation of a class of new persons entitled
to petition for writs of mandamus, the disruption and ultimate de-
struction of the administrative process, and the resulting adminis-
trative burden that would result in the judicial system. 54 These
51. Id. at 805, 614 P.2d at 283, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
52. The court states explicitly at the outset that the case is one of first impres-
sion and that it has not found any authority on point in any jurisdiction. Id. at 795,
614 P.2d at 277, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
53. Id. at 799, 614 P.2d at 280, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The court cites McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), as the "classic" example
of the forfeiture of some constitutional rights inherent in some public service of-
fices. In that case, a police officer sought to be reinstated after being discharged
for exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. The court, per Justice
Holmes, found that while the plaintiff had a constitutional right to talk politics, he
did not have the same right to be a police officer. It further held that the implied
terms of the employment contract required suspension of certain constitutional
rights. The majority in Carsten asserted that a similar rule is recognized in Cali-
fornia by virtue of Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416
(1939). That principle is expressed by the statement that:
There is nothing startling in the conception that a public servant's right to
retain his office or employment should depend upon his willingness to
forego his constitutional rights and privileges to the extent that the exer-
cise of such rights and privileges may be inconsistent with the perform-
ance of the duties of his office or employment.
Id. at 569, 92 P.2d at 419. While the fact that these two cases deal with police of-
ficers is in itself, sufficient to distinguish their rules, another reason exposes the
inadequacy of this contention. This is the only authority cited that found the exer-
cise of a citizen-taxpayer's right to sue a governmental agency to enforce the law
inconsistent with an agency board member doing the same. Even the appellate
court hearing Carsten did not find the two roles incompatible or the necessity of
petitioner's choosing one or the other status. The court seeks to use rulings which
involve public offices of a wholly different nature i.e., police officers, rather than
the office held by petitioner, i.e., board member, as a grounds for finding the role
of citizen to be incompatible.
54. The court states that as to the judicial burden and the potential new class
of litigants:
policy considerations appear to be the prime and, indeed, only
justification for the court's conclusion. 55
By characterizing the petitioner as a board member first and a
citizen-taxpayer second, the court asserted that permitting such
suits would allow discontented minority board members to turn
to the courts for a second chance at persuasion. The majority
seemed to think that permitting persons in the petitioner's posi-
tion to bring suit against an administrative agency on which he or
she serves would also result in "the entire administrative process
being transported wholesale to the courts." 56
The fear of disintegration and ultimate destruction of the ad-
ministrative process that the majority asserted would result by
recognition of such suits stems from the disruptive influence that
the threat of litigation involves. 57 In this respect, the majority
contended that allowing resort to judicial process undermines the
primary purpose of the administrative process, which is to pro-
vide "expeditious disposition of problems in a specialized field
without recourse to the judiciary."5 8 Further disruptive influence
is evidenced by the effect on the working relationship of board
members subject to suit by fellow members. If a suit did ensue,
members would be compelled to testify against each other, attack
each other's position on issues, and to divulge internal delibera-
We believe, however, that the California judiciary is ill-equipped to add to
its already heavy burden the duty of serving as an ombudsman for the
plethora of state administrative agencies and local agencies that exist in
every one of our 58 counties. Yet that role will inevitably be imposed if
minority board members may bring their defeats and frustrations to courts
for a second chance at persuasion.
27 Cal. 3d at 801, 614 P.2d at 281, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (emphasis added). As for the
effect of recognizing claims such as the petitioner's on the administrative process,
the supreme court states, "[a]nd if that were .permitted, the utility of adminstra-
tive boards - unless they always achieve unanimity - would face an untimely de-
mise." Id. It seems that the majority on the supreme court seized on the board's
arguments presented to, and rejected by, the appellate court. 97 Cal. App. 3d at
114-15, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57. The appellate court considered defendant's argu-
ments that a new class of litigants would be created, that the influence on the ad-
ministrative process would be disruptive and that the judicial burden would be too
heavy but rejected these. Id.
55. See 27 Cal. 3d at 805, 614 P.2d at 283-84, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting): 'The majority must rely on policy considerations alone. Why should
courts strip 'citizen-taxpayer' status from an entire section of the public composed
of persons who also happen to be public members of a government agency? The
majority's reasons are insufficient."
56. Id. The dissent found that the majority exaggerated the burdens that
would be thrust upon the judicial system if such lawsuits were recognized. "The
majority, fearing an explosion of lawsuits, conjures a litigation disaster that would
engulf us were petitioner's rights as a citizen honored. It is overreaction to antici-
pate that the entire administrative process will thus be transported, wholesale, to
the courts. Id.
57. Id. at 799, 614 P.2d at 279, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
58. Id.
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tions. Additionally, defending such suits would exhaust the lim-
ited monetary resources of such boards.
5 9
The majority sought to reverse a trend it noted in administra-
tive law which involves increased judicial intervention in the ad-
ministrative process. Allowing the petitioner standing would not
comport with this aim. In a similar vein of reasoning, the court
sought to avoid the role of an ombudsman. 60 By allowing "minor-
ity board members . . . [to] . . . bring their defeats and frustra-
tions to courts for a second chance at persuasion," 61 the majority
alleged that the judiciary would be undertaking a heavy burden
for which it is not equipped.62
IV. CASE IMPACT
The majority's decision leaves a clear legislative mandate unen-
forced. If the legislature had desired to allow PEC any discretion
in its testing procedures for determining minimum competency
levels, it would not have enacted section 2942 of the California
Business and Professions Code.63 By not granting the petitioner
standing, the enforcement of the committee's statutory obligation
must await suit by a citizen-taxpayer or a beneficially interested
party who is seeking a psychology license or in danger of losing
one. Enforcement seems unlikely. Allowing a member of the
general citizenry to bring suit, but not one situated in the peti-
tioner's position, appears inconsistent. By devoting her energies
to the service of such an administrative committee, the petitioner
was denied her right as a citizen to bring suit to enforce a public
duty. Certainly the qualification of only competent psychologists
in California is a matter of public interest and right.
In contrast, the court of appeal in Carsten found that "the duty
of the agency is sharp and the public need weighty,"64 as did the
three dissenting justices of the California Supreme Court.65 In
59. Id.
60. Id. at 801, 614 P.2d at 281, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
61. Id.
62. Id. But see 27 Cal. 3d at 805, 614 P.2d at 283, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52, (Rich-
ardson, J., dissenting). The minority found that the majority had exaggerated the
burdens that would be imposed by recognizing such suits. As a basis, it pointed to
the fact that the taxpayer and citizen suits to enforce public rights and duties have
long been recognized without any avalanche of litigation.
63. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
64. Id. at 111, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
65. 27 Cal. 3d at 803-07, 614 P.2d at 282-84, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 849-52.
this regard, the court of appeal aptly stated that "PEC, like any
administrative agency, must follow the law. It has been delegated
the authority to administer and enforce the psychology licensing
law except as to those functions specifically vested in the Board
of Medical Quality Assurance." 66 The end result is that the high
court's decision allows PEC to evade the law.
While the majority's opinion cited the administrative burden
that would be imposed on the judiciary if such suits were permit-
ted, the dissenting justices found that those fears were exagger-
ated. In support of its view, the dissent pointed out that taxpayer
suits have been allowed for years where governmental action is
challenged. There has been no indication that this has resulted in
an unmanageable burden, or that such suits have been instituted
in bad faith. Courts are capable of sorting out the sham suits
from the proper suits in this area, as they are in other areas of the
law.67
V. CONCLUSION
A majority of the California Supreme Court held that a member
of an administrative board or agency cannot sue the agency or
board upon which such a member sits as the two positions are in-
consistent. The ruling arose in the context of a suit by a member
of the Psychology Examining Committee of the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance filed against the board to compel its compli-
ance with the California Business and Professions Code section
2942. That section, guiding the conduct of examinations adminis-
tered to applicants for licenses to practice psychology, required a
passing score of seventy-five percent. Instead of adhering to the
statutory mandate, the board utilized the national average pass-
ing score as a requirement to qualify for a license. This has the
consequence of permitting some persons to be licensed who
would otherwise be statutorily disqualified.
The court's holding appears to be primarily based on policy
considerations regarding the division of authority between the ju-
diciary and administrative agencies. The majority feared a large
influx of future suits and fullscale importation of the administra-
tive process into the court room if such suits were permitted to be
brought. Rather than limit the situations in which such suits
could proceed, such as clear breaches of codified law, the court
concluded with a broad prohibition against any board or agency
member bringing suit against his or her board. This was based on
66. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
67. 27 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 614 P.2d at 283-84, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
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the fear that allowing such suits would spell the demise of the ad-
ministrative process.
Vi. LABOR LAW
A. CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM
1. The Scope of the Exclusive Remedy Under California
Labor Code §§ 3601 and 4553: Johns-Manville v. Contra
Costa Superior Court
Responding to the inadequacy of compensation available to employees
intentionally injured by their employer, the California Supreme Court de-
fines the scope of the workmen's compensation system so as to allow an ac-
tion at law for aggravation of disease. The extent of this exception and its
well defined logic is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court heldi that although section 36012
of the California Labor Code may bar an action at law by an em-
ployee against his employer for initial injury, it will not bar an ac-
tion for aggravation of disease where the employer fraudulently
and intentionally conceals from the employee his diseased condi-
tion. The court's decision examines the applicability of prior deci-
sions involving the employer acting in a "dual capacity."'3 The
Johns-Manville decision also makes it easier to show a distinction
between the initial job-related disease and the later unconnected
aggravation of that disease.
The court's interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting
section 3601 of the California Labor Code, the practical applica-
tion of section 3601, and the policy considerations surrounding the
Johns-Manville decision will be examined.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980). The majority opinion
was authored by Justice Mosk in which Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner,
Newman, and Manuel concurred. Justice Clark filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Richardson concurred.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1980). The California Labor Code pro-
vides for exclusivity of remedy in workmen's compensation cases by stating as fol-
lows: "Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such
compensation [is] . . .the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee
against the employer or against any other employee ... acting within the scope of
his employment. . . ." See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 29 and 30 infra and accompanying text. The "dual capacity" con-
cept concerns the employer inflicting a second injury to the employee while acting
in a capacity outside that of an employer.
Reba Rudkin4 was employed by Johns-Manville Products Cor-
poration,5 a processor of asbestos, for 29 years. As a result of ex-
posure to asbestos dust, plaintiff developed severe respiratory
diseases that resulted in his eventual death.6 Johns-Manville had
known since 1924 that prolonged exposure to asbestos was dan-
gerous to health. Disregarding this fact, the company concealed
the knowledge from the plaintiff and even advised him that there
was no danger in working with the dangerous material.7 Plaintiff
was not provided with adequate protective devices, nor was the
plant operated in compliance with state and federal regulations
concerning dust control.8
In addition to these violations, doctors retained by Johns-
Manville were unqualified and uninformed regarding the dangers
of asbestos exposure.9 The doctors were not advised by the cor-
poration of plaintiff's pulmonary disease, its development, nor
that the disease was initially caused by exposure to asbestos.
Johns-Manville further failed to file the statutorily required re-
ports regarding plaintiff's injury, which would have revealed the
disease and likely resulted in its treatment.10 These acts were
found to have been done willfully and fraudulently by Johns-
Manville with an intent to retain plaintiff in his line of work." An
analysis of the facts indicated the plaintiff was not aware of any
risk and would not have continued work in such an environment
had he been aware of the dangers.' 2
Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging
intentional and wilful misconduct by his employers. Johns-
Manville answered, alleging the action to be barred by section
360113 since an application for workmen's compensation had been
4. Reba Rudkin was the plaintiff in the original action and the real party in
interest in the action for writ of mandate to the Superior Court of Contra Costa
County.
5. Johns-Manville Products Corporation [hereinafter Johns-Manville] was
the defendant in the original action and is engaged in the mining, milling, manu-
facturing, and packaging of asbestos in Pittsburg, California.
6. Although plaintiff Rudkin's death occurred prior to the suit in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the court noted that the issues were not moot since an action
for personal injuries survives the death of the plaintiff. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573
(West Supp. 1980).
7. 27 Cal. 3d at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 470, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
12. Id.
13. Rudkin attempted to escape the exclusivity provision of § 3601 by alleging
intentional infliction of injury. Johns-Manville countered claiming intentional in-
jury was compensated by means of § 4553 of the California Labor Code and its pro-
vision for an increase of award. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. Rudkin
then argued the meaning of "intentional injury" to be different from that of the
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filed. The trial court denied Johns-Manville's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. An action for writ of mandate was filed with the
state supreme court seeking to vacate the trial court's order. The
writ was denied.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The court in Johns-Manville based its holding on an interpreta-
tion of section 360114 of the California Labor Code which provides
an exclusive remedy for an injury caused by an employer. Two
exceptions are provided which allow an action for damages to be
maintained when death or injury is caused by the "wilful and un-
provoked physical act of aggression" of another employee or
when death or injury is caused by the intoxification of another
employee.' 5 Apart from these two exceptions, section 3601 pro-
vides workmen's compensation as the sole remedy in the case of
an on-the-job injury.
Section 455316 of the Labor Code provides for employee re-
course where an injury is caused by an employer's "serious and
willful misconduct."l 7 Where intentional misconduct can be
shown, a compensation award is to be increased by 50%, but not
to exceed ten thousand dollars.' 8 As a result, any misconduct
"serious and willful misconduct" contemplated under § 4553. The court saw no
merit to this distinction and held § 4553 to cover intentional infliction of injury. 27
Cal. 3d at 472-73, 612 P.2d at 952, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862. Cf. Mercer-Fraser Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 102, 117, 251 P.2d 955, 966 (1953) (the Mercer
decision showed "[w]illfulness necessarily involves the performance of a deliber-
ate or intentional act or omission regardless of the consequences."). The defend-
ant attempted to use Mercer to show that there was not a real distinction between
intentional and willful misconduct as the plaintiff had urged.
14. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
15. Essentially the two exceptions provide for an action at law when another
employee inflicts injury outside the scope of his employment. Mr. Justice Clark
argues in his dissent that these are the only two exceptions intended by the legis-
lature since they were specifically enumerated, therefore, no other judge-made ex-
ception should be created. 27 Cal. 3d at 483, 612 P.2d at 959, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1980). Section 4553 provides: "(tIhe
amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased by one-half
where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and wilful misconduct of
[the employer]. But such increase shall in no event exceed ten thousand dol-
lars .. "
17. Id. The court equated the concept of serious and willful misconduct with
intent. See note 13 supra.
18. Prior to 1917, an injured employee would have a choice of remedy where
injuries were caused by an employer's gross negligence of willful misconduct. He
could either claim workmen's compensation or maintain an action at law for dam-
ages. 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 176, § 12b. In 1917 however, the provision was deleted and
that demonstratively causes the initial injury is exclusively com-
pensated by an increase in the compensation award.19
The workmen's compensation system contemplates an on-the-
job or closely-related job injury. The system was enacted to es-
tablish a balancing effect. The "advantage to the employer of im-
munity from liability at law [is balanced] against the detriment
[of] relatively swift and certain compensation payments."20
While the injured employee can be assured of quick and certain
compensation, his right to a potentially larger recovery in an ac-
tion at law for negligence or intentional misconduct of his em-
ployer is lost.21
To escape the restraints of the workmen's compensation system
and maintain an action at law, an injured employee must demon-
strate an injury outside the employment environment or one oc-
curring outside of the scope and course of his employment.2 2 A
mere showing of intent to injure will not escape the exclusive
a new provision inserted which allowed an increase of the compensation award by
one-half as the sole remedy. This provision was intended to be a substitute for the
right to seek damages in an action at law. 1917 Cal. Stats., ch. 586, § 6b.
19. The increase of an award allowed by § 4553 is additional compensation and
does not represent punitive damages. State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 885, 489 P.2d 818, 97 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971). Any
deterrent effect that might be provided by a punitive damage award for such so-
cially reprehensible conduct as that displayed by Johns-Manville can only be ac-
complished in an action at law.
20. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
21. Id.
22. A physical assault by an employer outside the scope of employment could
be one example. Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975) (waitress allowed recovery in action at law where she suffered injury due to
intentional "push" by her employer-bartender). See also Meyer v. Graphic Arts
Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1979) (employer is liable in a
civil suit for intentional assault, battery, false imprisonment, and rape committed
by employer's agent acting within the scope of his employment).
Although he would later withdraw his separate opinion, initially Justice Manuel
believed the rationale of Meyer and Magliulo clashed with the decisions of Azvedo
v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 52 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1968) and
Azvedo v. Obel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968). He stated that the
Johns-Manville case was not the proper means to resolve such a dispute. Justice
Manuel believed two different issues were involved in the cited cases and the in-
stant case. The Johns-Manville case involved the question of an employer's tort
liability for intentional post-injury conduct resulting in the aggravation of the in-
jury originally compensable only under workmen's compensation. The cases cited
concern the exclusivity of remedy under section 3601 for an initial injury as a re-
sult of an intentional assault by the employer which is "fairly traceable" to a risk
of the employment. Justice Manuel did not wish the court to obscure the distinc-
tion between the intentional aggravation of a job related injury and the intentional
infliction of the original injury itself. 27 Cal. 3d at 479, 612 P.2d at 956-57, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 866-67 (Manuel, J., concurring and dissenting) (opinion withdrawn).
The court modified their opinion to expressly indicate that the Johns-Manville
decision did not resolve any conflict as to an employee's right to maintain an ac-
tion at law against his employer for a physical assault related to employment. In
view of the court's modification, Justice Manuel chose to withdraw his opinion and
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remedy found in sections 3601 and 4553.23
Actions have not been successful where employees intention-
ally were not informed of the dangers of handling material which
would result in injury if handled improperly.24 The same result
occurred when false representations were made as to the safety
of certain materials. 25 In addition, no action at law was allowed
where an employee was permitted to use dangerous equipment
without proper instruction.26
To allow an action at law in these cases would undermine the
workmen's compensation system. 27 Inquiries would not focus on
whether the injury occurred within the course of the employee's
employment, but instead would center on the state of mind of the
employer or representative prior to the accident. 28
If an injured employee can show his injury resulted from the
employer's misconduct while acting within a "dual capacity," re-
covery in an action at law may be possible. The dual capacity
doctrine was enunciated in Duprey v. Shane 29 The Duprey court
held that although workmen's compensation benefits were recov-
erable, the plaintiff could also maintain an action against the de-
fendant employer who caused the aggravation of injuries. The
defendant had entered into two relationships with the plaintiff,
one as an employer and one as a physician.3 0 The Duprey court
join the majority. 28 Cal. 3d 194a, 194b (1980) (Manuel, J., withdrawing concurring
and dissenting opinion).
23. A mere showing of intent to injure will be insufficient. It must be demon-
strated that the employer intended to inflict an injury that an employee would not
contemplate being within the risks of the employment. See note 7 supra.
24. Wright v. FMC Corp., 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1978) (conceal-
ment of inherent dangers in chemicals used in preparation of pesticides for the de-
liberate purpose of inducing plaintiff to accept employment is insufficient to
maintain an action at law).
25. Buttner v. American Bell Tel. Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439
(1940) (intentional misrepresentation of the dangers of carbon tetrachloride result-
ing in the plaintiff's injuries insufficient to maintain an action at law).
26. Law v. Dartt, 109 Cal. App. 2d 508, 240 P.2d 1013 (1952) (no action at law
may be maintained where injury to employer results from inadequate training and
supervision).
27. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
28. The California Supreme Court noted this in denying a showing of intent as
sufficient grounds to maintain an action at law. Id.
29. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). In Duprey, a nurse employed by a medical
partnership was injured in the course of her duties. She was treated by doctors
within the partnership and suffered enhancement of her injuries.
30. Essentially the "dual capacity" doctrine examines the liability of an em-
ployer when he acts toward his employee in a capacity outside the employee-em-
ployer relationship. The decisive test of dual capacity is whether the
could see no reason to immunize a doctor from suit merely be-
cause his patient happened to be his employee and had also con-
tracted her injury while working for him. As a result of Duprey, if
an injury can be shown to have been inflicted or aggravated by an
employer acting in a capacity other than that as an employer, an
action at law may be maintained.31
In Johns-Manville, the California Supreme Court was con-
cerned with additional compensation to those intentionally in-
jured by the employer without undermining the workmen's
compensation system. In order to do so, the court would seek to
bifurcate plaintiff's injury into its original occurrence and its ag-
gravation due to intentional concealment. 32
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court was interested in establishing a
distinction between a cause of disease due to the hazards of the
occupation and an injury resulting from aggravation of that dis-
ease. Perceptively, the court noted a trend toward allowing an ac-
tion at law for injuries suffered during employment if the
employer acts intentionally to injure the employee such that the
employer's deliberate misconduct results in an aggravation of the
initial work related injury.
The supreme court relied on the court of appeal decision of
Ramey v. General Petroleum Company33 as an example of this
trend. In Ramey an action for fraud was allowed against an em-
ployer who made misrepresentations concerning an employee's
right to medical care. The employer had conspired with another
individual to conceal the fact that the employee's injuries were
nonemployer-type activity creates a differing set of duties owed the employee by
the employer. Thus, in the Duprey case, a doctor-patient relationship arose when
the employer undertook to treat the injured employee to the exclusion of other
physicians. 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, § 72.80 (1976); see Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Insurer as Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE L. J. 1117.
31. This discussion of the change in obligation as a test for dual capacity was
most recently shown in D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d
238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980). In D'Angona a nurse employed by defendant's hos-
pital contracted an infection known as meningococcemia in the course of her em-
ployment. Defendants undertook to treat plaintiff but due to their negligence she
developed gangrene in the extremities resulting in the amputation of all plaintiff's
toes and fingers except for one. In the ensuing suit, the defendant contended
plaintiff's sole remedy was workmen's compensation. The court held that defend-
ant's negligence occurred in a role other than that of an employer such that the
workmen's compensation system was not applicable and a suit at law could be
maintained.
32. As will be shown, workmen's compensation is the exclusive remedy for the
first injury, but an action at law may be maintained for harm suffered by the sec-
ond injury. See notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
33. 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d 787 (1959).
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caused by a third employee against whom he had recourse. The
court of appeal held this misconduct was sufficiently outside the
work relationship such that an action at law could be maintained.
The supreme court felt General Petroleum's concealment to be
similar to the concealment of Johns-Manville. 34
The court also examined an extension of the "dual capacity"
doctrine in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange.35 In Unruh, it
was held an action at law may be maintained against the em-
ployer for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as a result of the employer's deceitful conduct in
investigating a compensation claim.36 Although the Unruh deci-
sion dealt with a suit against an insurer as the alter-ego of the
employer and Johns-Manville dealt with a suit directly against
the employer, the court believed the Unruh decision and rationale
were applicable to the present case.37
34. Although related to the first injury, the further injury was suffered due to
the employer's acts outside the general risks of employment.
35. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
36. The suit was brought against the employer's insurer who, while acting
within the compensation system, stood in the position of the employer and was
immune from suit. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3850 (West Supp. 1971). However, when the
insurer stepped outside its role by committing an intentional tort, it became a sep-
arate party and was no longer cloaked with the etnployer's immunity.
In Unruh, an investigator of the insurer, misrepresented his position and inten-
tions, and befriended the injured employee. He then enticed her to visit Disney-
land where he violently shook a rope bridge causing her further injury. His
actions were designed to expose the alleged falsehood of her injury, but instead
her injury was aggravated. When films covertly made of this incident demonstrat-
ing the employee's conduct were shown at a compensation hearing, the employee
suffered a nervous breakdown. The court held the insurer had acted fraudulently
in obtaining evidence in a capacity other than that as an insurer. Therefore, work-
men's compensation law would not cloak them with immunity from a suit at law.
7 Cal. 3d 16, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
The Unruh holding that an insurer may be sued as a person other than the em-
ployer was based upon an analogy to Duprey's "dual capacity" doctrine. Like Du-
prey, which concerned doctors who acted as both physicians and employers, the
insurer in Unruh was vested with that same dual personality by committing the
intentional tort such that an independent cause of action was created. See also
Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 103 Cal. App. 3d 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (employee
of a limited partnership may sue the general partner for injuries sustained due to
negligence where the partnership could essentially do business with itself); Doug-
las v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (followed
the dual capacity doctrine of Duprey v. Shane); Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d
655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972) (negligence of company physician in treating industrial
injury is not immunized from suit by workmen's compensation).
37. The dissent decided this distinction was fatal since Johns-Manville acted
at all times as the employer in providing physical examination and x-rays for em-
ployees. This view may fail to consider the risks truly contemplated by an em-
The court explored the original philosophy of the workmen's
compensation system38 and the benefits of an employee giving up
an award at law, against the certain and swift compensation
under the statutory scheme. The court noted that in Magliulo v.
Supreme Court,39 an employee was willing to surrender his right
to maintain an action at law for injuries sustained in the ordinary
pursuit of his duties. However, the court concluded that an em-
ployee would not likely be willing to forego a remedy at law for
any and all injuries the employer might inflict upon him.40
The Johns-Manville court then observed that while it is possible
that the plaintiff could have anticipated injury due to the con-
cealed hazards of the job, it is inconceiveable that he contem-
plated that his employer would intentionally conceal the
knowledge that he was seriously ill as a result of the hazardous
work environment.4 1 The intentional concealment 42 was suffi-
ciently separate from the initial contraction of the disease such
that Johns-Manville could not reasonably expect to be immunized
from suit because of the initial workmen's compensation award.
Further, the plaintiff could not be expected to surrender his right
to recovery for any and all physical harms incurred at the hands
of his employer outside the scope and course of his employ-
ment.43
ployee when he undertakes employment. See notes 40, 43 and 45 infra and
accompanying text.
38. See note 20 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
39. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). See note 22 supra.
40. Essentially the court sought to balance the benefits of the workmen's com-
pensation system with any interference with an injured employee's other legal
rights. It was inconceivable to the court that sufficient benefit would be derived by
extending the exclusivity of the remedy provision to intentional aggravation of dis-
ease to justify denying an injured employee's right to bring suit. 27 Cal. 3d at 477-
78, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
41. Workmen's compensation was viewed by the court as a vehicle for com-
pensating those injured due to the inherent risks of the job, not to create new
risks by encouraging employers to further injure employees believing their liabil-
ity to be limited by workmen's compensation. Id.
42. Negligent aggravation of disease may not be made a basis of an action at
law for recovery against an employer or its insurer. Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal. App.
2d 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1961) (negligence of employer's agent in referring em-
ployee to incompetent physician who was unqualified to treat industrial injury
was not actionable at law); Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d
976 (1959) (negligence of defendant insurance company in delaying approval of
plaintiff's operation to remedy industrial injury is subject to the exclusivity of a
workmen's compensation remedy).
43. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447
(1978). The Renteria decision provided a further exception to the sole remedy of
workmen's compensation.
Renteria allowed an action at law when the injury to plaintiff is nonphysical as a
result of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court reasoned this rem-
edy was appropriate since the labor code did not provide an alternative remedy for
nonphysical injuries.
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The court did not believe its decision would undermine the ef-
fectiveness of the workmen's compensation system4 4 since it re-
stricted its holding to cases of aggravation of disease in an
employment relationship where the existence of injury is inten-
tionally withheld.
The majority also had little trouble rectifying the construction
of sections 3601 and 4553 and the literal reading given them by the
dissent. The majority did not "believe that the Legislature in en-
acting the workmen's compensation law intended to insulate such
flagrant conduct from tort liability."45 The normal work related
injury had been contemplated, but not the intentionally inflicted
injuries outside the scope of the employee's duties. Therefore,
the exclusivity provision of section 3601 will not preclude an ac-
tion at law where intent to aggravate known injuries can be
demonstrated.
IV. CASE IMPACT
The majority opinion should be applied narrowly. The court ap-
parently wanted to confine their decision to situations where the
employer knows of the employee's existing disease, and inten-
tionally fails to warn the employee, which eventually results in an
aggravation of that disease.4 6 Indicating such an intent, the court
dismisses the possible multiplicity of lawsuits by noting that the
restriction of "plaintiff's damages to aggravation of the disease
44. Previously, courts have strictly construed § 3601 to prevent the breakdown
of the workmen's compensation system. See, e.g., Eckis v; Sea World Corp., 64
Cal. App. 3d 1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976) (secretary injured while attempting to ride
defendant-employer's killer whale at defendant's request is subject to workmen's
compensation as her sole remedy even though the activity was outside her normal
line of duties); Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 403 P.2d 400, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1965) (workmen's compensation remedy will not be extended to co-employees in-
volved in an accident in the employer's parking lot since the accident occurred "af-
ter work"). The court believed that the feared plethora of actions which may
cause the downfall of the entire workmen's compensation system would be
averted if actions were restricted to those for fraud in aggravating a present injury.
45. 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. This demonstrates
the majority's concern over the true purpose of workmen's compensation and that
the court is not interested in rendering a harsh decision to preserve the ease of
practical application of the system.
46. This situation is most likely to arise in a setting such as Johns-Manville,
where the employer not only assures the employee of a safe environment in which
to work, but also advises him that his health is normal after the employer has ad-
ministered an examination. In this manner the employee is fraudulently con-
vinced that he need not seek further medical aid.
caused by the alleged fraud of the defendant would substantially
limit the number of such actions. '4 7 The decision also notes that
the exclusivity of the remedy under workmen's compensation for
on the job injury "would not be seriously undermined by holding
defendant liable for the aggravation of this plaintiff's inju-
ries. .... ,48 This clearly indicates the decision may be limited to
factual settings substantially similar to those of the Johns-
Manville variety.
Johns-Manville does not appear to be a real expansion or modi-
fication of the "dual capacity" doctrine formulated in Duprey v.
Shane.4 9 At a minimum, its expansion does not exceed the
boundaries established in the Unruh decision.50 In contrasting
the Unruh rationale, the court is not establishing that the defend-
ant employer has become a different person by engaging in inten-
tionally harmful conduct, but that California labor law will not act
as a limiting shield when the employer intentionally inflicts a
nonwork-related injury upon one of its employees. This is espe-
cially noted in the later case of D'Angona v. County of Los Ange-
les,5X where the court discussed the "dual capacity" doctrine of
Duprey. D'Angona noted that workmen's compensation was the
exclusive remedy for initial injury or its negligent aggravation
due to inept medical treatment. An exception to this rule is al-
lowed if it can be established that the employer undertook a dif-
ferent relationship with the employee by attempting treatment. A
clear dual role with dual obligation was still required.52
If a distinct, separate role need not be shown under Johns-
Manville, just what must be shown in order to sustain an action
at law is a relevant question. First, it would seem that an initial
47. 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). See notes 29 and 30 supra and accompany-
ing text.
50. It could be argued that Johns-Manville "stepped out of its role" as an em-
ployer by acting improperly such that a suit could be maintained under the dual
capacity doctrine. However, the decision does not indicate that a new duty is
owed to the injured employee when the employer knows of his malady and non-
disclosure would result in further injury. Mere nondisclosure would be insuffi-
cient; it must be done deliberately with an intent to further harm the injured
employee. 27 Cal. 3d at 477-78, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
51. 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980). See note 31 supra.
52. The D'Angona opinion was also authored by Justice Mosk. Justice Mosk
did not indicate any substantial change in the dual capacity doctrine nor any fur-
ther encroachment upon the exclusivity of remedy as provided by § 3601. The
Johns-Manville decision was not even mentioned in D'Angona, further indicating
Justice Mosk's desire to separate the court's holding in Johns-Manville and the
dual capacity of Duprey. All members of the court concurred in D'Angona, includ-
ing Justice Clark, which indicated their approval of the status quo of "dual capac-
ity."
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job related injury must be established in conjunction with a sepa-
rate but corresponding second injury resulting from the em-
ployer's intentional conduct.53 Thus, it would be necessary to
establish that the second injury was not proximately caused by
the work environment, but by the wrongful and intentional con-
duct of the employer.
Next it must be shown that the employer had an opportunity to
warn or mitigate the employee's injury and intentionally failed to
do s0. 54 Scienter is satisfied by a showing that the employer knew
the employee was diseased, knew the disease was work related,
and knew that through concealment the disease would be aggra-
vated.55
Once those factors are established, exclusivity of remedy under
workmen's compensation is no longer a bar since the injury for
which the employee seeks to recover is no longer directly job re-
lated, as contemplated by the law, but is essentially outside the
scope and course of his employment.56 In this way punitive dam-
ages may be recovered which serves the policy of deterring the
intentional and wrongful conduct of employers.5 7 Moreover, the
workmen's compensation policy of quickly compensating injured
workers for injuries due to contemplated hazards will not over-
ride the general desire to protect unsuspecting workers from un-
scrupulous employers. 58
53. This is the idea of demonstrating the secondary nonemployment-related
injury. See notes 32 and 41 supra and accompanying text.
54. A mere negligent failure to warn will be insufficient. See note 42 supra
and accompanying text.
55. Therefore, the intentional infliction of injury does not relate to an employ-
ment-related injury, which would be compensated by § 4553 of the Labor Code, but
relates to the secondary or nonemployment injury thereby allowing tort liability.
27 Cal. 3d at 469-70, 478, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61, 866.
56. The majority opinion allowed for a set-off to prevent double recovery.
Therefore, any amount received by the plaintiff for aggravation of disease in the
workmen's compensation action will be set-off against any recovery received in an
action at law. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. See Unruh v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
57. As previously discussed, additional recovery under § 4553 is not termed pu-
nitive. See note 19 supra.
58. Justice Clark in his dissent felt the effective result of the Johns-Manville
decision would be to encourage employers to curtail special medical programs to-
ward their employees in order to escape tort liability. This conclusion may as-
sume that the requisite elements of the majority decision are easily demonstrated
and, therefore, it appears unfounded.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Johns-Manville recognizes that section 3601 and
4553 of the California Labor Code may inadequately compensate
injured workers in certain cases of intentional misconduct by
their employers. Although employees may be willing to give up
their right to sue in order to gain the expeditious remedies of the
workmen's compensation system, it is unlikely that they wish to
immunize their employer from whatever sort of harm the em-
ployer may intentionally inflict upon them. Therefore, the court
allows suits at law to be maintained where intentional aggrava-
tion of disease may be demonstrated. By restricting the decision
to the factual circumstances similar to those of this case and by
limiting recovery to the aggravation of disease due to an em-
ployer's concealment, the court does not undermine the effective-
ness and purpose of the workmen's compensation system. The
court summed up its decision by saying, "the legislature never in-
tended that an employer's fraud was a risk of employment."59
B. HIRING STANDARDS
1. Private Hospital Held To Public Hospital Standards:
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center
In Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,' the California
Supreme Court expressly held that a private hospital cannot re-
fuse staff membership under a standard susceptible to arbitrary
application.2 Under the standard used by Eisenhower Medical
Center, Doctor Miller was denied staff membership upon a deter-
mination by the medical executive committee that sufficient
doubt existed concerning Doctor Miller's ability to work with
others.3 The court had previously held in the case of public hospi-
tals that the standard for staff membership could not be so vague
59. 27 Cal. 3d at 476, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980). Donald Miller, a li-
censed physician appealed from an order of the superior court which denied his
petition for a writ of mandate whereby he sought to compel a private, nonprofit
hospital corporation to grant him staff membership and hospital privileges.
2. See, e.g., Willis v. Santa Ana, etc., Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568,
26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962); Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hosp. Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d
377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965).
3. Article III, Section 2 of the Medical Staff Bylaws provides in relevant part
that "[o]nly physicians and dentists licensed to practice in the State of California,
who can document their background, experience, training and demonstrated com-
petence, their adherence to the ethics of their profession, their good reputation,
and their ability to work with others, with sufficient adequacy to assure the Medi-
cal Staff and the Board of Trustees that any patient treated by them in the hospi-
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and uncertain so as to provide a substantial danger of arbitrary,
capricious or discriminitory application.4 The court recognized
that a bylaw which focuses on an applicant's ability to work with
others in a manner which is designed to insure high quality pa-
tient care is not on its face, improper.5 However, it further rea-
soned that in order to prevent arbitrary application of an
otherwise acceptable standard, the medical center must show
that the applicant's apparent inability to work with others
presents a substantial danger to the quality of patient care to be
provided. 6 In arriving at this decision, the court rejected the Med-
ical Center's argument that such an adverse effect could be pre-
sumed.7
The court's holding is significant for two reasons. First, it is im-
portant in that a private hospital is being held to a standard of
employment previously found only in the public sector.8 Sec-
ondly, it further protects the rights of prospective employees of
private hospitals from standards susceptible to arbitrary applica-
tion.9
tal will be given a high quality of medical care, shall be qualified for membership
on the medical staff" (emphasis added).
4. See generally, Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375
P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551, (1962). (a bylaw that spoke in terms of "apparent ability
to get along with others" was improper); Martino v. Concord Community Hosp.
Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255, (1965); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp.
Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 931 (1959).
5. The bylaw provision ... must be read to preclude the rejection of an
otherwise qualified physician from medical staff membership unless it can
be shown that he manifests an inability to 'work with others' in the hospi-
tal setting which, by reason of its particular character, presents a real and
substantial danger that patients treated by him might receive other than a
'high quality of medical care' if he were admitted to membership.
27 Cal. 3d at 631, 614 P.2d at 269, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
6. The court noted that although a doctor may be shown to manifest person-
ality characteristics which other members of the staff may find disagreeable this is
not enough to justify rejection under the bylaw provision. "To permit such appli-
cation of the bylaw ... would ... pose a substantial danger of application 'as a
subterfuge where considerations having no relevance to fitness are present.'" Id.
at 632, 614 P.2d at 269, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
7. "[W]e must insist that a hospital seeking to withhold staff membership
... on the ground we here consider must be prepared to come forward with evi-
dence . . . ." Id. at 632-33, 614 P.2d at 839, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
8. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526
P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974) (Leon J. Pinsker claimed that various orthodon-
tists' societies denied his application for membership without giving him an oppor-
tunity to present his position on a contention that he violated a society rule).
9. Note that in Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d
431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962), the California Supreme Court reversed a superior
court denial of a writ of mandamus to compel the admission of a physician to
VII. JUVENILE
A. PRIVILEGES
1. Attorney-Client: De Los Santos v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles'
The California Supreme Court held in the case of De Los Santos v. Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County that statements made by a minor plain-
tiff to his mother-guardian ad litem in the preparation of answers to
interrogatories or responses to requests for information from opposing
counsel came within the attorney-client privilege.
I. INTRODUCTION
A suit seeking damages for personal injuries arising out of a bi-
cycle accident was filed by a minor, Jesse De Los Santos, through
his mother, Mrs. De Los Santos, as guardian ad litem. Mrs. De
Los Santos also joined in the suit to recover her costs for past and
future medical care for Jesse. During trial preparation, the de-
fendant submitted interrogatories to the minor through his attor-
ney. Subsequently, statements were made to the mother by the
nine-year-old plaintiff in response to the interrogations either for
the purpose of answering the interrogatories or to assist in the
preparation of the case for trial. The defendants sought to dis-
cover the entire contents of any conversations between Jesse and
his mother while answering the initial interrogatories. Mrs. De
Los Santos resisted discovery of these conversations on the
ground that they sought to elicit information protected by the at-
torney-client privilege.2 The defendants successfully sought a
motion to compel answers to interrogatories regarding any state-
ments made by Jesse to his mother, except those made solely in
the attorney's presence. Jesse petitioned for a writ of mandate to
prohibit discovery of the information sought and for a protective
order, which was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of
California.
The high court held that the information sought to be discov-
ered was privileged under the statutory attorney-client privilege
because it was analogous to a confidential communication 3 be-
membership on the medical staff of a hospital contracted by a local hospital dis-
trict. The Miller case expands the protections of Rosner to prospective employees
of private hospitals.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 677, 613 P.2d 233, 166 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1980).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 950 (West 1966).
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West Supp. 1980). The section reads:
As used in this article, 'confidential communicaton between client and
lawyer' means information transmitted between a client and his lawyer in
the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far
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tween an attorney and his client.4 The minor had disclosed the
information to the mother-guardian ad litem in her capacity as
such. Mrs. De Los Santos, in her capacity as guardian ad litem to
Jesse, was entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege. 5 She
could assert it on Jesse's behalf by refusing to answer questions
of the defendants seeking privileged information.
Further, the California Supreme Court found that statements
made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of answering in-
terrogatories or in preparation of litigation do not lose their confi-
dential character simply because the answers to the
interrogatories themselves will later be communicated by the at-
torney to others. It is only the answers to the interrogatories that
are intended to be communicated, and often the lawyer must sort
through the information received from the client to adequately
answer interrogatories. To hold that such information loses its
confidential character would completely destroy the privilege
under circumstances which should entitle the attorney and his
client protection, i.e., preparing to litigate a claim.6
The court also held that the guardian ad litem of a minor, as an
officer of the court, was not required to be entirely disinterested
in the litigation. 7 In light of the California Legislature's determi-
nation that a minor requires a guardian ad litem in any litigation 8
as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other
than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the con-
sultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and
the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 1966). The section states:
As used in this article, 'client' means a person who, directly or through an
authorized representative, consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining
the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional
capacity, and includes an incompetent (a) who himself so consults the
lawyer or (b) whose guardian or conservator so consults the lawyer in be-
half of the incompetent.
5. CAL EVID. CODE § 954 (West Supp. 1980). This section defines the privilege
as permitting "the client, whether or not a party, . , . to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and
lawyer if the privilege is claimed by: (a) the holder of the privilege ... ."; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 953 (West 1966). This section defines "holder of the privilege" to
mean "(a) The client when he has no guardian or conservator. (b) A guardian or
conservator .. "
6. 27 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 613 P.2d 236, 166 Cal. Rptr. 175.
7. Id. at 685, 613 P.2d at 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
8. Id. at 684, 613 P.2d at 237, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
and the broad powers granted to such guardian, 9 disclosure of in-
formation by the minor to the guardian is protected under the
statute governing confidential communications between attorney
and client. This is irrespective of the minor's age.O
Finally, the court determined that the statements rendered to
an attorney by a client through an agent are privileged whether or
not the agent actually relays such statements to the attorney. It
is the client's intent in making the communication that controls
whether it is confidential, and hence, privileged.1 Here, Jesse's
right to claim the privilege was not waived as to conversations be-
tween himself and his mother. The court held that the defend-
ants had confused Jesse's answers to the initial interrogatories,
which were discoverable, with conversations between Jesse and
his mother upon which the answers were based; such conversa-
tions were not discoverable.12
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West Supp. 1980). This section reads in rele-
vant portion:
When a minor .... is a party, he must appear either by a guardian of the
estate or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court .... The guard-
ian... so appearing for any minor, . .. in any action or proceedings shall
have power, with the approval of the court in which such action or pro-
ceeding is pending, to compromise the same, to agree to the order or judg-
ment to be entered therein for or against his ward.
See Robinson v. Wilson, 44 Cal. App. 3d 92, 118 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1974) (the guardian
ad litem of a minor has the right to make stipulations or concessions binding on
the minor if not prejudicial to him); Cf. Berry v. Chaplin, 72 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169
P.2d 442 (1946) (a minor appearing by guardian ad litem is not bound by admis-
sions of the representative which sacrifice the minor's property and any conces-
sions by the guardian surrendering material rights of the minor, such as the right
to a trial, will be set aside unless shown to be beneficial to the minor's rights). See
also State v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 86 Cal. App. 3d 475, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 308 (1978) (minor's parents have preferential status in applying for appoint-
ment as guardian ad litem). See Cloud v. Market Street Ry. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 92,
168 P.2d 191 (1946) (guardian ad litem has power to control the procedural steps
incidental to conduction of the litigation).
10. 27 Cal. 3d at 684, 613 P.2d at 237, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The California
Supreme Court noted that the legislature does not differentiate the age of the mi-
nor.
11. Id. at 685, 613 P.2d at 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 177. The court stated that "de-
fendants cite no authority for the proposition that in order to retain confidential
status statements by a client to his lawyer through an agent or other authorized
intermediary must be rendered literally by the intermediary to the lawyer. The
privilege belongs to the client, and it is his intent to make a confidential communi-
cation to his lawyer that controls." Id.
12. Id. at 685-86, 613 P.2d at 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 177. The defendants argued
that statements made to an attorney that are designated to be communicated to
others by the attorney, in this instance referring to answers to the interrogatories
sustained as privileged information, are not privileged for the very reason they are
to be communicated to others. The court stated, "To hold that such an intent is
commensurate with a waiver of the privilege would completely destroy the privi-
lege whenever a client sought to litigate his case." Id. at 682-83, 613 P.2d at 236, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 175.
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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The attorney-client privilege attaches where legal advice of any
kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his or her ca-
pacity as such. Communications relating to that purpose made in
confidence by the client are, at the client's insistence, perma-
nently protected from disclosure, unless the privilege is waived. 13
While privileges in general tend to block introduction of relevant
evidence, the law protects certain communications to promote
what it considers to be a greater objective.
The principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to
promote freedom of consultation between legal advisors and cli-
ents, which is essential to adequate legal representation.14 The
privilege embraces any means of communication, 15 from whatever
origin,16 and whether or not transmitted to the attorney by the cli-
ent himself, or by an agent of either the client or attorney,17 or if
13. Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977). The attorney-client priv-
ilege applies where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal ad-
visor in his capacity as such. Communications made in confidence by a client are
permanently protected from disclosure, unless the protection is waived. See City
& County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
This case is in accord with the above given definition as to when the privilege ap-
plies. The case also stands for the proposition that the attorney-client privilege
covers all communications originating from or transmitted through agents. Often,
the attorney-client privilege covers situations that other professional privileges fail
to cover, such as the physician-patient privilege with its notorious patient-litigant
exception that nearly swallows the privilege when litigation is involved.
14. United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) (the major
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) (the purpose of the attorney-chent privilege is to en-
courage full and free disclosure of all relevant facts since this is essential to ade-
quate legal representation).
15. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 227, 231
P.2d 26, 30 (1951). While some other professional privileges only cover oral or writ-
ten communications, the attorney-client privilege embraces actions, signs, or other
means of communicating information between a client and his attorney.
16. In Re Navarro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 325, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1979). Under the Cal-
ifornia Evidence Code's provisions regarding the attorney-client privilege, any in-
formation transmitted between a client and his attorney is a protected
communication regardless of its origin. This case discharged a contempt order
which had been issued against an attorney who had refused to disclose whether or
not she had shown her client a certain police arrest report. The court upheld the
attorney's claim that her refusal to disclose the report was within the privilege.
17. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d
26 (1951). The court held that communications from a physician to an attorney,
where the attorney had employed the physician as his and the client's agent for
preparation for litigation, were covered by the attorney-client privilege.
the communications originate with the agent. 18
The California Evidence Code, in defining the attorney-client
privilege, states that where a minor or incompetent has a guard-
ian, such guardian can invoke the privilege on behalf of the minor
or incompetent. 19 The code also protects confidential communica-
tions made by a client to an attorney through an agent where the
third party is "reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information to the lawyer or for the accomplishment of the pur-
pose for which the lawyer was consulted."20 Thus, while the privi-
lege is not waived simply because transmitted to the attorney
through the client's agent,21 where there is no indication of
agency, the privilege is not applicable. 22 Similarly, the presence
of third persons when a communication is made has often been
held to destroy the privilege,23 although such is not the case
where a third person is present to further the interest of the cli-
ent.24 It is the client's intent that determines whether a commu-
nication is confidential but the surrounding circumstances can
18. Id.
19. See note 5 supra.
20. See note 3 supra.
21. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 722, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (1964). While the attorney-client privilege is not waived simply because
a communication is made through the client's or the attorney's agent, in this in-
stance it was, as the information passed through four persons before reaching the
attorney. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d
26 (1951). Attorney-client privilege was not lost where a document was transmit-
ted by a physician who was an agent of the client to the attorney who examined it
in preparation of litigation. Grosslight v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 72
Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977). The attorney-client privilege protects
information coming from a third party who is not a client only when that person is
acting as the client's agent. People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715
(1970) (the attorney-client privilege does not protect information coming to an at-
torney from a third person who is not a client unless such person is acting as the
client's agent).
22. People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1970). Defendant,
charged with attempted murder, sought to exclude testimony from representatives
of the public defender's office that they received a pair of shoes allegedly used in
the murder attempt which had been delivered by the defendant's wife. The court
found no error in refusing to exclude such testimony on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege, as there was no indication that the wife was acting as the defend-
ant's agent or under his direction.
23. Lindholm v. Galvin, 95 Cal. App. 3d 443, 157 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979). The attor-
ney-client privilege applies only to confidential communications between lawyer
and client, and where a third person is present, statements of the client to his at-
torney did not qualify as confidential communications privileged from disclosure.
24. See note 3 supra; Cooke v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 83 Cal.
App. 3d 582, 147 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978). The attorney-client privilege "extends to
communications which are intended to be confidential, if they are made to attor-
neys, family members, business associates, or agents of the party or his attorneys
on matters of joint concern, when disclosure of the communication is reasonably
necessary to further the interests of the litigant." Id. See also Comment, Attor-
ney-Client Privilege in California,10 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1958).
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rebut any purported intent of confidentiality where they indicate
the communication was not made in confidence. 25
While De Los Santos appears to have been the first case to have
reached the California Supreme Court concerning the issue of a
minor's communication to his attorney through a parent or guard-
ian ad litem, there has been at least one case before a lower court
on point26 and several others dealing with statutory privileges
analogous to the attorney-client privilege. 27 In the case of In re
Terry W.,28 the court, in referring to various statutory provisions
regarding the attorney-client privilege, stated that
[there are undoubtedly situations where a communication from child to
parent falls within the attorney-client or other professional privilege.
Where, for example, the communication to the parent is to further the
child's interest in communication with, or is necessary for transmission of
information to, a lawyer, [citation omitted] a physician, [citation omitted]
or a psychotherapist, [citation omitted] the communication is protected
by the pertinent statutory privilege.
2 9
It was this reasoning that the Court of Appeal for the Second
District relied upon in finding that the analogous psychotherapist-
patient privilege applied to communications between parents of a
minor and psychiatric hospital personnel even though there was
no showing that such communications were made to further the
child's interest in receiving psychiatric care.30 In Grosslight v. Su-
perior Court of Los Angeles County,31 similar communications
were held to be absolutely privileged since they were for the pur-
pose of facilitating diagnosis and treatment. The Grosslight court
found that the minor-patient's age was irrelevant to the privilege's
application, although, the child was sixteen and able to communi-
cate with the psychotherapist herself.
While the state courts seem to liberally construe professional
privileges when dealing with a minor and communications
25. See note 23 supra. Where communications are made in front of third per-
sons who have no interests in common with the client, a reasonable person would
not intend that these comments be confidential. Any confidentiality has necessar-
ily been destroyed by their publication.
26. In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976).
27. See Grosslight v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 72 Cal. App. 3d
502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977). See also CAL EID. CODE §§ 952, 992, 1011, 1012 (West
1966).
28. 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976).
29. Id. at 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
30. Grosslight v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502,
506, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (1977).
31. 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977).
through the minor's parents,32 the federal courts have expressly
committed themselves to a narrow construction of such privi-
leges. 3 3 It has often been held that since the attorney-client privi-
lege blocks full disclosure in litigation, it will be confined to
narrow limits. Other privileges, such as those afforded spouses,
have been similarly construed in the attempt to balance protected
relationships against the need to bring out all relevant evidence.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court found that the mother of Jesse
De Los Santos could assert the attorney-client privilege on his be-
half under either the statutory language which allows the guard-
ian of a minor to assert the privilege on behalf of the minor,34 or
as a third person who is reasonably necessary to facilitating com-
munication between an attorney and his client.35 While the two
rationales are interdependent in the court's reasoning, a clearer
distinction could have been made.
The first theory, based on the language of the California Evi-
dence Code, seems relatively simple to understand. Section 954
of the code states that the holder of the attorney-client privilege is
the client and "a guardian or conservator of the client when the
client has a guardian or conservator."36 Since a minor litigant is
required to be represented by a guardian,37 and since the guard-
ian holds the minor's privilege to prevent disclosure of confiden-
tial communications, the court properly found that Mrs. De Los
Santos, as Jesse's guardian ad litem, could assert the privilege
32. De Los Santos, 27 Cal. 3d 677, 613 P.2d 233, 166 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1980); Gross-
light v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr.
278 (1977) (See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text); In re Terry W., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976) (See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying
text.)
33. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The Court held that testimo-
nial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that
the public has a right to every person's evidence and, as such, they must be
strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good that outweighs
the traditionally predominant interest of utilizing all rational means for ascertain-
ing the truth. United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 952 (1976) (the attorney-client privilege has to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its underlying purpose); In re
Amplicillin Antitrust Investigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, because it blocks the rule requiring full disclosure in the effort to es-
tablish the truth, will be confined within narrow limits).
34. 27 Cal. 3d at 682, 613 P.2d at 236, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 175. See notes 4 and 5
supra.
35. Id. at 683, 613 P.2d at 237, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
36. See note 5 supra.
37. See note 9 supra.
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and refuse to answer questions asked of her by the defendants.3 8
Further, section 917 of the California Evidence Code gives rise
to a presumption that statements given in the course of an attor-
ney-client relationship are made in confidence and places the bur-
den on the opponent of the party claiming the privilege to negate
it. Since Jesse's statements to his mother were made in response
to questions asked at their attorney's request, the statements
were made in the course of an attorney-client relationship and the
presumption of section 917 of the California Evidence Code
arose.
3 9
The second rationale for the court's holding rests upon the in-
terpretation of section 952 of the California Evidence Code, which
defines confidential communications for purposes of applying the
privilege. 40 It states that a communication is still confidential in
character even though a third person is present during consulta-
tion if the third person is "present to further the interest of the
client in the consultation" 41 or disclosure to the third person is
"reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information to
the lawyer or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
lawyer is consulted . ..."42 The court found that Mrs. De Los
Santos, given her capacity as guardian ad litem, was such a third
person necessary for the communication between Jesse and his
attorney. The court went so far as to assert that "[tihe disclosure
to the guardian is unquestionably necessary for the transmission
of the information to the attorney or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which he is consulted and is therefore protected by
the statutory privilege."43
The court relied on the powers granted to a guardian ad litem in
conducting litigation on behalf of a minor client to find Mrs. De
Los Santos a necessary party to the communication.4 4 The Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure 45 reflects the legislative judgment
concerning the necessity of a guardian ad litem or other represen-
tative to appear in litigation on behalf of a minor. Such persons
are given broad powers to conduct the litigation, to settle, to con-
38. 27 Cal. 3d at 682, 613 P.2d at 236, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
39. Id. See also CAL. EvIn. CODE § 917 (West 1966).
40. See note 3 supra.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 27 Cal. 3d at 684, 613 P.2d at 237, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
44. Id.
45. See note 9 supra.
trol procedural matters, and to make stipulations.46
In consideration of these powers, the court found that Mrs. De
Los Santos was essential for transmission of the information con-
tained in Jesse's statements to the attorney for preparation of an-
swers to interrogatories. The holding that Jesse's
communications to his mother were privileged rested on the need
for her as a guardian to be apprised of all matters in the action. 47
An informed exercise of Mrs. De Los Santos' powers necessitated
her knowledge of such communications.
The court referred to the Grosslight case in reiterating the
premise that the age of the minor was not relevant to the guard-
ian's powers.48 The court further relied on Grosslight in stating
that there was no statutory requirement that a person acting as
an agent who transmits information to an attorney be disinter-
ested in the outcome of the litigation.49 The defendants alleged
that Mrs. De Los Santos may have withheld certain statements of
her son because they were adverse to her own interests in recov-
ering her son's medical expenses. 50 While there is no authority
that requires a client's agent to be disinterested, as the supreme
court asserts,51 the statute requiring representation of a minor by
a guardian has been interpreted to require that the guardian's in-
terests not be adverse to those of the minor.52 There has been no
case decided in California that a guardian's interests must coin-
cide with those of his charge. However, it seems consistent with
the adversarial process that a guardian have the same interests as
his charge.
IV. CASE IMPACT
The impact of the De Los Santos holding will be limited to
46. Id.
47. 27 Cal. 3d at 684, 613 P.2d at 237, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
48. Id. at 684-85, 613 P.2d at 237-38, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77 (the court also refers
to legislative judgment as reflected in the California Evidence Code § 952).
49. Id. at 685, 613 P.2d at 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West 1973) (see note 9 supra); Guardianship
of Walters, 37 Cal. 2d 239, 231 P.2d 473 (1951). The fact that there was an action
pending by an incompetent against the guardian of her estate personally did not
disqualify that guardian from acting in his capacity as guardian of the incompe-
tent's estate since the alleged incompetent's interests were protected by court ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem. Townsend v. Tallant, 33 Cal. 45, 91 Am. Dec. 617
(1867) (in an action against a minor, a guardian ad litem must be appointed where
the guardian has an adverse interest in the subject matter of the suit). In re
Corotto, 125 Cal. App. 2d 314, 270 P.2d 498 (1954). Appointment of a guardian ad
litem was necessitated where a testamentary trustee who was also a co-executor
was required to maintain a neutral position as between beneficiaries in the contro-
versy both in his position as co-executor and trustee.
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those cases where a client is represented by a guardian or conser-
vator. It would be a legal anamoly for the law to require that a
guardian represent a minor or incompetent person in litigation 53
and then compel that guardian to disclose statements made to
him or her in a representative capacity. The holding seems con-
sistent with the purpose of the attorney-client 54 privilege, which
seeks to promote full disclosure of all relevant matters while safe-
guarding the interest in the minor's ability to openly communi-
cate with his legal representative.
The court's finding that a guardian need not be disinterested in
the litigation of his charge seems to be a novel proposition. The
court examined past cases which stated similar holdings in rela-
tion to a client's agent,55 and extrapolated to the instant case
where the agent was also the guardian of the client. While there
does not appear to be any ethical problems in the situation where
the guardian ad litem and the minor have similar interests,
problems would present themselves if their interests were ad-
verse.56 However, judicial interpretation of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure requiring minors to appear in litigation by a guardian ad
litem has already limited the interest shared by the minor and
guardian to those that are compatible and not adverse. 57 Since
the guardian, essentially represents the minor, it seems just that
he share the minor's interests. Court-appointed guardians are re-
quired, for this very reason, to protect and represent the minor's
interests. It is no less required where the guardian is the natural
parent of the minor.
Finally, the fear expressed by Chief Justice Burger of the
United States Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States,58 that
expansion of privileges tends to block legitimate law enforcement
53. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West Supp. 1980). See note 9 supra.
54. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
55. 27 Cal. 3d at 685, 613 P.2d at 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 177. The court states,
"there is no requirement in the statute that the person who transmits the client's
remarks to the attorney must be wholly disinterested in the action." Id. While the
court is referring to § 952 of the Evidence Code, which deals with transmission of
information by persons necessary for communication, this section does not in any
place indicate that the third person is a minor's guardian ad litem. Similarly,
there is no case under the California Code of Civil Procedure's § 372 which refers
to the guardian as an agent with respect to privileges. The only code sections con-
necting the two subjects are California Evidence Code §§ 951 and 953.
56. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
efforts, will not come to pass if the De Los Santos holding is lim-
ited to the context of civil suits. The Grosslight5 9 case, which the
California Supreme Court relied upon in De Los Santos was also
a civil case.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the California Supreme Court held that communica-
tions from a minor to his guardian ad litem which are transmitted
to the minor's attorney are privileged communications. Even
those communications not, in fact, transmitted may be privileged,
depending on the intent of the person making the communication.
The fact that they are relayed via a guardian ad litem does not de-
stroy the confidential character of those communications. Since
the guardian is the holder of the attorney-client privilege, he is
the person permitted to assert it. Moreover, the guardian need
not be disinterested in the case, so long as the interests of the
guardian and the minor are not adverse.
VIII. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. HEARINGS
1. "Own Recognizance" Under California Code of
Civil Procedure § 526(a): Van Atta v. Scott
In Van Atta v. Scott,' the California Supreme Court established
who should bear the burden of proof and producing evidence in a
pretrial hearing on an "own recognizance" release under Califor-
nia Penal Code section 1318.2 In determining whether due proc-
59. See notes 27, 31-32 supra and accompanying text. Grosslight was a suit for
personal injuries against a minor and her parents.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980). This was a taxpayer
action filed pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 526(a) attacking "own
recognizance" release procedures in the city and county of San Francisco. The
trial court found the challenged procedure to be in violation of the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Furthermore, the court found that
the prosecution was not required to assume the burden of proving that bail is nec-
essary to assure the presence of the detainee in court, and the courts are not re-
quired to furnish a written statement of reasons for denial of own recognizance
release.
2. See In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976) (in
an OR proceeding the court must consider (1) the detainee's ties to the commu-
nity, (2) the detainee's record of appearance at past court proceedings, and (3) the
severity of the sentence the detainee faces); In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508
P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973) (the sole issue at an OR hearing is whether the
detainee will appear for subsequent court proceedings if released on his "own re-
cognizance").
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ess was being met with regard to present procedures, the court
balanced the detainee's liberty interest against the state's interest
of assuring that the detainee would be present at future court
proceedings. 3 The court held that the detainee's innocence
should be presumed 4 and that the burden of proof concerning the
detainee's likelihood of appearance at future court proceedings
should be borne by the prosecution. 5 The burden of producing
evidence on the detainee's record of appearance at prior hearings
and as to the severity of the sentence facing the detainee was also
placed on the prosecution. 6 However, since the detainee has
more knowledge and more incentive, and it is easier and less
costly for him than the prosecution, the court held the detainee
has the burden of producing evidence concerning his community
ties in the jurisdiction (i.e., job, income, family, property, etc.). 7
3. By depriving a detainee of his liberty interest, not only does the detainee
lose his freedom, but also his ability to prepare an adequate defense is greatly cur-
tailed, consultation with an attorney is severely impaired, loss of income and often
employment mean the detainee's ability to retain his own lawyer may be limited,
and by entering the courtroom in custody subtle prejudices may be created in the
judge and jury which might interfere with the detainee's right to a free trial. 27
Cal. 3d at 435-36, 613 P.2d at 215, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 154. In addition to assuring pres-
ence at future court proceedings the government also has "a substantial interest
in seeing that it achieves its objective of assuring the accused's presence at future
proceedings at a reasonable cost." Id. at 437, 613 P.2d at 216, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
See People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979) (the
extent of procedural due process available depends on the careful weighing of the
private and governmental interests); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375,
131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976) (personal liberty is a fundamental interest and entitled to
the same due process protection as other fundamental interests).
4. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). The legislature can not
presume someone to be guilty merely upon the finding of an indictment or proof of
the identity of the accused.
5. 27 Cal. 3d at 441-444, 613 P.2d at 219-20, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59. The court
found -three values in this. It would preserve the respect for the individual's lib-
erty and presumption of innocence. The respect and confidence of the community
in uniform application of the law would be maintained. Finally, certain inherent
biases in the OR decision making process would be corrected. See Comment, The
Bail System and Equal Protection, 2 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 71 (1969); Note, Pretrial
Release in California: Proposed Reforms of an Unfair System, 8 Pac. L.J. 841
(1977); Thaler, Punishing the Innocent. The Need for Due Process and the Presump-
tion of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 441.
6. 27 Cal. 3d at 439, 613 P.2d at 217, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The court concluded
that the severity of the potential sentence could be easily determined by looking
at the complaint and relevant penal code section. Likewise, obtaining the de-
tainee's past record would be relatively easy and inexpensive for the prosecution
to secure.
7. If this were not the case, the court felt either the OR hearings would have
to be delayed while the prosecution got the evidence, thereby causing longer de-
tention, or the hearing would have to go on. If the prosecution could not meet this
This decision liberalizes the "own recognizance" release proce-
dure considerably and brings California in line with other juris-
dictions. 8 The court also made it quite clear that the decision to
release a detainee on his "own recognizance" is still discretionary
with the judge and that such a release is not a right of the de-
tainee.9
B. PLEADING
1. Compensatory Damages in Excess of Prayer Amount
Under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 580:
Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Company
In Becker v. S.P.V Construction Company' the California
Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of section 580 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Section 580 provides that any
relief granted to a plaintiff in a case involving a default judgment
may not exceed the amount demanded in plaintiffs complaint.
Where a plaintiffs complaint seeks more than one type of money
damages, such as compensatory and punitive damages, the court
burden of proof then many ineligible detainees might be released. Id. at 438, 613
P.2d at 216-17, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56. The court went on to hold that the Constitu-
tion does not compel a trial judge to issue a written statement of reasons when-
ever OR release is denied. Id. at 444-46, 613 P.2d at 220-22, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61.
8. See Wood v. United States, 391 F. 2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (the Bail Reform
Act creates a strong policy in favor of release on personal recognizance). Oregon
and the District of Columbia also operate under systems with this same presump-
tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146; OR. REV. STAT., § 135.24(3). Cf. Bowman, The Illinois Ten
Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. Ill. L. F. 35. For an analysis of other de-
veloping systems, see Comment, Travels in Own Recognizance Release: From
Manhattan to California, 5 PAC. L.J. 675 (1974).
9. See In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976). A
trial judge's discretion can not be exercised arbitrarily. In the case of a convicted
felon waiting on appeal, a judge may consider the likelihood of defendant's flight,
potential danger to society, and lack of diligence in prosecuting his appeal.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 489, 612 P.2d 915, 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1980). Becker had been
awarded a default judgment against SPV Construction Company when SPV failed
to answer Becker's complaint alleging breach of contract, fraud and negligent rep-
resentation due to the faulty construction of Becker's home. The default judgment
was subsequently vacated and in an appeal by Becker, the California Supreme
Court held that Becker's claim for compensatory damages "in excess of $20,000"
was not adequate notice under section 580 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure to inform SPV Construction of its potential liability. 27 Cal. 3d at 494, 612
P.2d at 918, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
2. 27 Cal. 3d at 394, 612 P.2d at 918, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 828. "The primary pur-
pose of this section [5801 is to insure that defendants in cases which involve a de-
fault judgment have adequate notice .... Id. at 493, 612 P.2d at 917, 165 Cal. Rptr.
at 827.
See also Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal. 2d 274, 282, 303 P.2d 539, 544 (1956). Section
580 was made applicable to a property settlement agreement in a divorce proceed-
ing. The court was allowed to grant less than the amount sought in the complaint,
but not more.
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states that such damages are different remedies and therefore, a
demand for one is not a demand for the other.3 As a result, if a
trial court awards a recovery of one type of damages in excess of
the prayer for those specific damages, but the award is still lower
than the total amount of damages demanded, the trial court has
still exceeded its jurisdiction and violated section 580.4
IX. CORPORATE LAW
A. SECURITIES LAW
1. Sale of Stock in Privately Owned Business Under
Corporate Securities Law Section 25104: Fox v.
Ehrmantraut
Fox v. Ehrmantraut,' interpreted the 1968 amendment to sec-
tion 25104 of the corporate securities law and concluded that the
sale of all outstanding shares in a privately owned business with
the intention of relinquishing all control and rights to profits to
the purchaser was included in the qualification requirement ex-
emption of section 25104 even though the sale was accomplished
through an advertisement. 2 The case clarified the exemption 3 by
limiting those transactions excluded from it to those where a right
3. 27 Cal. 3d at 494-95, 612 P.2d at 918, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 828; see also Gudarov v.
Hadjieff, 38 Cal. 2d 412, 417, 240 P.2d 621, 623 (1952) ("The two [compensatory and
punitive damages[ differ in nature and purpose. One is given as compensation;
the other purely as punishment .... ); Note, Default Judgments in Excess of
Prayer, 4 STAN. L. REV. 278 (1952).
4. 27 Cal. 3d at 494-95, 612 P.2d at 918, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 828. "If no specific
amount of damages is demanded, the prayer cannot insure adequate notice of the
demands made upon defendant." Id. See Ludlea v. Memory Magnetics Int'l, 25
Cal. App. 3d 316, 323, 101 Cal. Rptr. 615, 619 (1972) (an award of $17,500 was held to
be void because the plaintiff failed to demand a specific dollar amount in his com-
plaint).
1. 28 Cal. 3d 127, 615 P.2d 1383, 167 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1980).
2. Section 25130 of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 provides: "It is un-
lawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state in any nonissuer
transaction unless it is qualified for such sale... or unless such security or trans-
action is exempted under chapter 1 (commencing with § 25100) of this part." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25130 (West 1977). The exemption interpreted by the court to in-
clude the Fox transaction reads in pertinent part: "(a) Any offer or sale of a se-
curity by the bona fide owner thereof for his own account if the sale (1) is not
accompanied by the publication of any advertisement and (2) is not effected by or
through a broker-dealer in a public offering [is exempted from § 251301." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25140 (West 1977).
3. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25104 (West 1977) note 2 supra.
to share in the profits or proceeds of a business conducted by
others is obtained by the sale.4
Fox also interpreted the Franchise Investment Law section
31102 exemption 5 from the registration requirement of section
311106 by holding that the franchise exemption is lost only if a
franchisor obtains all or a substantial part of the purchase price.7
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4. The court found that the purpose of the 1968 amendment to the § 25104 ex-
emption provision was "to eliminate any qualification requirement with respect to
what are essentially private transactions by a person in his own property and to
require such qualification only where a public market is created in outstanding
securities." Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal. 3d 127, 138, 615 P.2d 1383, 1388, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 595, 600 (1980) (quoting 1 MARSH & VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
SECURITIES LAws 10-18.7 (rev. ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
The court distinguished between transactions which "constitute agreements
with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services or other active
participation in a business venture," as presented in this case, from transactions
which contemplate "the conduct of a business enterprise by others than the pur-
chasers, in the profits or proceeds of which the purchasers are to share." Id. at
139, 615 P.2d at 1388, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (quoting People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765,
768-69, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951)).
See also Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943); People v.
Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939); Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4
Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882
(1949); Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106 P.2d 846 (1945);
People v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370, 36 P.2d 40 (1934).
5. The section 31102 exemption reads as follows:
The offer or sale of a franchise by a franchisee for his own account or the
offer or sale of the entire area franchise owned by a subfranchisor for his
own account, is exempted from [the registration requirement of § 311101 if
the sale is not effected by or through a franchisor. A sale is not effected
by or through a franchisor merely because a franchisor has a right to ap-
prove or disapprove a different franchisee.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 31102 (West 1977).
6. Section 31110 provides:
"[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person to offer or sell any franchise in this
state unless the offer of the franchise has been registered under this part
or exempted. .. "
CAL. CORP. CODE § 31110 (West 1977).
7. In coming to this conclusion, the court held that a sale is not "effected by
or through a franchisor" merely because the franchisor furnished information to
the prospective franchisee or referred prospective purchases to the franchisee.
The court reasoned that any potential franchisee would be expected to seek infor-
mation from the franchisor and therefore, the exemption would be "meaningless if
franchisor responses to such inquiries served to deprive franchises of the exemp-
tion." 28 Cal. 3d at 142, 615 P.2d at 1390, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
